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ABSTRACT 
The stateness matrix permits comparison and explanation of differing outcomes to 
democratic civil-military transition in post-Communist countries. The stateness matrix 
comprises four variables: stateness, military restructuring, democratic rules and 
effective democratic management of defence. Post-communist civil-military relations 
are a function of the outcome of the interaction of these four factors. Stateness is the 
crucial element. Stateness can explain the differing outcomes of the post-communist 
reforms in post-communist states and, depending on circumstances, it can have either a 
beneficial or a harmful impact on the overall democratisation process. In the four 
countries studied, Poland, the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Ukraine, application of 
the framework allows the investigation and comparison of democratisation processes. 
Stateness emerges as the key factor in explaining the differences between these cases. 
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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. 
I first heard the terms 'consolidated democracy' and 'civil-military relations' while 
being one of the students invited from various post-communist countries to the International 
Summer School of Political Sciences, organised in 1994 in Poland under the auspices of the 
Batory Foundation. It was during lectures held in the School's makeshift premises, or during 
informal discussions afterwards, that professors like Kenneth Jowitt, Peter Sugar, Jim Carrey 
and others introduced their students to perspectives on political science that were dramatically 
different from those on offer at Warsaw University. The course on 'Transitions to democracy' 
was of special interest to all of us, having such a direct relevance to the situation in post- 
communist Europe at that time, although I daresay that in that particular case the lecturers 
profited just as much as did their pupils. Still under impressions from the course, when I 
became an assistant in the Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences in 
Warsaw, I had no objections when my tutor suggested that I focused on the problems of 
democratic transitions and civil-military relations in post-communist countries. 
However, my work would have been limited, if only for the lack of appropriate 
literature in Poland, if it had not been for the WEU fellowship which allowed me to come to 
London for three months between September and December 1995 to conduct research on 
selected aspects of civil-military relations at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
Chatham House. It was also through Chatham House that I was put in touch with Fiona Paton 
who was then co-ordinating a project on *Regional Security in the Global Context' at King's 
College, London and who invited me to participate in it while I was in London. Importantly, 
Fiona also introduced me to Dr James Gow, a lecturer at King's and my future supervisor. 
Thanks to friendly support and practical help from both Fiona and James I drafted a project 
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outline and submitted it together with an application for admission as a PhD student at the 
Dept of War Studies, King's College, London. The subject of my outline was the post- 
communist transformation of civil-military relations in Central Eastern Europe. My 
application was successful and in October 1996 1 became a student at King' s. 
Coming from a post-communist country, I had an instinctive understanding of the 
communist legacy in Central Eastern Europe and only this much for a beginning. My thinking 
on post-communist civil-military relations did not take proper shape until two particular 
books appeared, each of them pivotal for my thesis. In September 1997 James Gow and Carol 
Birch published Security and Democracy: Civil - Military Relations in Central and Eastern 
Europe. and soon after their work appeared, I read the book by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, 
Problems o Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America and ýf 
Post-Communist Europe. And while the publication by Gow and Birch offered a useful 
framework to discipline my analysis of post-communist civil-military relations, the concept of 
ýstateness' proposed by Linz and Stepan struck me as a missing element in the study that 
could bring all the other analytical pieces together. From then on, the 'stateness' matrix began 
to take shape until the dissertation was finished in February 2001. 
I owe my gratitude to a number of people without whom this study could never be 
completed. Fiona Paton deserves special thanks for navigating me through the complexities of 
the university system of applications, grants, reference letters etc., all of them rather 
unfamiliar to me back in 1995, as well as for her friendliness and practical support at various 
stages of my studies. I am grateful too for help given to me by Susan Walker at Chatham 
House who provided me "ith moral support and also temporary accommodation during the 
first year of my studies. I am also indebted to Professor Laurence Freedman for supporting 
my grant applications. In addition, my thanks are extended to Professors Jack Spence and 
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Wojciech Roszkowski; Dr Hans Bohr; Colonel Marian Kowalewski; Dr Monika Wohlfeld; 
ýtefan Sarv8; Paul Holtom; and Marina Caparini for their help in carrying out research, 
helping me to organise interviews and for useful comments on the results of the study as well 
as to David Whetham for his infinite patience with copy-editing. 
This work would not be possible without a generous scholarship from the University 
of London and an award granted within the Overseas Research Student Award Scheme by the 
CVCP of the Universities of the United Kingdom, and without the research grant from the 
John D. and Catherine T. Mac Arthur Foundation, all of whom I would like to thank. 
However, my greatest ever debt of gratitude is owed to my supervisor, Dr James Gow, 
from whose profound knowledge of the field and understanding of the problems of security 
and democracy I benefited at each stage of my work on the thesis. His invaluable help ranged 
from his severe critique and insightful comments on the earlier drafts of my work, through 
infinite patience and understanding shown to the somewhat unusual circumstances of my 
studies, to occasional driving me, my baby, his nanny and few tons of the luggage to the 
airport. Thank you, James. 
Finally, words of gratitude go to all my family for their moral support and practical 
help and for coping with me throughout these years. And I would like to dedicate this work to 
Kuba, my little son, who is just as old as this dissertation is and whose arrival gave those 
tumultuous years a taste of bittersweet happiness. 




On 4 March 1999, three former communist countries became members of 
NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, a body whose raison d'etre had been 
preparation for collective defence against the prospect of attack by Soviet-led 
countries. Those three countries, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, had 
emerged from the Soviet bloc and communist rule at the end of Cold War. In all, in 
the period between 1989 and 1992, these three formed part of a total of 23 states that 
had escaped the communist shadow. ' The remarkable historical turnaround in which 
three countries that had been enemies of NATO only a decade before became its 
members prompts an obvious immediate question: why these three and not any of 
the others? 
The NATO decision at its Madrid Summit in July 1997 to invite Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech Republic to open accession negotiations with the Alliance 
offered an answer to the question. The three were judged to have made the most 
satisfactory and comprehensive transitions from civil-military relations under 
communism to appropriate arrangements under democracy. This was made explicit 
by the official reasoning, which also made mention of two other countries by name, 
Slovenia and Romania, and indicated that there was still progress to be made in 
these two countries. Even though Slovenia was strong in its democratic credentials, 
restructuring of its armed forces was officially noted as the reason for its exclusion 
' This total includes The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which some n-dght argue remained largely 
under communist rule until late 2000 and does not include the transformation of the German 
Democratic Republic, which ceased to be communist-ruled, but also ceased to exist as it was included 
in the Federal Republic of Germaný. 
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from the invitation list. 2 In reality, there were other reasons for the NATO decision, 
but these are not necessarily of concern here. This is because, however much there 
might be arguments that the degree of transformation was used as a pretext for the 
decision, 3 it was also clear that those differences existed. This is the true concern of 
the present study: to understand how countries ostensibly starting a process of civil- 
military transformation from the same point took strongly divergent trajectories over 
a period of ten years. The remainder of this introductory chapter will explore the 
three assumptions on which this enquiry rests. Later sections will consider the 
treatment in the literature of the differential rates of civil-military transition in the 
former communist countries and the common attempt to consolidate democracy. 
Before this, the first section will outline the common legacy of communism that 
provides the starting point for both the study and the practice of transforming civil- 
military relations. 
Communist Legacy of the Civil-Military Relations. 
The character of every transition is in a large part detennined by the legacy 
of the past and the declared ultimate goals of the transformation. The need to 
confront and overcome the legacy of an outgoing regime has been a common feature 
of all modem transitions. 4 In the case of post-communist countries, the heritage of 
the party-states constituted 'a set of both legal -institutional structures as well as 
psychological and/or behavioural variables which emerged as a result of more than 
four decades of communist rule" and shaped the post-communist transitional 
2 See James Go\, \, and Cathie Carmichael Slovenia and the Slovenes: A Small State in thcNe'w Europe 
(London: Hurst and Co., 2000) Ch.. 6. 
These are noted by Gow & Carmichael, Slovenia pp. 109-20 1. 
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agenda. 5 Therefore, any substantial analysis of the post-communist civil - military 
transformations can only be carried out based on the thorough understanding of the 
communist systems and with declared goals of democratic transition in mind. 
A close part-military connection was a defining feature of the civil-military 
relations in communist systems. However, the exact nature of the relationship 
remained ambivalent. On one hand, the communist armed forces were the main 
supporters of the communist rulers and defenders of the ideological order. 
Moreover, the army represented a powerful instrument of coercion, indispensable 
for a regime with an inherent legitimacy problem. 6 In order to enhance the political 
reliability of the military, the regime offered the professional soldiers a complex 
system of incentives, such as material benefits, prestige, rapid promotion for the 
loyal members of the officer corps and educational opportunities. Last, but not least, 
the service in the communist military, both for the conscripts and professionals, had 
an additional function of political socialisation to the values desired by the regime. 7 
The unbroken record of military subordination to the communist regimes and their 
non-intervention by force in politics, stressed in many Western works on the 
communist military, could be regarded as a partial proof of success of this 
socialising policy. 8 
4 Andrzej Korbofiski. 'Facing the Legacy of Post-Stalinist Regimes', European Security Vol. 1, No 3, 
1992, p. 4 1. 
5 Korbofiski, 'Facing', p. 42. 
' Thomas S. Szayna, F. Stephen Larrabee, East European Militarý, Rqform After the Cold War. 
Implications fior the United States. (Santa Monica: National Defence Research Institute, RAND, 
1995), p. 6. 
7 Dale R. Herspring, Ivan Volgyes, 'The Military as an Agent of Political Socialisation in Eastern 
Europe', 
.4 rnied 
Forces andSocietY, Vol. 3, No. 2, February 1977, pp. 249 - 268. 
For example Jacque van Doorn, The Soldier and Social Change. Comparative Studies in the History, 
andSociologý, of the Military. (London: Sage Publications, 1975), chapter 4; Amos Perlmutter, 'Civil 
- Military Relations in Socialist Authoritarian and Praetorian States: Prospects and Retrospects', in 
10 
On the other hand, the attitudes of the communist rulers towards the military 
featured distrust and fear of its coercive capabilities. The communist rulers were 
conscious of the limited success that their political socialisation brought and realised 
that the national undercurrent was always present in the communist military. The 
resulting tension between 'red' and 'expert' was inherent in the Warsaw Pact armed 
forces and undermined the political reliability of the army. 9 The problem was 
aggravated after Stalin's death when most of the communist militaries underwent a 
process of partial re- national isation. 10 A strong attachment to national tradition was 
most visible in the case of the Polish military, '' however, other Eastern European 
members of the Warsaw Pact featured similar sentiments. Alexiev dryly summed up 
the dilemma facing communist rulers: 
It is quite significant ... that the 
Soviet Union has never been able to use 
the East European military establishments to resolve conflicts, crises, or 
anti-Soviet upheavals in their respective countries... The traditional 
organic relationship between the army and the nation-state, succinctly 
summed up in von Moltke's aphorism 'keine Grenzen, keine Militar' 
(no borders, no military) persists in Communism states. It remains 
Roman Kolkowicz, Andrzej Korbonski (eds. ), Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats. Civil - Military 
Relations in Communist and ModernLing, ýocieties. ( London: George Allen&Unwin, 1982), p. 31 1. 
9 Carl Beck, Karen Eide Rawling, 'The Military As a Channel of Entry into Positions of Political 
Leadership In Communist Party States'. Arnied Forces & Socie4,, Vol. 3, No. 2, February 1977, p. 20 1. 
"' Zoltan D. Barany. Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945 -90. The Case qj"Hungary. (New 
York: St. Martin Press, 1993), pp. 167 - 169, see also Alex Alexiev, 'Party - Military Relations in 
Eastern Europe: the Case of Romania', in Kolkowicz, Karbonski (eds. ), Soldiers, Peasants and 
Bureaucrais, pp. 199-230. 
'' Andrzej Korbonski. Sarah M. Terry. 'The Military as a Political Actor in Poland' in Kolkowicz, 
Korbonski (eds. ). Soldiers. Peasants, ond Bureaucrats, p. 176. 
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vitally relevant for understanding the nature of political - military 
interaction in Eastern Europe. 12 
In an effort to ensure political reliability and firm control over the military, 
the communist parties encouraged the party membership of the officers 13 and 
established the Main Political Administration operating within the military. 
Everywhere in the Soviet type regimes the MPA represented a direct and formal link 
between the army and the party and were major organs of party control over the 
military. 14 Also, the MPA played an essential role in the politicisation of the 
professional military in the Warsaw Pact armies. Its structure and activities led to the 
emergence of the one dimensional model of civil - military relations, where the 
military were subjugated to the civilian but non-democratic control. The degree of 
control varied between the countries, 15 however in all the communist states the 
experience left an unfavourable legacy of military resentment against civilian 
control, commonly equated with political intrusion in military professional affairs. ' 6 
12 Alex Alexiev, 'Party - Military Relations', in Kolkowicz, Karbonski (eds. ), Soldiers, Peasants and 
Bureaucrats, p. 201. 
13 Szayna, Larrabee, East, p. 6-7. On average, the rate of membership of the officer corps was 65%, 2ý 
but it was 100% in the top echelons. Herspring, Volgyes, 'The Military', p. 262. In the Soviet military 
under Gorbachev, the data was respectively 78% and 100%. Robert V. Barylski, 'The Soviet Military 
before and after the August Coup: Departization and Decentralization', Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 
19, No. 1, Fall 1992, p. 28. 
14 James Gow, Carole Birch, Securiq, and Democracy: Civil - Alilitat-Y Relations in Central and 
Eastern Europe. No 40, (London, the Centre for Defence Studies: Brassey's, September 1997), pp. 3 
-5. 
'5 Anton Bebler, 'The Evolution of Civil - Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe', NATO 
Rei, iew, August 1994, pp. 28 - 29. 
" Teresa RakoA,, ska - Harmstone, presentation during the conference, Civil - Mililary Relations in 
Central and Eastern Earope, workshop held in Luxembourg on 21 - 22 April 1995. Transcript of 
Proceedings, (Luxernbourg Institute for European and International Studies, 1995), p. 8. Andrew 
A. Michta, The Soldier-CitLen. - the Politics ofthe Polish Army 4fier Communism (Houndsmills, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1997), p. 4, 
12 
The existence of direct and formal party - army connection and the 
uniformity of the model of civil - military relations throughout the Warsaw Pact 
constitute distinctive properties of the communist legacy in the field. However. there 
was no agreement among the Western analysts as to the exact nature of the complex 
relationship that developed as a result of interaction between the political agents and 
the professional military. The three best-known Western models were devised by 
Kolkowicz, 17 Odom'8 and Colton'9 and presented mutually exclusive concepts of 
communist civil - military relations. 
20 Kolkowicz's model portrayed the party - 
military relationship as inherently conflictual. In his view the correlation between 
the political control and military skills was inverse. Odom saw the party-army 
relationship as the case of institutional congruence, in which the military were the 
main beneficiaries of the Soviet system. Finally, Colton's participatory model 
perceived the connection between the armed forces and the MPA as a mutually 
beneficial relationship, although not free from occasional disagreements. 
As Barany observed, none of the models offered a convincing explanation 
for a relatively low military profile in communist politics or for the acquiescence of 
17 Roman Kolkowicz, 'Interest Groups in Soviet Politics: The Case of the Military' in Date R. 
Herspring, Ivan VoIgyes (eds. ), Civil - Military Relations in Communist Systems (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1978), pp. 5- 27. 
William E. Odom, 'The Party - Military Connection: A Critique', in Herspring, VoIgyes, Civil - 
Military, pp. 28 - 29. 
IQ Timothy J. Colton. -The Party - Military Connection: A Participatory Model', in Herspring, 
VoIgyes, Civil - Mililaty, p. 53. Colton further developed his participatory model in the book 
Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority: The Structure (# Soviet Military Politics 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979). 
See also Michael J. Deane, The Main Political Administration as a Factor in Communist Party 
Control over the Military in the Soviet Union', Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 3, No. 2, February 
1977, pp. 295 -319. 
1, -, 
Ii 
21 the Soviet military in the course of dismantling the Soviet empire. Such an 
explanation, though unconvincing, was offered by Adelman's categorisation of the 
patterns in communist civil - military relations. He classified the relations by 
degrees of military political influence, which according to him was dependent on the 
origin of the communist regime. Eastern Europe was classified as a region of 
minimal political influence. '12 Adelman's model however had only limited 
theoretical application as the regime assessment by the origin was 'entirely 
situational and nonreplicable'. 23 Finally, a different view of Soviet political - 
military relations was proposed by Condoleezza Rice who devised a model of 'loose 
coupling'. 24 In this theory, the appropriate Soviet political bodies held a civilian 
monopoly in decision-making, while the military were the sole experts in security 
and defence issues, enjoyed considerable autonomy in the conduct of their affairs 
and had significant influence on the size of military budget. The theory of loose 
coupling might explain the stability of the Soviet political - military relations and the 
continuous military subordination to the party authority, 25 although the model suited 
only the hegemonic army of the Soviet Union. 
The history tested both ideological tenets and efficiency of party control over 
the military. The systemic politicisation of the communist military was undeniable 
and remained one of the most important aspects of the regime's legacy. However, 
2, Barany. Soldiers and Politics, pp. 15 -16 and 169 -17 1. 
22 Jonathan R. Adelman (ed. ), Communist Armies in Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982). 
2- Beck, Rawling, 'The Military', p. 202. 
'4 Condoleezza Rice. 'The Party, the Military and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union', World 
Politics, 40,1, (October 1987), 1 based my description here on the article of Brian A. Davenport, 
'Civil - Military Relations in the Post - Soviet State: "Loose Coupling" Uncoupled? ', Armed Forces 
Society, Vol. 2 1, No. 2, Winter 1995, pp. 175 - 194. 
25 Yang Zhong, -The Transformation of the Soviet Military and the August Coup", Armed Forces & 
Society, Vol. 19. No. 1. Fail 1992. pp. 48 - 50. 
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the politicisation did not result in the desired reliability of the military or their 
complete integration with the system. 26 Moreover, the complex system of incentives 
and disincentives for the armed forces seemed to be failing over time. The military 
were by and large ideologically apathetic and did not identify themselves 
sufficiently with the supranational interests of the Warsaw Pact to deserve trust in 
crisis situations. 27 Most importantly, the communist military record of non- 
intervention was not as impeccable as it had seemed. The few documented attempts 
of staging coups took place, for example, in Bulgaria in 1965, Czechoslovakia in 
1969, and Romania in 1984 and 1987.28 More importantly, however, the system of 
political socialisation in the Soviet style armed forces predisposed the military 
towards involvement in politics rather than inhibited it. As noted in the Western 
models of Soviet party-military connection discussed above, the institutional i sed 
link to the party organisation worked both ways and could become a military 
channel of exerting pressures on the political authorities. This natural closeness of 
the army to the party, combined with the unclear lines of party leadership succession 
and lack of institutional i sed rules for conflict resolution created an environment 
conducive to military engagement in politics and to it perfon-ning the role of arbiter. 
Thus, the challenge of restructuring the post-communist civil - military relations did 
not lie in making the military return to the barracks, but in preventing them from 
formal or informal involvement in current politics. 29 
Beyond military politicisation, the communist civil-military relations 
featured a number of structural properties that differentiated it from liberal 
26 Ivan Volgyes, The Political Reliahilio, (? f the Warsaw Pact Arinies: The Southern Tier, (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1982): Szayna, Larrabee, East European-', pp. 7-8. 
27 Barany, Soldiers and Politics, p. 165. 
29 Barany, Soldiers and Polilics, p. 152. 
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democracies and had to be overcome in the course of democratic transitions. 30 
Within the framework of the Warsaw Pact, the armies were effectively subordinated 
to the external command of the Soviet headquarters while the national chains of 
hierarchy were subdued and often bypassed. The coroltary of the Warsaw Pact 
structure was underdevelopment of the national capabilities in strategic defence 
planning, which later resulted in problems with drafting post-communist defence 
doctrines. 31 Those problems were intensified by another distinctive property of the 
communist legacy, that is the system of appointment of politically reliable people, or 
nomenklatura, to all leading positions in the state administration. 32 After the fall of 
communism, the former regime functionaries were the only available cadres with 
administrative knowledge and experience in the post-communist countries. 
The specific structures of the relations between the military, the executive 
and the party formed an institutional framework very different from liberal 
democracies. Consequently, policy-making in the communist institutional context 
differed as well. As William Odom sarcastically observed, 
No Western political leader could bring a mere dozen of his close 
associates into a closed room, deliberate with them based only on 
materials prepared by the staff of his military department and reviewed 
only by his own political staff, and then push through his preferred 
policy. 
33 
29 Szayna, Larrabee, East European, p. 5. 
to Eastern European Security in the '0 See Stephan Blank, Thomas Durell Young, 
1990s', European Securitv. Vol. 3, No. 3, Autumn 1992. 
Gow, Birch, Security and Democracy, p. 5. 
32 George Schopflin. Politics in Eastern Europe 1945 1992 (Oxford UK&Cambridge USA: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1993), pp. 139 & 200. 
William E. Odorn, The Collapse ofthe Soviet Military. (New Haven & London: Yale University 
Press, 1998), p. 37. 
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Yet, the institutional framework of communist civil - military relations 
allowed for elaboration of the defence and security policy in the closed and narrow 
circle of decision - makers and their advisors, without an outside institutional or 
public supervision. A number of systemic features enabled such a situation. First, 
the Soviet style systems lacked a clear distinction between the party and the state. A 
formal division of prerogatives and responsibilities was merely symbolic, primarily 
because the party structures doubled and merged with executive institutions and 
party members were present in all state organs, secondly because the constitutionally 
sanctioned 'leading role' of the communist parties guaranteed the supremacy of 
party decisions in all the fields. Thus, the 'power of the purse', a key instrument of 
control over the military, also rested with the party leadership, effectively restraining 
the influence of other state institutions over the army. 34 
The management of the communist military was carried out through the 
structures of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff. Those two institutions 
stood at the top of the military structure, and the scope of the nominative 
prerogatives of the Minister of Defence was extensive. However, in reality the 
General Staff were the more important part of the management structure, because it 
held operational command and control, as well as being in charge of strategic and 
operational planning. 1ý Additionally, the organisation and workings of the Warsaw 
Pact further diminished the importance of national MoDs in favour of the 
supranational, Soviet dominated structures. Another important difference was that, 
while in democratic systems MOD typically performs a mediating function between 
34 Odom, Collapse. pp. 16 - 23. 
35 Odom, Collapse, pp. 23 - 27. 
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the executive and the armed forces, in the communist regime such a function, if 
36 
anything, was performed by the MPA . 
The final aspect of the communist legacy was an obsessive secrecy in 
everything that concerned the military, defence and security issues. This particular 
characteristic had a serious impact on the development of civil - military relations in 
communist systems, and particularly on the underdevelopment of control. It gave the 
representatives of the military and the party a monopoly of information, prevented 
parliamentary scrutiny even over budget issues and, in the conditions of communist 
non-autonomous institutions, blocked the emergence of even the smallest ersatz of 
security community. 
Democratic Consolidation in Post-Communist Countries 
The notion of democratic civilian control of the military is predicated on the 
existence of a functioning, that is, consolidated democracy. The democratic order of 
the state is a necessary requirement for establishing democratic civilian control. By 
the same token, civilian control is a necessary though not sufficient precondition for 
democratic consolidation. 37 The attempt to consolidate democracy was shared by the 
ex-communist countries where the downfall of communist regimes was, without 
exception, in the name of democracy. 38 The present section, therefore, is devoted to 
3" Gow, Birch, Security, and Democracy, p. 4. 
Richard H. Kohn, 'How Democracies Control the Military, Journal (? f Democracy, Vol. 8, No. 4, 
October 1997, p. 144ý Adam Przeworski. 'The Games of Transition', in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo 
O'Donnell, J. Samuel Valenzuela, Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American 
Democracies in Comparative Perspective. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1992)ý pp. 131 - 136. 
Robert D. Grey, 'Introduction: How to Understand the Probable Political Future of the Formerly 
Communist States', in: Robert D. Grey (ed. ), Democratic Theorj, and Post-Communist Change, 
(Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prenice Hall 1997), p. 15. 
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the problems of democratic consolidation in post-communist countries, analysed 
against the background of the communist legacy of political and social systems in 
Central Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet countries. In this section, I will introduce 
a definition of consolidated democracy and apply it to the evaluation of the progress 
of democratic transition and consolidation processes in the post-communist states. In 
this process, I will re-examine certain assumptions regarding the goals of post- 
communist transitions and mechanisms of legitimating them. I will also discuss the 
distinctive features of the post-communist democratisation processes, pointing to the 
weakness of existing models for transition and their inapplicability to the post- 
communist processes of democratisation. Finally, in this section, the links between 
the process of democratisation and reforrn of the military and their interdependence 
within the framework of democratic civil-military relations will be addressed. 
A definition of the consolidated democracy adopted in this study is 
minimalist and procedural . 
39 In the most concise formulation it could be described 
40 
as a stage in which a democratic system would become 'the only game in town' . 
This approach, shared by most authors, 41 is linked to basic democratic institutions 
and procedures: free and competitive elections, universal suffrage rights for adults, 
freedom of organisation and expression, particularly expression of contest, access to 
'9 Based mainly on J. Samuel Valenzuela, 'Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: 
Notion, Process, and Facilitatin- Conditions', in Mainwarino ,,,, 
O'Donnell, Valenzuela. Issues in 
Democratic, pp. 58 - 61. Also in Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan, Problems qj'Democratic 1ransition and 
Consolidation. Soulhern Europe, South America and Post-Communiv Europe (Baltimore & London: 
1996), pp. 5 - 6. 
4(' Linz, Stepan, Problems qf'Democraiic, p. 5. 
41 Przeworski, 'Games', p. 105. 
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alternative sources of information, finally institutions and mechanisms for the 
42 democratic accountability of the government . 
The minimalist approach to the process of democratic consolidation put the 
onus on the process of institutionalisation of politics and therefore was liable to 
criticism for overemphasising the significance of electoral procedures, 43 for 
neglecting the normative values underpinning the functioning democratic systems as 
well as for excluding the problems of the quality of the governance. 44 Such criticism 
contains a double fallacy. First, an unrestricted extension of the definition beyond 
the institutional and procedural features of the consolidated democracy to include 
normative values and qualities might lead to picturing the democracy as an ideal 
type political system; in consequence, such system would be neither fully 
achievable, nor liable for comparisons due to a number of intangible values and 
indefinite standards included in such a broad definition. Moreover, that ideal 
democracy would be linked to the concept of a system that is so stable and immune 
42 See also Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds. ), Democratic Changes and Authoritarian 
Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
pp. I- 58; Guillen-no O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions ftom Authoritarian Rule. 
Tentative Conclusions Ahout Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1993), pp. 3- 11; Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave. Democratization in the 
Late Twentieth Centurýy (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), pp. 5- 13; 
Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, 'Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation. 
Parliamentarian ism versus Presidential ism', World Politics No 46, October 1993, pp. I- 22. 
43 This phenomena was called an 'electoralist fallacy' by Linz and Stepan and concerned the situation 
where the establishment of working procedures for free and competitive elections was regarded as a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the consolidation of democracy. Linz, Stepan Problems of 
Democralic, p. 4. also in Huntington, The Thircl Wave, p. 9. Zý 
44 For a value-oriented approach to democratic consolidation, see Kristen Hill Meher, 'The Role of 
Mass Values, in Grey, Democratic TheorY, pp. 79 - 10 1. 
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45 
to social unrest or urban riots that it is virtually unbreakable . In reality. . protests 
and political conflicts are the normal feature of functioning democracies and 
research carried out in the post-communist countries demonstrated that a 'heightened Z7, 
level of contentious collective action' does not necessarily present a threat to 
consolidation as long as the actors respect democratic rules for it. 46 As will be 
discussed later in this part, such an idealistic understanding of democracy had a 
negative impact on the post-communist transitions in Central Eastern Europe. 
Secondly, the focus on institutional and procedural characteristics does not eliminate 
the problem of operating values of democracy from the analysis of consolidation 
processes. 'Institutions' of democracy are understood as the procedures for conflict 
resolution which enable the political actors to resolve their differences and 
compromise on the diverging interests that are inherent to the pluralistic society. The 
institutions play a mediating role in democratic systems, offering a framework for 
peaceful policy formulation and for holding the decision makers accountable to their 
electorate. 47 However, for such a framework to operate effectively, democratic 
procedures must become routinised by the strong majority of the population and 
approved by all political actors as the only acceptable way for state governance and 
conflict resolution. 
Thus, a consolidated democracy rests on two major pillars: one is the 
framework of constitutional, legal and procedural nonns which govern the collective 
45 J. Samuel Valenzuela, 'Democratic Consolidation in Post-Communist Settings: Notion, Process, and 
Facilitating Conditions'. in Mainwaring, O'Donnell, Valenzuela. Issues. p. 59. 
46 Grzegorz Ekiert, Jan Kubik, 'Contentious Politics in New Democracies: East Germany, Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovakia, 1989 - 93% fforld Politics 50 (July 1998), p. 58 1. 
47 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993). pp. 7- 12. 
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life 48 and the second is the public trust in the durability of the system and the 
attitudinal acceptance of the population for democracy 'as the only game in town'. 49 
The mere introduction of electoral procedures for free and competitive elections 
could be conducive to the installation of democratic government, however, this is 
insufficient to make a democratic system operative. In the absence of the attitudinal 
acceptance for institutions of democracy, the constitutional and legal theory and the 
political practice invariably differ and the growing discrepancies distort the political 
system. 50 Such a phenomena was observed in many authoritarian systems of Latin 
America that possessed certain democratic institutions, yet their mode of operation 
was hardly democratic due to the authoritarian political practice. 5 
The necessity of attitudinal acceptance of the democratic institutions and 
procedures invited two key concepts of representative democracy, that is legitimacy 
and citizenship. For the purpose of this work, legitimacy can be defined as 'the 
capacity of a social and political system to develop and maintain a general belief that 
the existing social order and its main solutions are generally appropriate'. 52 If the 
strong majority of actors involved in the political process approves of democratic 
procedures as the only legitimate means for conflict resolution, then the democratic 
48 William R. Reisinger, 'Choices Facing the Builders of a Liberal Democracy', in Grey, Democratic 
Theory, pp. 24 - 44, O'Donell, Schmitter, Transitions, p. 65. 
49 Arend Lijphard, Carlos H. Waisman (eds. ), Institutio"al Design in New Democracies (Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview, 1996), p. 2. 
50 Amos Perlmutter, The Militaty and Politics in Modern Times: on Prqfessio"als, Praetorians, and 
Revolittionarli, Soldiers. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 230. 
ýj R. A. Humpreys. 'Latin America - the Caudillo Tradition'. in Michael Howard, Soldiers and 
Governmews: Nine Studies in Civil - Military Relations, (London: Eyre & Spotiswood, 1957), p. 15 1. 
i2 Jacques van Doorn, 'The Military and the Crisis of Legitimacy, in Gwyn Herries - Jenkins, 





system can perform effectively and may be consolidated . Legitimacy problems 
were always the Achilles heel of the communist regimes, particularly in Central 
Eastern Europe and it was precisely the final loss of popular legitimacy that was 
crucial for the rapid collapse of the regimes throughout the region. 54 
The second concept crucial for the functioning of democracy is citizenship. 55 
The concept defines the relationship between the state and the population; the 
granting of citizenship to an individual gives the person the right to participate in 
collective life as well as to pursue individual activities. However, citizenship does 
not only comprise of rights, but also determines the responsibilities of the individual 
to the state. 56 Historically, the universal citizenship developed together with mass 
conscription in the Western nation-states, which paved the way to equality of duties 
and rights of the citizens. 57 Today, the notion of citizenship has a normative quality 
of a knowledgeable and willing participation of the citizen in the maintenance of the 
democratic political practices. Seen in such categories, citizenship is the mainstay of 
the consolidated democracy and a necessary foundation for a civil society. 58 
In general, a successful transition from a non-democratic regime to a 
consolidated democracy would required a reformulation of the citizenship concept, 
an intensive legislative effort to create a new constitutional and legal framework, an 
institutionalisation of the policy making process, a redistribution of executive power 
See Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 207 
-208. 
54 Sch6pflin, Politics, p. 228. 
ý5 Morris Janowitz, 'Military Institutions and Citizenship in western Societies', Armed Forces & 
Society,, Vol. 2, No. 2,1976, p. 191ý Reisinger, *Choices Facing'. p. 42. 
56 Sch6pflin, Politics, pp. 281 - 284. 
57 Janowitz, 'Military Institutions', pp. 185 - 203. 
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and an introduction of the mechanisms for democratic accountability of the policy 
makers, finally an enforcement of the rule of law. However, the process of 
democratic consolidation in the post-communist countries had some additional 
distinctive features that resulted from the specific heritage of the communist regimes 
and the conditions of post-communism. 59 
One of the most characteristic features of the communist party-states was a 
deliberate lack of distinction between the public and private spheres of life. This 
was a direct result of the totalising nature of the communist regimes, in which the 
political sphere was above all the remaining spheres of life. The absolute supremacy 
of ideology and the priority of political goals were the fundamental tenets of the 
communist ideology and effectively eliminated the autonomy of all other fields of 
collective life. The party was the organisation that was supreme to all government 
structures and non-government organisations, that ran the policy of the state and 
controlled the state institutions. 'The party enveloped the state and sought to draw all 
activity into itself. 60 Consequently, one of the most important tasks to be undertaken 
in the course of democratisation was to remove the party structures from the state 
institutions and to separate the public sphere from the private. 61 
The successful disconnection of the party from the state required a thorough 
restructuring of the state construction and a decisive redirection of the decision- 
58 Jerome B. King, 'The Problematic of Citizenship in Liberal Democracy: an Essay on Politics and 
Faith', in Fred Eidlin (ed. ), Constitutional Democracy: Essays in Comparative Politics. (Boulder, 
Co.: Westview Press, 1983). p. 107. 
ýq For a 14-point characteristic of the post-communism see Leslie Holmes, Po. 5t- Comm un ism. - An 
Inlroduction. (London: Polity Press. 1997). pp. 14 - 15. 
60 Sch6pflin, Pofltics, p. 98. 
bI Jowitt araued that this communist legacy in fact directly favours authoritarian outcomes of 
transitions. See Kenneth Jowitt, New World Disorder: the Leninist Extinction. (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1992). pp. 121 - 158 and 293. 
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making channels to enhance the power of the state and its government. This issue 
was directly linked to the problem of communist heritage in the sphere of 
institutions. 62 The years of the communist regime damaged the institutions and 
deprived them of real autonomy and social trust. The institutions were dependent on 
the regime and their representative function was a sham. Rather than mediating 
between the individuals and the authorities, they were used to channel the decisions 
from the top down and to control and take charge of any spontaneous social 
movement that might have appeared in the communist state. 63 As the example of the 
Solidarity movement demonstrated, any autonomous social movement was a lethal 
threat to the regime because it immediately exposed its lack of legitimacy, the 
weakness of its foundations of power and its detachment from the social base. 
The circumstances of the post-communist states were additionally 
complicated by the lack of pre-totalitarian legacy that might improve the situation: 
none of the pre-communist institutions survived the communist rule in an original, 
authentically representative form. As a result, the post-communist entities were 
exceptionally ill-prepared for the institutional isation of political processes. And, 
since the supremacy of the party extended over the legal sphere in the communist 
regimes as well, this legacy of a lack of respect for the law of the state that had been 
perceived as alien and oppressive inevitably complicated the introduction of the rule 
of law in the post-communist states that would be compatible with democratic 
standards. Additionally, the deeply embedded distrust of the institutions and the lack 
On importance of the pre-democratic institutional heritage see O'Donnell, Schmitter, Tentative 
Conclusions, pp. 21 - 23. 
6' Sch6pflin. Politics, pp, 274 - 275. 
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of experience with autonomous social activities negatively affected the process of 
emergence of the civil society. 64 
While the readiness of the individuals to participate in the political, social 
and economic processes ongoing in the state is the fabric the civil society is made 
from, the very idea of an autonomous activity of the individuals in the state is 
predicated on the notion of universal citizenship. In the conditions of the totalising 
regimes that excluded any autonomous activity or participation in political and 
economic processes by definition, the definition of citizenship was not vitally 
important. However, the emergence of the new states and the reform of the post- 
communist legal systems prompted the redefinition of the citizenship laws in many 
countries, not always in a way compatible with democratic standards . 
65 The 
citizenship controversy was one of the distinctive features of the post-communist 
democratisation processes. This was closely related to the granting of individual and 
collective rights and freedoms, a freedom of expressing individual or collective 
dissent in particular, which also redefined the concept of citizenship in the post- 
communist countries. For example in the constitutions of the Czech Republic, the 
catalogue of citizen rights constitute the major part of the basic law. t: l 
In each of the post-communist countries, the introduction of a democratic 
political system was the declared goal of transition and the legitimating factor for 
the post-communist incumbents. However, those declarations should be treated with 
64 George Schbpflin. ýCulture and Identity in Post-Communist Europe', in Stephan White, Judy Batt, 
Paul G. Lewis (eds. ). Developments in Eastern European Politics (London: The Macmillan Press, 
1993), pp. 16 - 34. 
65 Li nz, Stepan, Problems, pp. 414 - 419. 
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caution. The speed and the snowballing effect 66 that had occurred in the process of 
collapse of the communist regimes throughout Central Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union did not allow for an elaboration of the comprehensive lists of 
postulates. But, while everyvbere the goal of dernocratisation was acknowledged, in 
Czechoslovakia the discussion on the formula of the state prevailed over other 
political reforn-ts in the first three years, in Lithuania the desire to establish a strong 
nation-state was a dominant feature of the post-communist transition, and in Ukraine 
a number of interest groups presented differing agendas for launching the transition, 
however the first administration of the independent state prioritised nation- and 
state-building processes over other reforms. Only in Poland did the concept of 
democracy appear to be a well defined goal of the transition from its onset. 
However, the actual content of that concept had little to do with real, 
functioning representative democracy. Under communist rule, the dissidents had 
defined 'democracy' as a moral and ethical concept and put it in opposition to the 
totalising communist regime. Such an idealised notion of the democratic system 
survived the break down of the communist regime and in a non-revised version 
became the goal of the transitions. A similar process was taking place in other post- 
communist countries. Once the basic democratic institutions and procedures were 
put in place, the workings of the democratic system inevitably disappointed the 
citizens of the post-communist countries as being very remote form the ideal type of 
democracy that had been pictured by the former opposition. 
One of the problems with transitions from non-democratic regimes to 
democratic rule is that non-democratic regimes typically build a strict order for the 
66 on 'snowballing' or *demonstratioii effect' in democratisation of the communist countries in 
Central Eastern Europe see Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave. Delliocratisalion ill the Late 
Tiventieth Centuty (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), pp. 100- 106. 
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state, while democracy introduces an institutionalised uncertainty of political results 
through the process of bargaining. 67 This uncertainly is not well tolerated by a 
population at large that had been habituated to authoritarian order. It produces a 
longing for the rule of the 'strong man' and consequently may be disruptive for the 
consolidation of democratic systems. This process was observed in many post- 
communist countries, and showed particularly in the popular consent for the 
personalisation of politics. Therefore, the quick and effective institutionalisation of 
the post-communist polities was a high priority for all post-communist reformers. 
Failure to institutionalise politics could result in what Huntington called the rise of 
ýpraetorian society', characterised by: 
absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, 
refining, and moderating group political action. In a praetorian system 
social forces confront each other nakedly; no political institutions, no 
corps of professional political leaders are recognised or accepted as the 
legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict ... In an 
institutional ised polity most political actors agree on the procedures to 
be used for the resolution of political disputes ... In a praetorian society, 
however, each group employs means which reflect its peculiar nature 
and capabilities. The wealthy bribe, mobs demonstrate; and the military 
coup. In the absence of accepted procedures, all these forms of direct 
action are found on the political scene. 68 
67 William R. Reisinger, 'Establishing and Strengthening Dernocracy', in Grey, Democratic Theory.., 
pp. 52 - 73. 
68 Samuel B. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1968), p. 196. 
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The overview of the requirements for consolidating the democratic system of 
the post-communist states revealed the interdependence of the two previously 
mentioned streams of the civil-military transformation: the reform of the state and 
the reform of the military and the convergence of the goals. Both required changes 
in the legal and constitutional order, both call for the redistribution of executive 
power, both need the institutionalisation of the policy-making processes to make 
their outcome predictable. Moreover, both the civilians and the military involved in 
processes of democratisation are in need of the attitudinal acceptance of democratic 
. rules of the game. Research showed that 'officers who behaviourally submit to 
democracy without attitudinally supporting the regime might pose a not insignificant 
d e-con soli dating threat to the regime until they adopt a more democratic attitude'. 69 
Internalisation of democratic values is a necessary condition for a consolidation of 
democracy to occur. The fact that the post-communist transition was from civilian, 
and not military rule, was one of the features conducive to the prospective 
democratisation. The military in Latin American, Spanish or Portuguese transitions 
had a number of instruments which limited the extent of democratisation. Such 
means of power preservation as tutelary powers, creation of 'reserved domains' of 
authority, and a direct threat of removing legal government from office by coup 
d'etat70 were frequently employed in the countries where the military had rules prior 
69 Neovi Karakatsanis, 'Do Attitudes Matter? ',, 4rmed Forces & Socielj,,, Vol. 24, No. 2, Winter 1997, 
p. 289. The sarne distinction between behavioural or functional as opposed to attitudinal integration 
with the system was applicable to communist regimes. See Teresa Rakowska- Harm stone, Christopher 
D. Jones, Jahn Jaworski, Ivan Sý Ivain and Zoltan Baranv, Ularsaw Pact: Ouestion of Cohesion Phase 
11, Vol. 1. The GI-eatet-, ýociali. 5t, 4t, tit, t,. - Integration and Reliabilioý (Ottawa: Dept. of Defense, Canada, 
1984)ý pp. iv - v. 
70 Valenzuela, 'Conso)idation in.. '. pp. 62 - 69. Also David C. Rapoport, 'The Praetorian Army: 
Insecurity, Venaiity, and Impotence', in Roman Kolkowicz, Andrzej Korbonski (eds. ), Soldiers, 
29 
to the initiation of democratic reforms. None of these instruments was readily 
available to the post-communist military and therefore the challenge of civil-military 
transformations lay in fitting the military in the proper place in the state institutions 
rather that preventing the threat of a coup. 
Transforming Civil-Military Relations 
The transformation of communist civil-military relations was a prerequisite 
for successful democratisation in the post-communist political systems. The task of 
introducing democratic civilian control of the military gained an additional weight 
after NATO had included its implementation as a necessary precondition for 
membership. However, the complexity and speed of the post-communist transition 
did not allow for an evolutionary emergence of indigenous models in the countries 
the way the democratic civil-military relations had developed in the West. Instead, 
Western specialists, who essentially prepared a list of minimal requirements for 
democratic civilian control to be operational, offered a ready-made policy model - 
and such academic discussion as there was focused around this template, rather than 
seeking to investigate and analyse. The major failing of most of this work, as will be 
seen below, was that it began from a Western ideal, rather from the reality of post- 
communist transition. The purpose of this final section is to address that work, with 
a view to identifying and building on limited work by others that has correctly taken 
the break from communism as the starting point for analysis, rather than a non- 
existent ideo-typical template of democratic civil-military relations. The point of 
departure for this is an understanding of civil-military relations in which the 'civil' 
is as important as the military, or even more so. 
Peasants and Bureaucrats. Civil - Militaijý Relations in Communist and Alloderniiing Societies 
0 
The basic civil-military problematique can be defined as the 'challenge ... to 
reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to with a 
military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorise them to do ... just as 
the military must protect the polity from enemies, so must it conduct its own affairs 
so as not to destroy the society it is intended to protect'. 71 In the light of the above 
formula, any transformation of civil-military relations essentially would represent a 
process of redrawing the balance between the civilians and the military and so 
would always be a daunting task for the reformers. 
Regardless of the particular type of transition, the civil-military 
transformation is always a double-streamed process. One stream concerns the 
military and the process of redefining its place in the state, ascribed functions and 
the mechanisms of control by the civilian authorities. The other stream relates to the 
general transformation of the state, namely the reform of the political system, 
institutions and the administration. Despite much overlap and interaction between 
the two processes, each of them is individually conditioned by the particular legacy 
of the past and the declared goals of the transformation. These two conditioning 
factors set the framework for and impose limits on the reforms in their military or 
political dimensions. 
The legacy of the communist regimes and the agenda of political reforms set 
the general framework for democratic transitions in the post-communist countries 
and the democratisation of civil-military relations constituted an inherent part of 
those transitions. Without democratisation of the entire political system, it would be 
London: George Allen&Unwin. 1982), p. 254. 
71 Peter D. Feaver, 'The Civil - Military Problematique: Huntin---ton, Janowitz and the Question of 
Civilian Control', Vol. 23, No. 2 Armed Forces & Society, Winter 1996, pp. 149 & 152. See also 
impossible to democratise a selected fragment of the polity, namely civil-military 
relations. At the same time, democratic reforms of this sector may serve as a catalyst 
for the rest of the political system transformation. Either way, the civil-military 
transition and the democratisation of the political system of the state are inseparable 
and interdependent processes. 
The present study focuses on the post-communist civil-military transformation in 
the wider context of democratic transition and consolidation processes, in which an 
establishment of the reasonably effective democratic civilian control of the military 
is regarded as one of the prerequisites for a consolidated democracy. Inclusion of 
democratic civilian control of the military to the preliminary criteria set by NATO 
for the possible admission of the post-communist candidates 72 to the alliance further 
increased the weight of the relevant reforms and consequently, the state of civil- 
military relations 'became a yardstick of political reform' in the post-communist 
countries. 
73 
There are three fundamental assumptions that condition an investigation of civil- 
military relations in a period of transition from communism to democracy. These 
need clearly to be identified if there is to be a proper understanding of the issue, 
however, this understanding is absent, explicitly or implicitly in most of the relevant 
literature. First, since 'democracy is a form of governance of a modern state', 74 there 
is no chance of democracy being possible without a functioning state. 75 Secondly, 
Christopher Dandek-er, 'Nationa) Security and Democracy: the United Kingdom Experience', Armed 
Forces S, Society, Vol. 20, No. 3, Spring 1994, pp. 353 - 374. 
72 Study on, \'A TO Enlatýqement. (Brussels: NATO. 1995). 
7- 
-' Ben Lombardi, *An Overview of Civil - Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe', The 
Journal ot'Slavic Afilitar. v Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, March 1999, p. 13. 
ý4 
' Linz, Stepan, Problems(? fDemocralic Trunsilion, p. 17. 
7-ý Reisinger, 'Establishing and Strengthening', p. 59. 
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dernocratisation of the civil-military relationship is a necessary though not sufficient 
condition for the consolidation of democracy in any state; failure to transform the 
relations in a manner compatible with modem democratic systems will inevitably 
impede the general consolidation processes and put democracy in jeopardy, or at 
best deteriorate its quality. Thirdly, as already noted, the post-communist countries 
that had been part of the 'inner and outer Soviet empire' 76 shared a common legacy 
of communist civil-military relations and declared similar goals of democratic 
transformation in the field. 
Based on the above assumptions, four factors are of decisive importance for 
understanding the civil-military transformations in the post-communist countries: 
the state, the processes of its democratisation, the communist legacy and the 
declared goals of transition. These factors have shaped the interface between the 
government, the military and society and have ultimately conditioned the outcome 
of the reforms. However, the common legacy of the past and the similar goals of the 
transition created the initial conditions for democratic civil-military transformation, 
which were, by and large, the same, at least in terms of experience, throughout the 
post-communist countries. In addition to this, similar transition goals produced 
similar reform agendas, and therefore the civil-military reforms undertaken in 
individual post-communist countries have been concurrent. 
This begs the question identified at the beginning of this chapter: why, 
despite the shared legacy and the converging goals and measures of transformation, 
have the outcomes of post-communist civil-military reforms varied to such a 
degree'? This is not a question addressed at all in the existing literature - the most 27, 
appropriate treatment to date, bN7 Gow and Birch. (appropriate because it took the 
Mette Skak, From Empire to AnarchY. Post-communist Foreign Policy and International Relations 
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communist legacy as its starting point), is in the end no more that an elementary 
pathology, providing a basis for comparison, but failing to offer reasons for the 
77 differences identified 
. 
This failure was evident in work by academics and practitioners alike, 
whether the forum was publications, gatherings of various kinds, or formal and 
official critiques, each of which is considered in the following paragraphs. First, in 
terms of publications, the subject of civil-military transformations in Central Eastern 
Europe was predominantly linked with the process of NATO enlargement and so the 
progress of reforms was surveyed case by case against the membership requirements 
professed by the Western community of policy-makers, 78 Along with the judgement 
of the reforms in individual countries, the works offered strong policy 
recommendation for the future. 79 Secondly, a similar picture emerged from reports 
(and so forth) on seminars, meeting, NATO workshops and courses. 80 However, the 
(London: Hurst & Company, 1996), p. 4. 
77 The fact of varied outcomes to transition over a ten-year period is not a problem because of variety 
per se - this is and should be expected. Civil-military relations vary in form and character among the 
democratic states. Indeed, the process of 'teaching' the representatives of the post-communist states 
the properties of democratic model was at the same time a process of elaborating such a minimal 
model of democratic civil-mifilary relations in the West. The thing that brought the varied outcomes 
into question was that the differences concerned quality and completeness, rather than form. 
" The best known publication on the Central Eastern European civil-military relations were: Jeffrey 
Simon, Central European Civil - Militatýv Relations and NA TO Expansion, McNair Paper, No 3 39, 
(Washington D. C. Institute for National Strategic Studies: 1996); Ernest Gilman and Detlief Herold 
(eds. ), Democratic and Civil Control Over Militarýv Forces: Case Studies and Perspectives (Roma: 
NATO Defence College Monograph Series, No 3,1995); Anton Bebler (ed. ), Civil - Militaly 
Relations in Post-Communist States., (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995). 
'9 A more general overview of the post-communist situation and imperative reforms, see Anton 
Bebler, 'The Evolution of Civil - Militarý Relations in Central and Eastern Europe', NATO Review, 
August 1994; Christopher Donnelly, 'Developing a National Strategy for the Transformation of the 
Defence Establishment in Post-Communist States', European Security, Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 1996. 
For example speech by Ambassador Robert E. Hunter, US Permanent Representative on the North 
Atlantic Council on Civilian Control (? f the Military in Democracies-Prepared Remarks, held at 
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meetings of the Western scholars and policy makers with the gradually expanding 
community of post-communist specialists in military and defence policy permitted 
more a broader theoretical discussion on the democratic civil-military relations, 
acknowledging the variety of models of such relations in Western democracies. 81 
Perhaps the most interesting document in that context was the policy paper produced 
by the team of British experts after they had conducted the review of the democratic 
control of the military in Hungary. The British document contained the list of 
minimal requirements for the democratic overseeing of the military, followed by the 
detailed description of the Hungarian model and its deficiencies, complete with 
strong policy recommendations and as such was most representative to the Western 
approach toward post-communist countries and their civil-military 
transformations. 82 Finally, the same picture emerged from the numerous critiques 
that spelled out the message of the insufficient progress regarding the reforms, 
pointing most of all to the lack of adequate political guidance or even elementary 
political will to carry out civil-military transformation, along with the detrimental 
influence of the competency conflicts on the post-communist civil-military 
Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland, May, 6,1996; Civil - Militaty RelaliOnS in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Transcript qf proceedings, workshop held in Luxembourg on 21 - 22 April 1995, 
Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies; in Conference on Civil - Military 
Relations in the Context q1'an EvolvingNATO, (Budapest: Ministry of Defence/Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 15 - 17 September 1997) and others. 
'ý For example parliamentary Oversight (? f Dqpnce Budgets -a British perspective. Prepared by 
United Kingdom Delegation for the Meetim-, of the PMSC in NACC, /PfP Fon-nat on Civil/Military 
Relations and Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Ljub)iana, 10- 11 October 1996. 
Review qf Parliainenlary Oý, ersighi q1' the Hungariun MOD and Democratic Control (, ý' the 
Hungarian De/ence Forces. Study No 810, dir. by M. Holmes, (UK MOD: Directorate of 
Management & Consultancy Services, February 1996). 
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relations 83 and incompatibility of the Central Eastern European military cultures 
with the democratic ones. 84 
What emerged in sum from academic and official treatments was a number 
of recommendations, the implementation of which was imperative for the 
introduction of functioning democratic civilian control of the military. The first 
necessary condition was the introduction of democratic governance itself, that is of a 
constitutional and legal framework, rule of law, civil liberties, workable electoral 
practices, and institutional i sed policy-making. 85 Secondly, the civil-military 
interface should be legally regulated in a way fostering democratic civilian control. 
For this aim, a clear division of authority is necessary on all levels of military 
governance, from distribution of executive powers between the presidents and the 
prime ministers to the division of responsibilities between the minister of defence 
and the chief of general staff. Next, a progressive civilianisation of defence ministers 
is necessary to break the military monopoly on expertise and establish viable civilian 
control. Last but not least, the parliamentary overseeing of the armed forces and 
supervision of defence and security policy of the state are necessary elements of 
democratic civilian control of the military. 86 
The presentation of a concise list of reforms implementing democratic civil- 
military relations and close scrutiny of the outcomes without doubt sped up the 
process of post-communist restructuring of this field, particularly in the countries 
R&a Szemerk6nyi, 'Central European Civil - Military Reforms At Risk', Adelphi Paper 306, 
(London, IISS: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
84 Frank E. Fields, Jack J. Jensen. 'Military Professionalism in Post-Communist Hungary and Poland: I 
An Analysis and Assessment', European SecitritY. Vo. 7, No. ), Spring 1998, pp. ) 17 - 155ý 
Kohn, 'How Democracies', p. 144. 
Jeffrey Simon, 'Central European Civil - Military Relations and NATO Expansion'. in Anton 
Bebler (ed. ), 0vil - Vilitat: v Relations in Post-Coninninist States (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995) 
p. 117. 
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interested in joining NATO. However, by offering a *pre-digested' formula for 
application to the post-communist states, the Western politicians separated the 
practice of democratic civilian control from the tenets of Western theory of civil - 
military relations and from the moral and political principles underpinning the 
democratic system of such relations in the West. As a result, with considerable 
progress achieved in consolidating democratic civil -military relations in some 
countries, the classic works of Huntington, 87 Janowitz, 88 Finer. 89 van Doom" or 
Perlmutter9l remain virtually unknown, and so are the moral, political and social 
dilemmas discussed in the publications of Etzioni-Halevy, 92 Kohn, 93 Avant, 94 Kemp 
and Hudlin 95 and others. Lack of such knowledge possibly contributed to some 
faulty institutional reforms, as well as restricted the public debate that might have 
otherwise developed in the society on the role and place of the national military. 
One work, in particular, partly went against the grain of the rest. In their 
comparative monograph, Security and Democracy: Civil-Allilitary Relations in 
87 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and The State. The Theory and Politics (ýf Civil - Military Zý 
Relations. 5th edition. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972). 
88 Morris Janowitz, The Pro/essionalSoldier. A Social andPolilical Portrait. (New York: Illinois Free 
Press, 1960). 
'9 Samuel E. Finer, The Alan On Horseback, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967). 
90 Gwyn Herries - Jenkins, Jacques van Doorn (eds. ), The Military and the Problem of Legitimacy. 
(London: SAGE, 1976); Jacque van Doom, The Soldier and Social Change. Comparative Studies in 
j, (? f the Military. (London: Sage Publications, 1975). the Histoty and Socioloc 
9' Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times - on Prqfessionals, Praetorians and 
Revolutionary Soldiers (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977). 
92 Eva Etzioni - Halevy, 'Civil - Military Relations and Democracy: the Case of the Military - 
Political Elites' Connection in Israel', Armed Forces & Sociei),,, Vol. 22, No. 3, Spring 1996, p. 490. 
') -, Richard Kohn, 'Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil - Military Relations', The National Interest 35, 
Spring 1994, pp. 3- 17. 
9' Deborah Avant, 'Conflicting Indicators of "Crisis" in American Civil - Military Relations'. Armed 
Forces & Socieiy, Vol. 24, No. 3. Spring 1998, p. 375. 
Central and Eastern Europe, Gow and Birch 96 identified a model for comparison 
based on four factors: restructuring, rules, management and policy communities. 
While the last three provided the essential basis for comparison of democratic 
control of defence, with the last being the most demanding and going beyond much 
in other studies at the time, it was the first that provided the real differencel, 
beginning with an understanding of that which had to be restructured. 
Assessment of the restructuring process - that is, the degree to which 
organisational, structural, or social transformation of the armed forces has occurred 
in a given country is used in conjunction with the three factors that characterise 
democracy, 97 Of the three factors that permit the comparison of democratisation, the 
first includes both formal rules, such as laws, and procedures. The second embraces 
accountability, structures and personnel. The final factor is the one that most clearly 
defines a democracy. It includes the institutions and arenas that are essential to 
public discussion of policy and to scrutiny and overseeing. This level most defines 
democracy because it permits openness and exchange of information and serves, in 
principle and in practice, to limit those with power. It is the autonomous sources of 
knowledge, analysis and argument, both for creative and critical input to policy- 
making, however, imperfect they may be, that make the difference between 
democracy and other forms of governance. 
The four-pillar framework in Gow and Birch's security and democracy 
model offered a basis for comparison. However, it is my contention that it omitted a 
crucial condition for civil-military relations in any of the post-communist countries: 
95 Kenneth Kemp and Charles Hudlin, 'Civil Supremacy Over the Military Its Nature and Its Limits', 
Arined Foi-ees & Sociely, Vol. 19, No. 1. Fall 1992. pp, 7 - 26. 
"' Gow, Birch, Security and Democracy. 
97 Gow, Birch, Secziriýy and Democruey. 
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the degree of 'stateness'. While the four components of the Gow and Birch model 
allowed investigation and comparison, the framework was limited by a failure to 
identify a crucial variable that could offer explanation, rather than mere comparison. 
This variable, as I shall argue in the present thesis, is 'stateness. ' This enhances the 
Gow and Birch model by permitting explanation - by taking this approach it is 
possible answer the question identified at the beginning of this chapter: why did 
countries beginning civil-military transformation from the same departure point 
reach such dissimilar positions after a decade? Or, to pose the question more 
precisely, based on the conceptual modification of the security and democracy 
framework identified above, is civil-military relations in democratising post- 
communist transitional countries a function of the interaction of stateness, 
restructuring, rules and democratic management? It is my contention that a major 
factor in determining how far there is a stable and democratic civil-military 
relationship is the quality of statehood. Some of the post-communist states began as 
states, such as Poland, others, such as Lithuania, have sought to establish new 
statehood. Moreover, while some new states have been weak, such as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, others have proved stronger, such as Estonia. Thus, stateness is the 
crucial variable for explaining the variety of outcomes in post-communist civil- 
military transformations. 
The Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis will use an adapted version of the Gow and 
Birch comparative framework to go beyond comparison into explanation. To do so, 
it will introduce the crucial variable of stateness, while compounding one of the 
Gow and Birch variables - policy communities - into a modified version of their 
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effective management of the defence element. This framework will be laid out in the 
following chapter. That chapter will also discuss the selection of four countries - 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Ukraine - used to draw empirical 
material that gives substance to each of the subsequent chapters. This empirical field 
research in the four countries is an original contribution to knowledge in the field =1 
through the presentation of new information. This complements the distinctive and 
original theoretical contribution that the dissertation makes by the identification of 
stateness as a key explanatory variable, which is then combined with three 
imperatives from an existing model, permitting the development and application of a 
theoretical framework: the stateness matrix. 
The remaining chapters will offer an integrated comparison across the four 
countries, with each chapter focusing on one of the elements in the model. In chapter 
2, the complete theoretical framework will be laid out and the concept of stateness 
will be presented together with an explanation of the applicability of the stateness 
matrix to the study of post-communist civil-military relations. The chapter will also 
list the countries chosen for the present study and offer justification for their 
selection. 
In chapter 3, the stateness matrix will be applied to the four case countries, 
offering a cross-country comparison of the nature of the individual nation-states and 
the quality of their statehood. The aim of that chapter is to identify the advantages 
and weaknesses of the selected post-communist states and to measure the degree of 
stateness problems that might have emerged in the aftermath of the collapse of 
communist regimes in Central Eastern Europe and the break up of the Soviet Union. L- 
It will also offer assessment of the state's legitimacy in each of the case countries. 
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Chapter 4 will be devoted to the problems of military restructuring. By 
analysing the reforms undertaken in each of the countries, I will survey the progress 
made by the countries in departing from the communist model of civil-military 
relations and in aqjusting the post-communist military to the changed political and 
security environment. 
Chapter 5 will present the process of creating the legal and procedural 
framework for the post-communist military in the context of the processes of 
democratic consolidation. The analysis will be focused on the power distribution 
among the major political actors and the impact of those processes on the forming of 
democratic control of the military. I will also identify the main controversies 
hindering the legal reforms in the case countries and underline the scope of 
legislative gaps and overlaps in each of the countries concerned. 
Chapter 6 will analyse the functioning of the mechanisms for the democratic 
management of the military and defence policy. I will argue that despite some 
indication of the progress in establishing the instruments for effective democratic 
management, such as strengthening and progressive civilianisation of the ministries 
of defence, enhancement of civilian defence expertise or a growing security 
community, democratic management remains the most underdeveloped sphere of the 
post-communist civil-military relations. 
Chapter 7 will contain conclusions on the applicability of the stateness 
matrix to the study of civil - military relations in the post-communist countries. In 
that last chapter, I will reiterate the differing results of the post-communist reforms 
of the civil-military relations and explain the influence of the stateness problems on 
those varying outcomes of the civil-military trans formati on s. 
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Throughout, I shall sustain the thesis that the theoretical framework 
established in Chapter 2 accounts for different transitional outcomes in the post- 
communist civil-military reforms in the individual states studied. Depending on 
circumstances, the stateness matrix can have either a beneficial or a harmful impact 
on civil-military relations and on the overall democratisation process in any of the 
post-communist states. Variations in the outcome of post-communist civil-military 
transitions to democracy may be explained by analysis of the interaction of 
restructuring, rules, effective democratic management and stateness, of which the 
last is the crucial variable. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: THE STATENESS MATRIX 
Analysis of civil-military relations under conditions of post-communist 
clemocratisation has generally been inadequate, as was established in the 
Introduction. The need to understand the communist legacy and the character of 
democratic consolidation is essential to proper consideration of the topic. Alas. this 
has not been forthcoming. As noted in the previous chapter, only one approach has 
reflected these needs, yet, even that approach did not explain why there had come to 
be such variety when all countries began their transition in the same place and were 
heading in the same direction, as far as this can be said. The key to offering such 
explanation, it was contended in the previous chapter, lies in what might be termed 
the stateness approach, that is, the integration of stateness as the crucial variable in a 
modification of the security and democracy analytical matrix used by Gow and 
Birch. It is the purpose of the present chapter to establish this distinctive framework 
through conceptual examination of stateness and its merging with analytical factors 
derived from the security and democracy approach. In essence, it answers the 
question: how can stateness be allied to the security and democracy model and 
applied to the study of Central and Eastern Europe? The final part of the chapter will 
deal with the selection of four 'case' countries, on which empirical study for the 
comparison is based, The earlier sections will explore stateness and its importance 
and, first of all, \Nill revisit and expand interpretation of the imperatives identified by 
Gow and Birch, upon which the stateness matrix used in this study is founded. 
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Security and Democracy: the Imperatives of Transition 
The comparative framework adapted in the present study is based on the 
identification of four imperatives for successful democratic transition in post- 
communist civil-military relations by Gow and Birch. ' These imperatives included 
restructuring, rules, effective democratic management and democratic security 
policy communities. The present section will examine the security and democracy 
model more fully, identifying the strengths that make it a useful foundation for 
analysis, as well as the deficiencies that require amendment and addition. 
The framework proposed by Gow and Birch had several important advantages 
that were decisive for choosing it as the base for the present study. First of all, the 
original framework took into account the inherent relationship between the reform 
of the post-communist civil-military relations and the general processes of 
democratic transition and consolidation in the post-communist states. Each of the 
original imperatives: restructuring, rules, effective democratic management and 
democratic security policy could be used for studying the civil-military 
transformations, but at the same time it was examining selected aspects of 
democratisation reforms of the overall state and measured the progress of 
democratic consolidation in the individual country. Secondly, the basic framework 
was devised in such a way that it presented democratic reforms of the military as a 
sequence of interconnected and mutually dependent undertakings. The authors 
underlined this aspect of their approach themselves, writing that 
These imperatives for a successful transition are inter-connected in a 
circular problematic: restructurincy requires decisions-, decisions require Z-- 
rules on how decisions are to be arrived at-, for rules to be established 
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and procedures to be followed appropriately, the competent people and 
suitable structures for making them, following them and for checking on 
them need to be in place; and for all this to be effective, there must be 
the possibility of informed debate in society. 2 
At the same time, the stress put on the interconnected and interdependent 
structure of the problems brought the problem of the simultaneity of post-communist 
transformations to the fore. A successful implementation of any one imperative 
depended on the functioning of the remaining one but none of those prerequisites of 
the consolidated democracy was already in place in the post-communist conditions. 
Therefore, for the sake of the transitions all the reforms should have been introduced 
simultaneously and in a compressed period of time, which was both necessary and 
impossible to carry out. However, the circular character of the democratisation 
processes rendered the lack of any one element of the democratic order detrimental 
to the development of the remaining ones. That was creating the simultaneity 
dilemma for the post-communist reforms to which there was no easy solution. 
Simultaneous transitions of the political system, economy and civil - military 
relations had occurred previously in the states of Southern Europe 3 and Latin 
Americaý but none of them faced the challenge of political, social and economic 
restructuring on quite the same scale. 
' James Gow, Carole Birch, Security and Democracy,. Civil - Military Relations in Central and 
Eustern Europe (London, The Centre for Defence Studies: Brasseys, September 1997), p. 10. 
2 Gow, Birch, Securitj, and Democracy, pp. 10 - 11. 
For example Felipe AgUero, Soldiers, Civilians and Detnocracjý: Post-FrancoSpain in Comparative 
Perspective (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995). 
4 For an overview of the civil-military problernatique in the context of democratisation processes in 
Latin America see Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Bra.: il and theSouthern Cone 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
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Finally, the original framework advanced by Gow and Birch allowed us to 
identify the direction of the reforms in the case countries, to compare the progress 
made toward the establishment of democratic civil-military relations and toward the 
democratic consolidation of the states under study, to determine the main problems 
generated by the transitions and to discern the major differences in the results 
achieved. That framework, however, had one major shortage: while accounting for 
the differences, it did not attempt to explain them. For this reason, the framework 
has been modified here by adding stateness as the key variable. 
For the purposes of my study, each imperative is broken into sub-variables that 
are used to compare the condition of the civil-military transformation in each of the 
case countries. However, in order to test the hypothesis regarding the impact of the 
stateness condition on the overall outcome of the democratisation, I have amended 
the original framework by merging their 'policy communities' under the imperative 
of effective democratic management of defence, while stateness is added. The issue 
of stateness is addressed below. Regarding the folding of policy communities into 
effective democratic management, there are three reasons to do this. The least of 
these is to maintain the relative simplicity and manageability of a four component 
theoretical model - it may be generally inferred that the more complex a theoretical 
model, the less useful and usable it will be. More importantly, the relative 
immaturity of democratisation in most post-communist countries means that the type 
of Western policy community introduced as a factor by Gow and Birch remains in 
the early stages of development. There is too little meaningful development of 
autonomous defence related elements in civil society to make sense of treating this 
aspect on a par with the other imperatives they identify. This is reinforced by the 
understanding, evident in the security and democracy approach, that policy 
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communities are in fact a part of the process by which effective democratic 
management of defence is effectuated in mature liberal democracies. For the present 
attempt to explain variable civil-military outcomes, it is a factor that might be used 
to manifest degrees of weakness across variable outcomes, rather than to explain 
them. This is why I have decided to compound policy communities and effective 
democratic management of defence. 
The final framework for comparative and explanatory analysis, therefore, is 
based on four imperatives: stateness, rules, restructuring and effective democratic 
management. Each of these, as indicated, has sub-variable components. The first of 
these, stateness, incorporates the following aspects, each of which will be treated in 
the relevant substantive chapters: national identity and statehood traditions; the 
transitional opening of the communist regime; 5 polity-demos congruency, involving 
the nationality issues, territorial problems, cultural and linguistic issues, and 
citizenship, 6 and finally; a legitimacy assessment. Restructuring incorporates the 
following aspects: military tradition; de-politicisation, de-communisation, and re- 
national i sation; new missions of the post-communist military; and issues of 
structural reform. The third imperative, rules: laws and procedures has three sub- 
components: the constitutional framework; military legislative regulation, and the 
division of prerogatives and responsibilities. Lastly, effective democratic 
management covers the following: the operation of the ministry of defence and the 
The term 'transitional opening" was borrowed from the book by Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillippe 
C. Schmitter, Transit ions. 1roin A uthoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain 
Democracies (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 17 - 19. The 
term refers to the reasons for launching a transition and circumstances of the breakdown of the non- 
democratic re-ime. Zý 
6 To some extent, there are echoes here of the model for nationhood identified by George Schopflin, 
in which nationhood is the product of ethnicity, civic qualities and statehood. See George Sch6pflin, 
A'ations, Identity and Power (London: C. Hurst and Co., 2000). 
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general staff, advisory bodies, and parliamentary committees; the dynamic 
interaction of civilian and military expertise; and finally, the aspect of the Gow and 
Birch model subsumed here, security policy communities in civil society. 
The rest of the chapter will be devoted to describing the different imperatives 
included in the framework. The later - and greater - parts of the chapter are devoted 
to the new imperative being added to the framework, the concept of stateness, which 
will be laid out, as will the relationship between the condition of stateness, 
democratic consolidation and civil-military transformation in any state. The 
importance of the sub-variables singled out for the task of measuring the degree of 
the stateness problem will be reiterated in the course of this analysis. Before this, 
however, the next section will give expanded consideration to the three imperatives 
derived from the security and democracy model outlined by Gow and Birch - 
restructuring, rules and effective democratic management, each of them set within 
the theory of democratic consolidation. 
Restructuring, Rules and Effective Democratic Management 
The communist regimes left the institutional and cultural heritage 
incompatible with the democratic systems and inhibiting the democratic civilian 
control of the military. The post-communist conditions featured extensive 
politicisation of all spheres of public life, low institutionalisation of the policy 
making process, weakness of autonomous institutions and civil society, and in the 
military the formal party presence in the army, the offensive organisation and 
capacities of the military. and the legacy of the subordination of the national 
militaries to the Soviet command within the framework of the Warsaw pact that 
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cause the deliberate underdevelopment of the national capacities for strategic 
planning and resulted in the absence of individual defence doctrines. 
These traits of the communist legacy dictated the course of post-communist 
civil-military reforms. Within the armed forces, the party cells had to be removed 
from the military, the direct link between the political organisation and the army had 
to be severed and the military required transformation into a national army, both in 
terms of symbolic appearance and defence capacities. However, dealing with the 
communist legacy inevitably involved the issues of judging the army involvement in 
communist politics and eventual punishment. It presented the authorities with the 
difficult dilemma: given the high rates of the party membership in the officer corps 
and the past engagement in the communist regime in each of the case countries, the 
military should undergo a detailed screening process, if only for the safety of the 
transitions. However, an introduction of the drastic lustration laws was likely to 
undermine the cohesiveness of the armed forces, lower its combat readiness and 
install distrust of the civilian incumbents in charge of the army affairs. In extreme 
cases, it could even provoke a violent reaction in the armed forces. Moreover, it was 
difficult to set the criteria for the screening, as the party membership in the 
communist armies was practically obligatory and spoke nothing of the real character 
of the individual's views and activities. Yet, the resignation from the de- 
communisation process also carried potential threats and disadvantages. Leaving the 
officer corps intact preserved the communist structures and cadres, and maintained 
the image of the army as a communist body that survived all the transformation 
processes unchanged. Moreover. the preservation of the military structures would 
likely reinforce the autonomous tendencies in the officer corps and thus delay the 
structural reforms of the army. It appeared that the approach adopted by the 
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individual countries at least partly depended on its military traditions. Where the 
military were traditionally perceived as the national institution and enjoyed social 
prestige, the screening process was moderate or none; where the military was held in 
a very low esteem and seen as the mainstay of the communist regime in the past, as 
was the case in the Czech Republic, the screening procedures were harsh. 
The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 and fast changes in the 
geopolitical environment surrounding the post-communist countries caused them to 
redefine their security interests and confronted them with the necessity of creating a 
national defence policy. Devising the national security policies involved the need to 
redefine the mission of the military, but both processes were difficult due to the lack 
of experience with strategic planning, but also due to the uncertain political 
situation, both in terms of internal and external developments. Yet, although none of 
the post-communist countries proved capable of drafting more than temporary 
defence doctrines, in each of them the military were withdrawn from internal 
politics and their fundamental mission was redirected towards national defence. That 
was a crucial step for the safety of the consolidation processes, and also opened the 
restructuring of the military into a defensive force, compatible with democratic 
standards. 
In the present study, only selected issues of the structural refonn of the post- 
communist military were analysed. This is because the structural reform of the army 
was conditioned by a number of factors that could not be accounted for in this study, 
if only for the lack of space. It involved problems of the budget resources, 
procurement policý decisions, individual defence capacities and finally the influence 
of NATO enlargement process. Moreover, the technical details of the structural 
military reform did not have a direct impact on the processes of consolidation in any 
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of the case countries, although they were naturally relevant for the civil-military 
relations on the whole. Therefore, in this study I have only emphasised issues related 
to the cadres and management and control organisations, as they seemed most 
important from the point of view of civil-military transformation in the countries 
concerned. Failure to reform the communist military structures in the long run 
would inevitably cause problems, if the political and social systems of the post- 
communist states were thoroughly reformed and democratised; and in that sense the 
structural reform of the military was closely related to the democratic consolidation. 
A particularly close connection between democratic consolidation and the 
civil-military transformation was visible in the process of creating the framework of 
rules and procedures. Putting the legislative framework in place was a necessary 
pre-condition for a change of the political system in the post-communist states; 
however, its importance was further reaching than that. In democratic systems, the 
legal and procedural rules constitute the basis for decision-making processes; 
therefore, as long as such a framework was not prepared in the post-communist 
countries, the decision-making processes were still governed by the communist 
rules. 
The making of the post-communist constitutions appeared the most urgent 
task for the post-communist polities and some of the countries, such as the Czech 
Republic or Lithuania, indeed adopted their constitutional frameworks quickly and 
efficiently. However, the major problem of the constitution making processes was 
that it involved the distribution of powers and in some countries agreement on the 
delineation of po\Ners appeared impossible to be reached. The solution adopted in 
the case of Poland and Ukraine was to adopt an interim basic law. Such a solution, 
however, proved to be detrimental to the processes of democratisation. It delayed 
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the moment of permanent regulation of the power relations inside the post- 
communist polity, and so the situation of interim political rules encouraged 
competition between the main political actors, hoping to achieve greater 
prerogatives before the final constitutional act is adopted. 
Interim constitutions not only fuelled political struggles and negatively 
affected the institutionalisation of post-communist politics, but also delayed the 
elaboration of the lower order legislative system, which was equally needed. 
Normally, the laws should ensue from the constitutional norms and regulations, 
therefore the lack of fundamental laws stalled some other reforms, particularly in the 
military. The unresolved questions of the supreme executive authority and the 
subordination of the highest military commanders had a disruptive impact on 
military legislative reform in many post-communist countries. However, a lack of 
constitutional regulations was not the only problems that delayed legal reforms. The 
post-communist legislatures were inefficient institutions, very much burdened by the 
legacy of the communist system where it was merely a rubber stamp to decisions 
taken elsewhere. Evolution of the parliaments from weak and fragmented 
organisations to autonomous institutions that were capable of asserting a due degree 
of political leverage and managing legislative procedures, was a lengthy process and 
the one that was also part of the democratic consolidation. Finally, insufficient 
progress of military legal reforms in the post-communist countries should also be 
attributed to the absence of political directives and generally low priority given to 
the legislative regulations on the situation of the armed forces. Here the simultaneity 
factor became important - having so many legislative reforms to carry out, the post- L- L- 
communist governments limited themselves to dealing with the most pressing issues 
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only. Consequently, once the basic rules for the military's existence and functioning 
were put in place, the authorities took to other, more pressing reforms. 
Conflicts between the main political actors over the division of executive 
powers were a characteristic feature of the post-communist political transformations. 
The executive struggles had a direct and negative impact on the military and in some 
instances, they brought the democratisation processes dangerously close to collapse. 
In most instances, the struggle involved the divisions of prerogatives in the military 
and defence politics, and the inability of achieving consensus on those issues was 
detrimental to civil-military relations. Clear division of powers and responsibilities 
was one of the basic imperatives necessary for the successful introduction of the 
democratic civilian control of the military. However, the combined effect of 
temporary or imprecise constitutional regulations, incomplete legal frameworks for 
the military and political struggles had the effect of distorting the civil-military 
transformation. The problems emerging in the process of distributing powers over 
the military were in particular visible in the processes of regulating the scope of 
prerogatives and responsibilities of the ministers of defence versus the General 
Staffs. The reform of those two institutions required a radical departure from the 
communist model of civil-military relations. The review of the case countries 
showed that the weaker the military emerged from the communist regime, the easier 
was the process of redefining the relations between the MOD and the General Staffs. 
The successful completion of the legal division of powers in those two institutions 
was crucial for the prospective democratisation of civil-military relations and the 
post-communist political systems. But. the process of the legal division of 
responsibilities for military management and control also involved the most serious Z-- 
threat to the process of legal military reforms, that is the politicisation of the 
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military. In some instances, the political actors involved in the struggles surrounding 
power distribution created opportunities for the military to become involved in the 
current politics. If that process was stopped with the successful introduction of the 
necessary regulations, then the democratisation processes could be continued, as was 
the case in Poland. However, failure to stop the military from developing close 
relationship with the political actors and exerting influence on politics, as took place 
in Ukraine, meant that the democratic consolidation would not be possible in that 
country. 
The connection between the civil-military transformation and the overall 
process of democratic consolidation of the post-communist states is particularly 
evident in what concerns the effective democratic management of the military. 
Managing the military effectively and in a democratic manner requires all 
democratic institutions to be put in place and functioning. To this end, the post- 
communist ministries of defence must be restructured and civilianised and their 
position strengthened in relation to the militarised general staffs. The activities of 
the civilian ministers must be well integrated into the executive chain of powers that 
would leave no doubts as to the division of duties and responsibilities within the 
government framework. This way, the ministry of defence would be able to play the 
role of 'double agent' typical democratic management of the military, that is 
representing the military to the government and mediating the policy issues with the 
Prime Ministers on behalf of the armed forces; and at the same time implementing 
the executive policy in the military and defence sector. Finally, the mechanisms of 
democratic management would not be complete without effective parliamentary 
control, which for the most part is executed by the appropriate parliamentary 
committees. The efficiency of the parliamentary control of the military is based on 
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the intricate network of connections between the legislature and the various 
government bodies, as well as on the willingness of the military in charge to co- 
operate with the parliamentarians. 
However, the issues of democratic management cannot be confined to the 
problems of organisation of the ministries of defence, parliaments or other 
government bodies for this matter. Their effective functioning requires an 
underpinning of the broader security community, which represents a society of 
academics; journalists and individuals from the non-governmental organisations that 
would be knowledgeable and interested enough in defence and military matters to 
hold the proper government agencies accountable to the public. The right to 
participate and control the political processes is part of the very definition of the 
democratic citizenship; however, only an organised civic society can make full use 
of citizenship rights in democratic systems. A robust civil society has a capacity to 
monitor the government and to generate policy alternatives. However, in order to be 
able to do it, the individuals associated in the non-governmental organisation must 
be able to have enough access to the information to carry out an informed political 
debate. 7 Thus, fostering the development of the dynamic security communities that 
can be regarded as part of the civic society interested in defence and military matters 
is crucial for ensuring the consolidation of the democratic control of the military in 
the post-communist countries. Moreover, an informed public debate could be helpful 
for determining the security interests and foreign policy objectives in the post- 
communist states where civil-military transfon-nations are hindered by stateness 
problems, which in turn could boost the legitimacy of the government and its 
politics. 
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Unfortunately, the post-communist conditions prevented the emergence of a 
robust civil society where it was most needed. They also invalidated those 
mechanisms in the political systems that enabled the effective democratic 
management of the military. The low degree of institutional i sation of politics is one 
reason for which democratic management cannot yet be fully effective in the post- 
communist countries. The survey of the reorganisation processes in the post- 
communist ministries of defence and the problems related to the empowerment of 
the civilian ministers towards the military chiefs of general staff in the case 
countries illustrate the difficulties of putting the framework for proper democratic 
management of the military in place. 
The incomplete framework of laws and procedures was yet another persistent 
problem of civil-military relations in all of the case countries, depriving the 
institutions managing the military of legal foundations. However, the creation of 
fundamental constitutional and parliamentary laws was not enough for the 
successful development of the management mechanisms. In this case, the detailed 
regulations, such as statutes of the Ministries of Defence played an important role, 
and they were either neglected in the course of restructuring reforms or it proved 
difficult to work out agreement on their contents. The gaps in the legal system 
provoked yet another problem of overpowered political bodies managing civil- 
military relations without sufficient constitutions and legal prerogatives for their 
activities. As a rule, the considerable political leverage of those bodies would ensue 
from a personal connection with the head of the executive. If the political system of 
the country had not been democratised enough to check the growing power of the 
'advisory' bodies in military and defence matters, then their activities were likely to 
7 Jean Cohen, Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theor),,, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 
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be a hindrance for the institutionalisation of democratic management and could even 
threaten the consolidation of democracy. 
Stateness and Democratic Consolidation 
After the collapse of the communist systems, the post-communist polities became 
exposed to a problem of redefining their collective identities, in many instances 
within the boundaries of the new state. As was earlier asserted, the existence of 
democracy is predicated on the presence of a viable nation-state. While the studies 
of earlier democratic transitions did not investigate the intrinsic relationship between 
democracy and the state because the nation-states were well established and 
somehow obvious entities, the viability of the post-communist states undergoing 
transition could not be taken for granted that easily. Therefore, in most post- 
communist countries. in addition to the usual democratising reforms, an additional 
task had to be undertaken of defining the national identity and its relation to the 
particular statehood. Because of that particular stateness dimension of the post- 
communist transitions, the processes in Central Eastern Europe had to be analysed 
with the use of conceptual means which had not been utilised in the case of other 
transitions to democracy and which comprise such issues of territorial boundaries, 
concepts of citizenship, congruity between the populations and the state, and finally, 
the legitimacy of the state. The processes of nation-building and state-building that 
were taking place simultaneously with the reforms of the political systems make the 
post-communist transitions unique and preclude a simple imitation of any previous 
models of deniocratisation. 8 
29-82. 
8 Claus Offe, Varieties (? f Transition. The East European and East German Experience (Cambridge 
and Oxford: Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1996), pp. 3 1- 35. 
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The problems related to the intrinsic relationship between the quality of 
statehood, its collective identity and legitimacy and the impact of this problernatique 
on the processes of democratisation are relatively new issues in the literature on 
democratic transitions. The field started being investigated only after the break-up of 
the Soviet Union and the rapid emergence of a number of new entities, many of 
which were nation-states only by name. The territorial, political and psychological 
uncertainty surrounding those new beings, and the largely incidental national 
composition of many of them brought to the fore the problems of their dubious 
ability to establish themselves as viable nation-states and the troubles with gaining 
sufficient legitimacy to be able to exercise their state prerogatives. 9 
The term 'stateness' was borrowed from the book by Linz and Stepan who 
described the stateness problem as a situation in which *there are profound 
differences about the territorial boundaries of the political community's state and 
profound differences as to who has the right of citizenship in that state. They also 
noted that in some countries the stateness problem might be so profound that 
democracy was impossible to establish until it was resolved. 10 It is because 'if a 
significant group of people does not accept claims on its obedience as legitimate, 
because people do not want to be part of the political unit .... this presents a serious 
problem for democratic transition and even more serious problem for democratic 
9 See for example: ]an Bremmer. Ray Taras, New States, Not, Politics: Building the Post-Soviet 
Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)-, Graham Smith, Vivien Law, Andrew 
Wilson, Anette Bohr, Edward Alworth, Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands - the Politics 
qf National Identities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Cherles King and Neil 
J. Melvin, 'Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy and Security in Euroasia' and Ronald 
Grigor Suny, 'Provisional Stabilities: The Politics of Identities in Post-Soviet Euroasia', both articles 
in International SecuritY, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Winter 1999/2000), pp, 108 -13 38 & 139 - 178 respectively. 
to Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan, Problems oj'Den? ocratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern 
E7irope, Sowh A n7crica and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore & London: 1996), p. 16. 
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consolidation'. '' Thus, a successful consolidation of democracy in any nation-state 
would be at least partly dependent on the legitimacy of that state. 
The authors admitted that the concept of stateness was as yet fluid and 
under-theorised. In this study the stateness variable was broadly defined as a 'quality 
of statehood', determined by the quality of relationship between the state and the 
nation within a given nation-state formula. Seen in that context, the stateness 
variable remains relevant for all the modern nation-states, and not limited to the 
newly established polities. If a concept of a 'nation' is inclusive enough to prevent a 
significant portion of the population to develop a sense of 'otherness' in their 
community, and if the people generally perceive its state as a legitimate entity and 
on the basic level accept the mode of governance, then its stateness is strong and 
consolidated. However, if there is no agreement on the concept of the nation or the 
citizenship criteria are exclusionary, and the state lacks a basic legitimacy in the 
eyes of the citizens, then its ability to exercise its govenu-nent functions is 
undermined and the stateness problem occurs. 
A major question was how to measure the degree of stateness problem, since 
the criteria were vague and subjective. For the purpose at hand, I accepted the 
proposal by Linz and Stepan that the greater the congruency between the polity and 
the demos, the better the chances for success of a simultaneous building of nation- 
state and democracy. 12 For measuring the congruence between the policy and the 
demos, such variables were used as nationality situation, citizenship, territorial, 
cultural and linguistic issues. The examination of the stateness in each case study Z:, 
was completed vith gencral overview of its state tradition and the circumstances of 
the transitional opening. 
" Linz and Stepan. Problems qfDemocratic, p. 27. 
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How people in a given state define the 'nation' and grant citizenship rights is 
crucial for the determination of the stateness condition. Such a definition essentially 
answers the questions of who are 'we' and who are 'they' and denotes collective 
identity. 13 Understandably, an inclusive formula of a nation fosters the legitimacy of 
the state and strengthens its stateness. The problem arises when national or ethnic 
identity is predicated on a form of imagined community that reifies the importance 
of national or ethnic boundaries to the detriment of the wider political Community . 
14 
A narrow, ethnic-based, exclusionary definition of the citizenship would then be a 
confirmation of the stateness problem of the country and would have an inevitably 
detrimental impact on the democratisation process. 15 
Historically, Eastern Europe was particularly prone to the develop of the 
stateness problem. While in Western Europe the emergence of the nation-states was 
facilitated by the relative national homogeneity in the 18'h and 19'h centuries, in 
Eastern Europe nation and state were rarely concomitant. Eastern European 
nationalism grew without the state and often in protest against the existing state, 
hence out of necessity was based on ethnic identities. As a result, the two definitions 
of the 'nation' in Western European states: as a population within the territorial 
boundaries of the state and as a political community based on ethnic identity, were 
Linz and Stepan, Problems (? f'Democru6c, p. 25. 
Offe, Varieties, p. 32. 
14 Smith, Law, Wilson et al., Nafion-Building, p. 1. 
15 On the analysis of citizenship issues in the post-communist context, see Graham Smith, Aadne 
Aasland, Richard Mole, 'Statehood, Ethnic Relations and Citizenship', in Graham Smith (ed. ), The 
Baltic Slates. The National Seýf-delei-minafion qfEstonia, Latvia and bihiiania (London: Macmillan 
Press Ltd., 1994), pp. 181 - 183. 
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complementary. 16 In Eastern Europe, due to the national heterogeneity of the states, 
the logic of those two definitions was contradictory in most cases. The interaction of 
the 'nation' and the 'state' was historically conflict - prone and so the probability 
that in the aftermath of the collapse of communism various ethnic groups would 
pursue their interests to the detriment of the wider political community was very 
high. )7 Thus, the entire post-communist region is prone to the stateness problem and 
in most extreme cases, an elaboration of the legitimate nation-state formula may turn 
out to be impossible, Because the institutions of a state cannot function properly in 
an environment where its existence and rights are not accepted therefore it is 
possible that in some post-communist states, the logic of nation building may be 
contradictory to state-building and dernocratisation. 
The Stateness Variable and Civil-Military Relations 
While the question of stateness, though without using the term, was 
investigated by many authors in the general context of post-communist transitions to 
democracy, none of the authors explicitly linked the issues of stateness to the 
transformations of post-communist civil-military relations. This was also a major 
shortcoming of the analytical framework designed by Gow and Birch. 
It was already established that there exists an inherent relation of dependency 
1) between an existence of the state and the democracy, 2) between a consolidated 
stateness and a democratic state and 3) between a consolidated democracy and 
democratic civil - military relations. These three conditions form an interdependent 
James Gow, 'Nation. States. and Sovereignty: Meanings and Challenges in Post-Cold Wai- 
International Security', in Christopher Dandeker (ed. ), Ncilionalism and Violence (New Brunswick 
and London: Transaction Publishers, 1998), p. 180. 
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circle from which a relation between the stateness and the civil-military relations 
resulted. The civil-military problematique is linked to the stateness variable on three 
levels: 
1. Relation of the stateness problem to the issues of identity and legitimacy. 
2. Impact of the stateness condition on the functioning of the state institutions and 
executive politics, which are always embedded in the collective identity of the 
state 
3. Dependence of democratic consolidation processes on the consolidation of 
stateness. 
These three CODditions also form aD interdeperldent circle. Although the 
legitimacy of the military is not a simple function of the state's legitimacy, 
nevertheless without defining a collective identity of the state and establishing its 
legitimacy, the military will be unable to define its own identity or acquire 
democratic legitimacy. Additionally, depending on the state of the civil-military 
relations and the legitimacy of the armed forces, a situation of weak regime 
legitimacy may either create conditions conducive to military involvement in 
politics or prompt the civilian authorities to use the military as a state legitimating 
factor. ' 8 Furthermore, identity/legitimacy problems would inevitably undermine the 
capability of the state authorities to define the place and mission of the national 
military. For the same reasons, it would be difficult to satisfactorily determine the 
17 Stephan lwan Griffiths, Nationalism and Ethnic Coqflict. Threats to European SecuritY. SIPRI 
Research Report No 5, (Stockholm and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 12 - 14. 
is For a theoretical overview of the problems related to the legitimacy and civil - military relations, 
see James Gow, Legiiiinacy and the. Wililaiý,. The Yugoslav Crisis (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992), 
pp. 9- 21 & 26 -31. 
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state's security interests and formulate a defence doctrine for a country if that 
country suffers from the stateness problem. 19 
The overcoming of the stateness crisis of identity is crucial for the 
organisation of 'normal' executive politics, that is forming the institutional 
framework and subsequently making it work, The functioning of the government. 
and particularly of a democratic government, is always embedded in the identity of 
the nation-state and is dependent on the legitimacy of the regime. 20 One of the 
problems that may occur if the institutions of the state are weak, is that the state 
cannot exercise its functions, such as keeping the monopoly of the use of force and 
controlling the military and other armed formations. Failure to manage and control 
the military effectively, ensuing from the stateness problems, would inhibit the 
establishment of democratic civil - military relations and consequently hinder 
processes of democratic consolidation, thus closing the vicious circle of 
interdependent developments. 
In the case of post-communist transitions the stateness problems stood out as 
important characteristics of democratic transformation, capable of fostering or 
hindering democratisation processes. On most occasions, however, the analysis of 
stateness related problems were restricted to the post-Soviet states, whereas such 
issues as conversion of the collective identity, resurgent enthnonationalism, or 
difficulties in redefining the policy interests and perspectives were experienced by 
most post-communist states. It would also be wrong to assume that the extent of the 
stateness problem was similar for all the post-Soviet states. The simple comparison 
between the case of Lithuania and Ukraine showed that even though both countries 
experienced Soviet rule., their different pre-communist histories and unequal length 
Suny, 'Provisional Stabilities', pp. 143 - 144. 
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of time that the Soviet regime ruled in either of the countries gave Lithuania a 
number of advantages over Ukraine in the course of democrat] sation. 
One of the most important sub-variables on which the post-communist states 
differed was the tradition of statehood. Here the differences were evident not only 
between the countries of Central Eastern Europe, but also among the post-Soviet 
entities. From the countries selected for the present study, Poland had the longest 
standing statehood tradition, the roots of the Czech Republic and Lithuania reached 
back to medieval times, while Ukraine hardly had any 'usable' past as a state. The 
issue of statehood was closely related to the national identities which were linked to 
the concept of statehood but, owing to the complicated history of the Central Eastern 
European region, it often developed without the existing statehood. In a clear 
contrast to Western Europe, the national consciousness in today's post-communist 
region often formed in reaction to the loss of the statehood and under the 
circumstances where the actual state was perceived as an alien and oppressive power 
by the indigenous population. In this respect, the years of communist rule only 
deepened the already existing distrust of the population towards the institutions and 
representatives of the state. Yet, where present, the latent desire for its own, 
sovereign nation-state was a strong incentive for the initiation of the transitional 
processes and assured the strong legitimacy of the post-communist entities, whereas 
the ambiguous collective identity and considerable ethnonational division of the 
indigenous populations complicated the formulation of the goals of transition and 
could hinder the transformation to the point of collapse. Moreoveor, in the absence 
of viable state traditions. the politics of nation-building and state-building were in 
20 Offe, Varieties. pp. 32 - 33. 
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the constant need of self-justification and liable to critique from the groups of people 
who did not perceive that particular nation-state as desirable or legitimate. 
Another important feature characterising the stateness condition was the 
mode of the transitional opening. In any of the case countries it was an important 
factor in shaping the future processes of dernocratisation. Its particular context 
depended on the history of the state, both recent and more remote, and reflected the 
internal configuration of the forces and their determination to carry out the changes 
or to resist them. The context of opening of the communist regimes both outside and 
inside the Soviet Union revealed the correlation between the strength of the popular 
opposition to the regime and the strong or weak opening. By the 'strong' opening I 
understand such an act of opening the communist regime that was clearly 
identifiable in time and was marked by enforcing the communist regime to grant 
concessions under pressure from the opposition. Such an opening took place in 
Poland, where first the regime was forced to negotiate with the organised opposition, 
and later the agreement concluded at the Round Table was undermined by the 
results of the elections which were part of the settlements. A similarly strong 
opening was witnessed in Lithuania, where the popular resistance of the population 
in the Lithuanian Republic defeated the blockade imposed by Gorbachev and forced 
him to withdraw from the republic. On the contrary, the two remaining countries, 
(Ithen) Czechoslovakia and Ukraine had very weak openings that were difficult to 
identify in time and place and that owed more to the snowballing effect than to the 
internal dynamics of the political process. The crucial difference lay in the strength 
of the national inotivation for resisting the communist rule. and for this reason the 
problems of the transitional openings were included in the stateness section. 
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Finally, the end of the communist regimes forced all the post-communist 
states to redefine their identity, place on the international arena and interests in the 
changed political and security environment. If the post-communist state was a 
continuation of the communist polity, then these questions were easier to answer and 
in the process of answering them the authorities often related to the pre-communist 
traditions. Poland was the example of such a 'fortunate' case of the sustained nation- 
state. The situation was much more complicated if the identity of the new state was 
uncertain and its statehood and national traditions non-usable for this end. Under 
such circumstances, a plethora of additional problems was encountered in the 
countries undergoing transition, relating to the definitions of territory, citizenship, 
collective identity of the 'nation' and the necessity of state legitimisation. Ukraine is 
the extreme example of the stateness problems, yet to some extent they were present 
in all the countries where the continuity of the statehood and national traditions was 
broken. 
Thus, the relation of stateness to the democratisation processes is visible in a 
number of cases. In the extreme case, the stateness problems may inhibit democratic 
transitions because of the impossibility of consolidating the state. But the problem of 
stateness may affect civil-military transformations indirectly. Weak stateness means 
weak identity, both for the state and for the military. An impossibility of defining its 
identity may destabilise the military, but can also force the armed forces to become 
part of the nation-and state-building processes, which should not be their function in 
a democratic system. Moreover, the vogue identity of the nation-state makes it 
impossible to define its security interests. that is the post-communist defence 
doctrines and security policy, as well as the mission of the military, causing further 
identity problems for the army and for the civil-military relations. Finally, the 
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effective functioning of state institutions is embedded in its collective identity and 
legitimacy; weak legitimacy and identity lower the quality of the state governance 
and disrupt the processes of democratisation. The stateness variable is not a causal 
factor in transitions, however, depending on the circumstances, it can either foster 
the democratic transformation of civil - military relations or impede it. 
Applying the Framework: Case Selection for Integrated Comparison 
Having established the elements of a comparative and explanatory 
framework, there remains the issue of selecting country cases that may be compared 
using this framework and a decision on how, in practice, to compare them. The final 
section to this chapter will briefly indicate the methodological approach taken over 
these issues. Most of the attention concerns the case countries themselves. Before 
giving consideration to the selection of cases, however, it is necessary to explain the 
decision to use an integrated comparative methodology over a standard case study 
approach. 
In a standard case study approach, once selected, the cases would be treated 
in parallel. Each substantive chapter would treat a particular case, applying the 
elements in the analytical approach consistently in each case. Thus, given the model 
established in the earlier parts of this chapter, each chapter might be expected to 
have an introductory description on the case itself, followed by sections on each of 
the imperatives - that is, one on stateness, one on restructuring, one on rules and one 
on effective democratic management. The real comparison would then be carried 
out, usually on a limited basis, in a later, separate chapter. 
This approach was considered at earlier stages of the research for this project 
and originally standard case study chapters were written. However, having done this, 
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it became clear that the more ambitious, but more satisfying, methodology of 
integrated comparison would be both desirable and feasible. The standard case study 
approach leaves the real point of analytical interest stretched over a number of 
chapters and compressed into the later stages of the study. In general, the quality of 
material and analysis is higher where an integrated approach is available and used. 
In the integrated comparative approach, the comparative and explanatory 
elements provide the structure for the analysis. In this case, the empirical material 
derived from the cases used in directly proximate and comparable fashion. Thus, on 
each point, direct comparison is available throughout the whole study. The 
theoretical framework is used to transect the substantive material in a synthetic 
manner that permits the theoretical argument as a whole to me made directly, rather 
than as an awkward adjunct to discrete empirical case studies. 
Whichever of the foregoing approaches is adopted, it is still necessary to 
select cases that are capable of being investigated by the theoretical approach used 
and, at the same time, will allow the theory to be tested in a satisfactory way. This 
requires selection of cases according both to basic common criteria of qualification - 
in this case post-communist countries - as well as criteria that offer sufficient 
differential points for useful comparison. In the present study, four post-communist 
countries have been selected: Poland, Czech Republic, Ukraine and Lithuania. The 
selection is based upon the type and position of the military in the post-communist 
state structures of each case study. Together, the four countries covered the entire 
spectrum of possible civil-military relationships in the post-communist environment. 
Poland inherited an army that went though the transitional opening essentially intact; 
the Czech armed forces were formed on the basis of the former Czechoslovak 
federal army but retained their command and control facilities; Ukraine acquired its 
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army through 'nationalisation' of the large chunk of the Soviet Armed Forces; and 
finally Lithuania attempted to built the national army from scratch. 
Even a preliminary assessment of the democratic transformations in each of 
the selected case countries reveals significant differences in the character of civil- 
military relations. When Poland and the Czech Republic were granted membership 
of NATO in March 1999, Lithuania was still consolidating its state and democracy 
on the way to meeting NATO standards, but Ukraine lagged far behind, with a 
system that was closer to an authoritarian regime than to democracy. 
Beyond the purely military dimension, the 1999 accession of Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO was the first spectacular act of international 
recognition of success that the three post-communist countries had achieved in the 
process of democratic transformation of civil-military relations. At the same time, 
the selective mode of admission underlined the fact that the post-communist 
countries were making varying progress in democratic transition and consolidation 
and that the democratising reforms, their implementation, pace and outlook feature 
dramatic differences between the individual countries of Central Eastern Europe. 
Based on an integrated comparison of the civil-military transformations in the four 
case countries, the present study identifies the key factor that has had a decisive 
influence on those diverging outcomes of the post-communist reforms: stateness. 
This chapter has taken the security and democracy model for comparing 
democratic civil-military transitions in Central and Eastern Europe and both adapted 
it and auamented it in crucial ways that permit not only comparison, but also 
explanation. The important new aspect of analysis is the concept of stateness. This 
adds explanatory capacity to the modified security and democracy model. As has 
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been argued, the integration of stateness in the analysis creates an original and 
distinctive contribution to the study of post-communist civil-military relations and to 
the study ol'both civil-military relations and democratisation, more generally. The 
distinctive conceptual framework incorporating stateness and the three imperatives 
of restructuring, rules and effective democratic management offers both comparison 
and explanation of varied civil-military outcomes. Stateness complements the 
security and democracy model in a way that lets theory transect empirical material 
to provide an overall synthesis of comparison and explanation for the four countries 
selected. The countries themselves have been selected both for common features and 
for the spread of sub-types of civil-military relationships that they offer. Thus, the), 
provide a cross-section of common and yet assorted empirical material. Taken 
together, the cases selectcd and the analytical framework established offer a 
complementary package from which knowledge and understanding can be derived 
and inserted: the cases can be investigated, while the theory can be tested. That 
thesis, as indicated earlier, is that civil-military relations in post-communist 
countries can be compared and explained by the stateness matrix, with stateness the 
salient and explanatory variable among a set of four imperatives. The remainder of 
this thesis deals with each of those imperatives in a separate chapter - restructuring, 





Studying the stateness condition in the four post-communist countries reveals 
the full extent of their differentiation. Although the years of communist rule left a 
similar legacy for each of them, the fact was that the end of the totalitarian regimes 
found each of the case countries at a different stage of their nation-building and 
state-building processes. Poland and Ukraine are at the two extremes, the former 
being an example of consolidated stateness and sustained statehood, the latter 
presenting the case of an extremely weak nation-state, suffering from a number of 
stateness related problems. However, the stateness related problems were not 
limited to entities emerging from the Soviet Union; the collapse of the regimes also 
exposed some stateness problems in the countries of Central Eastern Europe that had 
previously been 'frozen' in the party-states. The comparison of the four case 
countries not only reveals the extent to which they differ on the stateness variable 
but also indicates that there may be various degrees to the stateness problem and that 
it is by no means limited to the new states. 
National Identity and Statehood Traditions. 
The tradition of statehood can be measured by the longevity of an historically 
confirmed existence of the state, but also by the strength of the popular myths of the 
past and the extent to which the population inhabiting the territory of the country 
recounise that state as its wwn. Much more difficult to measure is the national tl- 
identity of the population as it may rest only on the subjective feeling of the 
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population, However, the relationship between the state and its population is a 
crucial factor determining the collective identity of any nation-state and 
consequently its condition of stateness. Historically, the nation-states were a 
relatively recent phenomenon in Central Eastern Europe, and in many cases the 
bonds between the nation and the state were not properly established. The 
communist regimes were one of the factors that arrested the nation and state- 
building processes in the region. As a result, the countries that emerged as a result 
of the communist demise featured various stages of consolidation, from considerable 
homogeneity between the national identity and the state to a dangerous mismatch 
between the two. 
In this regard, the situation of Poland at the onset of the transition was 
favourable. The history of the Polish statehood dated back to 966 when the country 
adopted Christianity and entered the period of state organisation under the rule of 
the first indigenous dynasty of Piasts. Gradually, the Polish state developed into a 
medieval European power and in 1569 formed a union with Lithuania to establish 
the Polish - Lithuanian Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita). The union state, powerful 
at first, gradually weakened and began showing signs of internal decay. Despite a 
major effort undertaken during the sitting of the so called Great Sejm (parliament) 
between 1788 - 1792 to reform the Polish state, in 1795 following two earlier partial 
annexations of its lands the Polish - Lithuanian Commonwealth was partitioned 
between Russia, Austria and Prussia and ceased to exist. ' 
The ýears of Polish statelessness between 1795 and 1918 represented a 
formative period for the Polish national consciousness. The cyclical national 
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uprisings, the biggest two of which took place in 18311-32 and 1863 )-64, were the 
foundations for the great romantic tradition of heroic independence struggles. As 
Linz and Stepan noted, 'the Polish people's support for the nation was one of the 
most emotionally and historically intense in Europe. 2 The heroic tradition of armed 
struggle and national sacrifice became again evident during the years of German 
occupation during the Second World War in the formation and activities of Armia 
Krqýowa (Home Army), the biggest underground organisation in wartime Europe. 
This traumatic history formed the Polish national consciousness into a 'highly 
individualistic and anti-authoritarian' type of identity, although it was not entirely 
free from dictatorial inclinations. 3 
Poland achieved full independence in 1918 and became a multinational and 
multicultural entity. After a short period of parliamentary democracy during which 
the country experienced profound political instability, a successful military coup 
established the presidential system, featuring strong authoritarian elements. At the 
end of World War 11 Poland was formally part of the victorious alliance, yet the 
occupation by Soviet armed forces lead to the installation of a totalitarian regime in 
Poland. However, as a result of the post-war European settlements Poland gained 
one important asset: it became a territorially compressed, ethnically homogenous 
and culturally uniform nation-state. 4 
' For the historical review of the Commonwealth see Norman Davies, God's Playground: A History 
of Poland (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). 
2 Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan, Problems (? f Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern 
Europe, SozahArrierica and Post-Communist Eirrope (Baltimore & London: 1996), p. 258. 
Teresa Rakowska- H arm stone, Christopher D. Joncs, Ivan Sylvain. WarsavA, Pact: The Question of 
Cohesion (ORAE Extra-Mural Paper No 33, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, vol. I and 11, 
1981,1984), p. 175. 
Krystyna Kersten, Narod: in. v sYstenm wladiy. Polska 1943 - 48. (Birth qfthe Regime. Poland 1943 
48) (Paris: Libella, 1984), in Polish. 
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The subsequent years of communist rule, although disastrous from the point 
of view of civilisational development, strengthened the identity of the Polish nation- 
state. Moreover, the recurrent popular anti-regime protests (1956,1968,1970,1976, 
1980 to indicate just the most important ones) and the self-organisation of Polish 
society demonstrated in the success of the Solidarity movement 5 unified the Polish 
people around a common goal which, subsequently, gave a strong legitimacy to the 
6 
post-communist state and its incumbents. Judged by the condition of stateness, 
Poland was well predisposed for a quick and effective transition and consolidation 
of democracy. 
The issues of nation-state identity were more complicated for the Czech 
Republic, although the Czech traditions of statehood also went back many centuries 
to the Great Moravian Empire that was consolidated in the thirteenth century by the 
indigenous Premyslid dynasty. 7 The high levels of political, economic and cultural 
development of that medieval kingdom, particularly under the rule of Charles IV, 
was always a source of Czech national pride and provided the origins of Czech 
historical awareness. The foundation of the University of Prague in 1348 as one of 
the first in contemporary Europe as well as the indigenous reform movement of Jan 
Hus till this day represent the most important symbols of Czech identity and 
tra itions. 8 
5 Timothy Garton Ash, The Polish Revolulion. - Solidarily (London: Granta in association with 
Penguin, 1991). 0 
Wojciech Roszkowski, Historia Polski 191-4 - 1990 (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 
199 1 ), p. 417. 
7 Andrew A. Michta, The Government and Politics qf Postcommunist Europe (Westpoint. Connecticut 
& London: Praeger, 1994), pp. 29 - 30, 
Miroslav PurWbck, 'Legitimita a podpora branne politiky jako realizAtora vetejn6ho zAjmu', in 
Stefan Sarvaý a kolektiv výzkurnn6ho tymu, Be: peenost a armýida v n2oderni spoleenosli (Security 
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With the death of the king Charles IV a gradual decline of the kingdom began. 
The Thirty Years' War brought the Great Moravian kingdom to the final collapse 
and the Czech lands became incorporated into the Habsburg empire for several 
hundred years. The Battle of the White Mountain (Bild hora) in 1620 was the final 
act of resistance. The majority of the Czech protestant nobility perished in the battle., 
and in the aftermath of their defeat the remaining Czech nobility were expropriated 
and exiled by the Habsburg authorities, while the population at large was subjected 
to cultural germanisation and forced religious conversion to Catholicism. The Battle 
of the White Mountain became a symbol of the loss of independence and the 
national trauma associated with the dramatic events remained deeply embedded in 
the national Czech consciousness. The defeat at the White Mountain gave rise to the 
persistent Czech myth on the impossibility of successful national resistance to 
foreign aggression which in turn provided the basis for the contemporary anti-heroic 
attitudes of the majority of the Czech population. 9 
The tales of the Czech reformation and the legend of Jan Hus were the 
background against which the modern Czech national identity developed. They also 
inspired the 19th century intellectuals and patriots. In particular, Francisek Palacky's 
History oj' the Czech Nation in Bohemia and Moravia was a stepping stone in 
forming Czech historical awareness. '() However, until the second half of the 
nineteenth century Czech nationalism remained essentially dormant. An early 
and the Military in Modern Societies), (Praha: University Karlovy, Fakulta socWnich výd), No 6, 
1997, in Czech. 
9 Stefan Sarvaý, 'Attitudes of the Czech Republic twward National Security, the Military, and NATO 
Membership, The Journal qfthe Slavic Hilitur)lStudies. Vol. 11, No 3 (September 1998), p. 57. 
"' John Morison, 'The Road to Separation: Nationalism in Czechoslovakia'. in: Paul Latawski (ed. ), 
Contewporcu-j, Nationalism in East Centi-al Europe (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1995), pp. 69 - 
70. 
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abolition of serfdom in the Czech lands (1781) and their intensive urbanisation and 
industrialisation created favourable conditions for the social mobilisation and finally 
the revolutions of 1848 awakened Czech nationalism. However, prior to World War 
I the Czechs only demanded an increased political representation in the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire while national independence was not on the agenda. ' Thus, the 
founding of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918 was not a result of the conscious 
action of the Czech nationalists, but came about in a sequence of favourable 
international developments and a complex interplay of great powers' interests. 
Czechoslovakia originally was envisaged as a counterbalance to Gennany and 
Hungary in Central Europe, should their influence grow in the region. 12 On creating 
the common Czech and Slovak state, the great powers also took into account the 
ethnic composition and made an instrumental use of them: the Slovaks population 
strengthen the Czech against the Germans within Czechoslovakia and reduced the 
proportion of German minority. 13 Thus, the Czechoslovak Republic was conceived 
in a somewhat artificial way, based neither on language criteria nor on the ethnicity 
and from the beginning the state lacked a common goal that would have a unifying 
power for both nationalities. Generally speaking, Czechoslovakia never achieved a 
real unity or asserted a sense of common, supranational identity and as a result the 
state suffered from the symptoms of the stateness problem. 14 Differences between 
the peasant and mostly catholic Slovaks and urban, educated, Protestant Czechs 
" Michta, The Government, p. 30. 
12 Jan Urban, 'The Czech and Slovak Republics: Security Consequences of the Break-up of the 
CSFR'. in Regina Cowen Karp (ed. ) Central and Eastern Europe: Ihe Challenge qf Transition 
(SIPRI and Oxford University Press. 1993), pp. 102 - 1033. 
111 Jaroslav Krej6. Pavel Machonin. Cfechoslovakia 1918 - 1992. A Laboratot-yfi)r Social Change 
(Oxford, Macmillan Press in association with St Antony's College, 1996), pp. 20 - 42. 
14 Joseph F. Zacek, 'Nationalism in Czechoslovakia', in P. F. Sugar, I. J. Lederer, Nationalism in 
Eastern Ein-opc (University of Washington Press: Seattle, 1969), p. 166. 
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turned out to be irreconcilable and throughout the years of the Czechoslovak 
existence the Slovaks by and large represented a handicapped minority partner in the 
Czech - Slovak relationship, both under the democratic system and the communist 
regime. 
Throughout the inter-war years, Czechoslovakia remained a state of 
uncertain identity and legitimacy. The partition of Czechoslovak lands by the great 
powers in Munich in 1938 later demonstrated that the country failed to establish 
itself as a viable nation-state on the international arena. However, the inter-war 
Czechoslovakia left an important legacy of a strong and sustained democracy 
throughout the two pre-war decades which made the country an exception in the 
region. Compared to the remaining group of newly created European countries, the 
Czech democracy was characterised by a unique stability and internal strength. 16 
The political culture of the Czech population was characterised by an attachment to 
the democratic political framework and the internalisation of those democratic 
values gave Czech nationalism a more civic than ethnic outlook. Yet, even within 
the democratic framework the Slovaks were perceived by the Czech population as 
junior and immature partners in the federal state and denied greater autonomy. Such 
policy caused resentment on the part of the Slovak population and contributed to the 
development of a conservative political culture and ethnic nationalism in their part 
of the common state. ' 7 
The post-war communist regime in Czechoslovakia was established in 1948 
as a result of the communist coup. It was received by the population with a passivity 
15 Ra kowska-H arm stone, Jones, Sy)vain, Warsaw Paci, pp. 98 - 99. 
16 Michta, The Governmem, p. 30. 
" Rakowska-Harmstone, Jones, Sylvain, Warsaw Pact, pp. 98 - 99. 
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that was to become the hall mark of the Czechoslovak society for years to corne. ' s 
Despite the initial high levels of popular support for the communist rule, the Stalinist 
regime in Czechoslovakia was ruthless, specially towards the clergy, private 
entrepreneurs and later to some prominent communist activists as well. In the 1950s 
and 1960s Czechoslovakia was one of the most orthodox communist countries in the 
entire region. The eruption of social discontent during the Prague Spring of 1968 
was the only exception to the passive endurance of oppression demonstrated by the 
population at large. In 1968 in an internal Party reshuffle a Slovak- communist 
reformer Alexander Dubeek became the first secretary and initiated cautious 
reforms. ") The Soviet-led invasion of the Warsaw Pact 'friendly armies' brutally 
terminated the revolution and in the ensuing period of 'normalisation' all the social 
20 dissent was effectively quelled . 
The years of the communist rule not only failed to strengthen the weak 
Czechoslovak identity, but created some additional ethnonational conflicts by 
instrumental use of ethnic issues, for example in the composition of the military 
officer corps. In the early post-war years the Hungarian minority was persecuted and 
denied citizenship by the Slovak communist authorities; the Slovaks in their own 
turn were striving for emancipation from Czech tutelage within the Czechoslovak 
institutional framework and tried to secure a degree of influence over the political 
decisions in Prague. 21 In the 1980s, Czechoslovakia already featured political and 
"' Rakowska- Ha rm stone, Jones, Sylvain. Warsaw Pacl, p. 102. 
,9 Michta, The Governmew, p. 33. 
2' For an excellent description of the nature of Czechoslovak regime see Vaclav Havel, 
"Czechoslovakia: Stories of Totalitarianism', in Ruth Petrie (ed. ), The Fall of Communism and the 
Rise qf Nationalism, (London and Washington, Cassell. 1997), pp. 91 -I 10. 
George Schopflin, Polilies in Eastern Europe 1945 - 1992 (Oxford UK & Cambridge USA: 
Blackwell, ) 993), p. 66. 
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economic stagnation and the few existing groups of dissidents were unable to 
mobilise the public. 22 The swift collapse of the communist regime after only a few 
days of the 'Velvet Revolution' in November 1989 came as a surprise to everyone, 
including the regime incumbents, and demonstrated the extent to which the regime 
had been alienated from Czech society. 23 However, the years of communist rule had 
frozen the identity of the Czechoslovak state in its pre-war ambiguous form and all 
the stateness problems re-emerged with great intensity after the collapse of the party 
- state. The unresolved ethnic and formal issues resurfaced at the start of transition 
and exacerbated economic and political problems beyond the point of 
reconciliation. 24 The inability to reach the agreement over the political formula of 
the common state led to the break up of the federation three years after the Velvet 
Revolution, and on I January 1993 the two new independent Czech and Slovak 
Republics replaced Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak society on that occasion 
again demonstrated its characteristic passivity: although the separation did not enjoy 
much public support, the implementation of the Velvet divorce did not provoke 
mEýjor protests either. The relative indifference to the disintegration of the common 
state was the final proof of the weak identity and feeble legitimacy of the now 
defunct federal state. 
Paradoxically, the break up of the Czechoslovak Federation reinforced the Czech 
national identity and liberated the Czech Republic of many persistent problems, 
including stateness related issues. The new country became a territorially and 
ethnically homogenous entity, free of minority problems and with an instantly 
2 Linz, Stepan, Problems of Democralic, p. 3 16. 
23 See John F. Bradlev. C: whoslovokia's Velvet Revolution. - A Political Analysis (New York & 
Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1992), p, 93, 
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improved economic performance. 25 The peaceful dissolution of the federation 
allowed the Czech authorities to quickly establish the Czech Republic on the 
international arena; in addition, the separation from the Slovaks initiated the process 
of crystallising the Czech national consciousness, distinct from both the Slovak and 
from the Czechoslovak identities. However, as some Czech authors commented 
unhappily, the Czech population carried through the communist rule some 
traditional features and attitudes that might have a negative influence on democratic 
consolidation, and on the civil-military transformation in particular. Among other 
things, it was a deep rooted distrust of state institutions that for most of the Czech 
history were perceived as a representation of an alien and oppressive authority, a 
prevalence of hard and pragmatic attitudes over idealistic postures which showed in 
the political decisions of 1938,1948 and 1968 that ordered the ar-med forces to cease 
their fruitless resistance in order to avoid bloodshed, and a fluctuating defence 
willingness that always disappeared when danger was no longer explicit and 
immediate. 26 
The Czech Republic was a senior partner in the Czechoslovak Federation and 
it emerged after the 'Velvet divorce' as a stronger and better consolidated nation- 
state with an improved stateness condition. Because the Czechs remained in control 
of the federal government and major state institutions in the Czechoslovak state, in 
the aften-nath of the Velvet divorce one could not speak of the initiation of the state- 
building process, but rather of the state-organi sing and refinement of its structures. 
24 Stephen ]wan Griffiths, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. Threats to European Securii)ý SIPRI 
Research Report No 5 (Oxtbrd: Oxford University Press, 1993). pp. 28 - 32. 
25 jeffery Sinion. Ciechoslovakia's 'Felvet Divorce', Visegrad Cohesion, and European Fault Lines. 
McNair Paper 23, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University (Washington 
D. C.: October 1993), ppý 3-4. 
26 Purkrdbek, Tegitimita', pp. 90 - 93. Z, 
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Similarly, the national identity of the Czechs were reinforced by their separation 
from the Slovak Republic, yet admittedly the divorce caused a degree of social 
confusion. 27 Although the residue of the stateness problems was likely to cause 
some complications in the course of post-communist civil-military transformation in 
the Czech Republic, the emergence of the national state, the strengthening of the 
Czech collective identity and the legacy of political democracy with civic values 
deeply internalised in the Czech political culture represented important assets for the 
processes of democratisation. 
While the formation of the nation-state was a cure to most Czech stateness 
related problems, no such thing could be said about Ukraine. Ukraine had three 
fundamental problems related to the issue of the state tradition and it was the 
extreme weakness of that tradition, the lack of historical continuity and the highly 
amorphous character of Ukrainian statehood, in the past and at present. The 
discussion on the Ukrainian statehood tradition and national identity was defined by 
two characteristic features, One was the 'historical indigenousness discourse' 28 
which stemmed from the fact that the indigenous rights to inhibit the Ukrainian 
lands could be equally claimed in today's Ukraine by the Russophones and 
Ukrainophones population. The second distinctive feature of the dispute was the 
frequent use of the arguments referring to the distant, half-mythological past in the 
absence of more recent, historical arguments. 
27 Interview with Jifi Sedivý. Director, lmtitute of International Relations. Prague, interview in 
Birminaham, October 2000. 
28 See Graham Smith, Vivien Law, Andre"! Wilson, Anette Bohr, Edward Alworth, Alation-Building 
in the Posi-Soviei Bortlerlands - the I)olifics (? fNalional Identities (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), pp. 119 - 13 8. 
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The first state organisation, Kievan Rus', appeared on the territory of today's 
Ukraine in the 10"' century and lasted till the middle of the 1 33", when the Mongol 
invasion and the sack of Kiev brought the existence of Rus' to an end. Kievan Rus' 
was the largest and one of the most powerful states of medieval Europe and Kiev 
was the great centre of trade, religion and culture in that period. It is not clear, 
however, who established the medieval state and founded Kiev, so the 
'indigenousness discourse' focused on that controversy. Theories that Kievan Rus' 
was established by the Normans were rejected by both Russian and Ukrainian 
historians who preferred to stress the role of the local Slav tribes in the formation of 
the medieval kingdom. Yet, the Ukrainophones saw the Kievan Rus' as the 
homeland of the Ukrainian nation and the genuine beginning of Ukrainian state 
tradition, whereas their Russophone counterparts rejected that interpretation and 
perceived the medieval state as a predecessor of Muscovy and later Russia. 29 
Although the controversy dated back to Tsarist Russia, in contemporary Ukraine it 
acquired special importance. 
After the sack of Kiev, the territory of today's Ukraine became 'a frontier 
zone that for several centuries remained at the intersection of the continually shifting 
borders of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Ottoman Empire, the Polish - 
Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Crimean Tatar Khanate, and Muscovy'. 30 For the 
Ukrainian national tradition the period of Cossack settlement on the Zaporozhian 
islands and the left bank of the river Dnieper from the 16 th century until 18t" century 
was the most significant development in that period. The Cossacks established a 
'q Smith et al., , Vation-Building, pp. 127 -- 132, Andrew Wilson, Ukruinia" j\utionulism in the 1990s. 
A Ifinoi-ii), Faith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1997), pp. 2-4. 
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self-governing autonomy, the so called Hetmanate and their movement is today 
treated as a fundamental part of Ukraine national identity. 31 
In the I gth century Ukraine experienced a national revival, but it was not 
until World War I that the Ukrainians undertook several attempts to establish their 
own state. Over the period from November 1917 to December 1919 three short-lived 
quasi-state formed on the Ukrainian territory: the Ukrainian People's Republic, 
which fell to the Bolshevik invasion, the Hetmanate, which was the product of a 
Ukrainian separate peace with Germany and Austro-Hungary and finally the 
Directorate. All three entities soon disintegrated and the internecine nationalist wars, 
the peasant uprising and war operations brought poverty, deprivation and death to 
Ukraine. 32 
Following the Ukrainian defeat to the Bolshevik forces, the Ukrainian 
territory was partitioned and partly incorporated into the Soviet Union, while the 
remaining part went to the newly created Polish state. Ukrainian efforts to establish 
a national state during the Second World War were even more short-lived than the 
earlier attempt, and ended in unification of the whole Ukrainian territory under 
Soviet rule. The independence finally came in 1991, but then 'it was not so much 
won by, as bequeathed to, Ukrainian nationalists'. 33 The suddenly independent state 
lacked a viable tradition, lacked the experience of the modern government and 
'0 Alexander Motyl and Bohdan Kravchenko, 'Ukraine: from Empire to Statehood'. in Ian Bremmer 
and Ray Taras (eds. ), New States, Nc-ýv Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 236. 
Motyl, Kravchenko, Trorn Empire, pp. 237 - 239; Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, pp. 6-7. 
32 A concise overview of Ukrainian history from early to modern Ukraine can be found in Bohdan 
Nahaylo, The Ukrainian Resurgence (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1999), pp, I- 19. 
Motyl. Kravchenko, 'From Empire', p. 235. 
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lacked state models other than imperial or totalitarian ones 34 that could not be 
supportive in the course of transition to democracy. Thus, any attempt to find a 
'usable past' was inevitably reduced to historiography or even mythology. 35 
The second great weakness of the Ukrainian state tradition was its 
discontinuity. The long periods of foreign domination and frequent partitions of 
territory fragmented the history of Ukraine and deprived its institutions of historical 
roots. As a result, Ukraine does not have institutional models to draw upon in the 
course of its state-building process. Nor does it have the state symbols that have 
common connotations and a unifying influence for the society at large. 36 
The national tradition of Ukraine is somewhat stronger than the statehood 
tradition, and over the centuries produced a discernible, though weak, national 
identity. But rather than being a cohesive entity, the Ukrainian national tradition 
represented a range of 'identity options', additionally complicating the stateness 
problem in that republic. 37 
Ukrainian identity was caught between the two conflicting traditions which 
had developed over the centuries and today are difficult to reconcile. There is a 
tradition of full assimilation of the Ukrainian elite to the Russian elite, associated 
with the Little Russianism ideology. Smith characterised it as 'an instrumental 
identity, a rational calculation of the greater practical and symbolic benefits of 
34 Alexander J. Motyl, Dilemmas of Independence. - Ukraine after Totalitarianism (New York: Council 
of Foreign Policy Relations, 1993), p. xii. 
Ilya Prizel, Nalional Identiýy and Foreign Polic. y. Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia 
and Ukraine (Cambrid-e: Cambridge University Press. 1998), p. 2. 
Ilya Prizel. 'Ukraine Between Proto-Democracy and 'Soft' Authoritarianism'.. in Karen Dawisha, 
Bruce Parrot, Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and 
Moldova (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 33 1. 
37 Smith, Law et al., Nalion-Building, p. 138. 
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Russian culture'. 38 For centuries, Ukrainian elites supplied cadres for the imperial, 
and later Soviet, bureaucracy and army, and their identity merged with the 
Russian/Soviet one. The tradition of Little Russianism (which had its equivalent in 
Polish - Ukrainian relations) weakened Ukrainian claims to self-determination and 
was a source of the already mentioned 'indigenous discourse'. 
The second strand of Ukrainian tradition was embedded in the memory of 
national dissent and liberation struggles, from Cossack uprisings in the 16 th and 17 th 
centuries, through the history of World War 1, to the subversive activities of the 
Ukrainian fighters before the Second World War. The martyrdom of the Great 
Famine in the 19332 - 3333 and the memory of the forced collectivisation and 
urbanisation of the Soviet Ukraine also belong to this stream. 39 But the most 
controversial part of this tradition is the history of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army 
(UPA) which operated in the western regions as a guerrilla force before and during 
the Second World War, fighting German, Soviet and Polish forces alike. While the 
nationalists, particularly from the radical Ukrainian National Assembly, celebrate 
the activities of the UPA as a heroic struggle against the enemies of the Ukrainian 
nation, in the Soviet and Polish historiography the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was 
considered a fascist, extremist and terrorist organisation. 40 Nevertheless, the 
population of Western Ukraine was receptive to the nationalist pull of the UPA 
tradition, and the assertive, ethnic based identity associated with it. 
Smith, Law et al., Nation-Building, p. 132. 
Bohdan Kravchenko, Social Change and Naiional Consciousness in Twenlieth Ccnturý, L7kraine 
(Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta and St Anthony Colle(,, e, Oxford, 
1985). 
4c) Tor Bukkvoll, Ukraine and European Security, Chatham House Papers, (London: RIIA, 1997), pp. 
14 - 16ý M ichta, The Govemment, p. 199. 
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As a result of the identity rift ,a 
large part of the Ukrainian population 
became divided along Russophone/ Ukrainophone lines. This identity divide was 
additionally intensified by its overlap with the regional divisions in Ukraine which 
also corresponded to the layout of political preferences, particularly in the early 
1990S. 41 The Western Ukraine was traditionally nationally conscious and anti- 
Russian, while the eastern regions of the country were largely Russified and anti- 
nationalist. The complex identity/regional/political cleavages were vividly 
demonstrated by the structure of votes cast for two presidential candidates in the 
Kravchuk - Kuchma runoff elections in 1994. Kravchuk, running on nationalist 
platform, scored in the Western regions between 70% - 95%, while Kuchma, 
perceived to be pro-Russian, received between 67% and 88% in Eastern Ukraine. 42 
The Ukraine that emerged after the break up of the USSR was ill-prepared 
for independent functioning as a state. It had the appearance of a typical nation-state, 
yet in reality the country lacked most of its modern attributes. Its borders were 
uncertain, the national composition owed to the unpredictable politics in the Soviet 
Union, and instead of a nation, genuine institutions and ruling procedures, Ukraine 
in 1991 only had 'prerequisites of statehood' in place. 43 In terms of state tradition, 
the only legacy available to the creators of the Ukrainian state was their Soviet 
heritage. This legacy, however, was generally incompatible with the task of effective 
41 Valeri Khmelko, Andrew Wilson, 'Regionalism and Ethnic and Linguistic Cleavages in Ukraine', 
in Taras Kuzio (ed. ), Contemporary Ukraine: Lýynamics (? f Post-Soviet Transformation (New York 
and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 60 - 78. 
42 Roman Solchanyk, 'Ukraine: The Politics of Reform', Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 42, No. 
6, November/December 1995, p. 48. 
. 411 Motyl, Dilemmas of Independence, pp. 34 - 35. The institution which bore the brunt of the sudden 
chang, e was the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet (parliament). See David M. Olson, 'New Wine in Old 
Institutions: Parliaments in Post-Communist Democracies', Problems ql* Post- Com m un ism, Vol. 46, 
No 1, January/ February 199 1, pp. 15 - 23. 
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dernocratisation because, as Motyl noted, the Soviet era institutions precluded rapid 
transition to democracy, civil society, rule of law and market economy and elites 
were poorly prepared to govern the modern nation-state. 44 A po st- independence 
Ukraine lacked both a national identity and a state tradition. It was in a situation 
where it had to initiate the building of the nation and of the state, yet the two 
processes were likely to represent conflicting logics that would be detrimental to 
dernocratisation. 4' Briefly, a post-independent Ukraine lacked any tradition, state or 
national, that would be conducive to transition and supportive to democratic 
consolidation and both the state and the nation in a sense had to be constructed from 
scratch. However, despite the weakness of all features of Ukrainian stateness, that is 
the state tradition, national identity, and institutional experience Ukraine 
nevertheless pursued the policy of civic-oriented nationalism and inclusive nation- 
building. 46 The nation-building programme in Ukraine was organised in accordance 
to three imperatives: first, identification of Russia as 'the other' and so the point of 
reference for 'Ukrainess'; secondly, promotion of a 'civiC sense of nationhood, 
47 
based on a loyalty to the territory; and thirdly, building of an inter-ethnic accord . 
Lithuania also emerged from the Soviet Union amalgam, yet its stateness 
problems were considerably less than in the case of Ukraine, owing to a longer state 
history and established national identity. The Lithuanian written history dates back 
to the 133th century. Around 1230 various Lithuanian tribes became united under the 
44 Alexander Motyl, 'State, Nation and Elites in Independent Ukraine, in Kuzio (ed. ), Contemporuty 
Ukraine, p. 3. 
45 Such situation and its consequences are described in Linz, Stepan, Problems, p. 25. 
46 Mykola Riabchouk, 'Civil Society and Nation Building in Ukraine', in Kuzio, Contemporary, p. 
84. 
47 Motyl. 'State. Nation', p. 7. 
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power of the Grand Duke Mindaugas. Lithuania became converted to Christianity in 
1387 as the last nation in Europe after the Lithuanian duke Jogaila (in Polish 
Jagiello) accepted the Polish crown. In 1569 the Lithuanian Grand Duchy unified 
with Poland and formed the Commonwealth. The common Polish - Lithuanian state 
existed until its final partition in 1789.48 
Although the period of the Polish - Lithuania commonwealth was politically 
significant for both countries, contemporary Lithuanian views on that period are 
mostly critical. The opinions expressed and published by Lithuania nationalists in 
the early 1990s were particularly negative. 49 With time, however, they became more 
balanced. For Poles, as Karpinski observed, 'an idealised Lithuania is a part of an 
idealised Polish past', 'O however for the Lithuanians the issue is more complex: 
Christianisation of their country and the Polish Lithuanian common state did bring 
the Lithuanians into the Western cultural sphere and strengthened them, yet it 
resulted in the rapid polonisation of the Lithuanian nobles and arrested a 
development of the Lithuanian national language and identity for many centuries. 51 
Despite this Polish and Lithuanian sides officially reconciled their differing views 
and the past is no longer a contentious issue. 52 Nevertheless Lithuanian historians 
prefer to stress the pre-Christianisation period until the 13 th century and the history 
48 V. Stanley Vardys, Judith B. Sedaitis, Lithuania: the Rebel Nation (Boulder, Colo. & Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1997), pp. 9- 14. 
49 For example Gintaras Tamalaitis, National Security and Defence Poliqv qf the Lithuanian State, 
Research Paper No 26 (New York and Geneva: UNIDIR, 1994), p. 1. 
50 Jakub Karpifiski, 'Poland and Lithuania Look Toward a Common Future', Transition, 4 April 
1997, p. 15. 
Alfred Erich Zenn, 'Lithuania: Rights and Responsibilities of Independence', in Bremmer, Taras, 
Neu, States, pp. 57 - 64. 
', 2 Interview with Dovil6 Survilait6, Third Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania, Warsaw, 
Poland. April 1999. 
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of 19'h and 20'h centuries in Lithuania as the formative periods of national identity 
and tradition. 
Modern Lithuanian national identity started forming during the cultural 
renaissance of the 19th century and gradually evolved into a political awakening. 53 
In 1918 Lithuania gained the formal independence that lasted until the outbreak of 
the 11 World War. 54 Democracy, however, did not survive long but broke down in 
1926 in the aftermath of a military coup, directly provoked by the plans to reduce 
the officer corps. Afterwards, an authoritarian regime of Antanas Smetona's was 
installed and ruled until 1940, and although the regime was described as 'benign 
rather than malignant', 55) its record in domestic politics was far from civic-oriented 
and featured military corporatist policies, narrow ethnic chauvinism and religious 
oppression of minorities. The maltreatment of minorities in particular caused 
international criticism of the Lithuanian state. 
The international position of Lithuania was difficult throughout the inter-war 
period. The state had poor relations with its neighbours; Polish - Lithuanian 
relations in particular were hostile after the Polish annexation of Vilnus in 1920. 
Nevertheless the pre-war Lithuania scored many significant successes as it managed 
to build a viable nation-state and establish itself on the international arena, 
5- 3 More on the cultural ernancipation of Lithuanian population form Polish culture, see Karpi6ski, 
'Poland and Lithuania', p. 16 - 17. 
54 For more details on the inter-war history of Lithuania, see John Hiden, Patrick Salmon, The Baltic 
Nalions and Europe. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the I it, entieth Ceniury (London and New 
York: Longman, 1994), pp. 43 - 58. 
Nicholas Hope, Interwar Statehood: Symbol and Reality', in Graham Smith, The Baltic Slates. The 
National Seýf-Determinalion of Estonia, LaIvia and Lithuania (London: Macmillan Press, 1994), p. 
63. 
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performing well economically and making tremendous progress towards building a 
national elite. 56 
Lithuanian independence came to an abrupt end in 1940. On the 21 July 1940 
the state was incorporated by force into the USSR. 57 During the war Lithuania 
experienced successive Soviet - German - Soviet waves of invasion and undertook 
an armed attempt to shake off the Soviet rule, but the Soviet forces prevailed. The 
communist rule brought large scale oppression for the Lithuanian population that 
suffered mass deportations during the war. However, after the war the Lithuanian 
republic managed to establish a modicum of national autonomy within the USSR 
and fostered its own culture and language. Lithuania was also among the most 
rebellious republics in the USSR and a dissident movement was always present 
58 there . 
The experience of the inter-war statehood was a defining experience for the 
contemporary national consciousness of the Lithuanian people, both in terms of 
national and state awareness. This tradition helped the Lithuanians survive the years 
of Soviet rule and save their language and culture, 59 it also offered 'a rich variety of 
the pre-Soviet national symbols' to draw upon 60 in the course of post-communist 
transition that were of paramount importance. The history of the inter-war period 
became subsequently mythologised and became a frame of reference for all political 
56 For a history of inter-war state see Vardys, Sedaitis, Lithuania, pp. 28 - 43. 
57 Michta, The Government, 1994, pp. 128 - 129. 
58 Anatol Lieven, The Baltic Revolution. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence 
(New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 20 - 53, Alfred Erich Senn, 'Lithuania's 
First Two Years of Independence', Journal qj'BullicStudies, Vol. XXV, No. 1, Spring 1994. p. 355. 
S9 For discussion on the nature of the Lithuanian national identity, see Hank Johnston., 'The 
Comparative Study of Nationalism: Six Pivotal Themes From the Baltic States', Journal qf'Ballic 
Studies, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, Surnmer 1992, pp. 95 - 103. 
60 Smith, The Baltic States, p. 12 1. 
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actors in the post-communist state. 61 The most prominent politicians derived their 
origins from the pre-war nationalist movements, among them Vytautas Lanclsbergis 
and his Sajudis movement that played the crucial role in the Lithuanian quest for 
independence. Landsbergis's personal credentials were not represented by a record 
of any anti-Communist dissident activity, but by the family history of merits for the 
Lithuanian culture, language and the political activity in the First Republic. 
Landsbergis regarded himself as a political heir of the pre-war Lithuanian president, 
Antanas Smetona. 62 
Here lies the greatest problem of the national identity and state tradition of 
contemporary Lithuania. The modem consciousness of the Lithuanian people is 
somewhat obsolete, deeply embedded in the historical past that is treated with 
admiration and was not subjected to critical reflections in a public debate. There was 
little if any discussion on the break-up of the democratic system in pre-war 
Lithuania under the authoritarian pressures from various movements rooted in 
Catholicism, nationalism and socialism. 63 The pre-war state provided Lithuania with 
modem state tradition and strengthened its identity and without that experience 
Lithuania would likely have experienced equally serious problems of stateness as 
Ukraine did. However, such an uncritical approach to its own national legacy may 
foster some anti -democratic, exclusive movements that derive their origin from the 
pre-war period. For example, the leader of the Sauliai paramilitary forces when 
inquired before the 1992 elections how he would react to the post-communist 
government formed as a result of electoral victory, answered that his forces would 
" Kristian Gerner. Stefan Hedlund, The Soviet Siates and the End of the Soviet Empire. (London and 
New York: Routlege, 1993), pp. 51 - 62. 
62 Lieven. The Baltic, p. 73. 
Vardys. Sedaitisý Lithuania: the Rebel, p. 34, Lieven, The Baltic, chapter 3, pp. 64 - 69 
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tolerate such a government only as long as it would not act against the interests of 
the Lithuanian state. 64 Thus, in addition to the task of building a modern state 
Lithuania faced the necessity of 'updating' its national identity to avoid the 
repetition of the problems that hampered the pre-war nation-state. 
Transitional Opening of the Communist Regime. 
Differences in the internal position of the regimes can partially account for 
the different modes of transitional opening in the post-communist countries. While 
in some countries the society mobilised enough resources to be able to negotiate 
with the regime, in other states only the externally initiated transition was possible. 
The opening may be strong or weak, depending on the individual characteristics of 
the country's tradition and situation, but in any case 'the manner of inaugurating a 
new, democratic regime had a significant effect over the regime's subsequent 
evolution'. 65 Thus, the transitional opening represents one of the factors that have an 
important influence over democratisation processes in the post-communist countries. 
The transitional opening in Poland beyond doubt counted among the 
strongest among the communist states. It came into effect through the Round Table 
talks between the regime and the opposition. Such a mode of transition is described 
66 , 67 in the subject literature as a 'transplacement' , transition through transaction' , or a 
64 Lieven, The Baltic, Revolution, p. 74. 
65 J. Samuel Valenzuela, 'Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, 
and Facilitatin- Conditions', in in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela 
(eds. ), Issues in Democratic Consolidation. The New South American Democracies in Comparative 
Perspective (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Darne Press, 1992). p. 75. 
66 'in transplacements democratization is produced by the combined actions of government and n 
opposition'. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave. Democrati.: ation in the Late Twentieth Centuly 
(Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), p, 15 1. 
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'pacted transition 68 . Two 
features are crucial here: the joint involvement of both 
regime representatives and the opposition in the opening and an agreement on the 
conditions of opening prior to the initiation of the change of regime. A consensual 
approach to the opening is an advantage at the start of democratisation, however, the 
problem may come later when the settlement that had been reached under the 
circumstances of the authoritarian/totalitarian regime in the crisis situation remained 
binding in a completely changed political environment. For Poland, the Round Table 
agreement in the short run prevented an outbreak of political crisis and possibly 
bloodshed as well as facilitating a smooth start of the democratisation process; most 
importantly, it strengthened the positions of the dissidents in the eyes of the regime 
representatives and promoted them to the role of politicians rather than illegal 
opposition members. Consequently, their distinctive non-communist identity drew 
the line between the communist regime and the non-communist government once 
the first opposition representative was nominated Prime Minister. However, the 
long-term consequences of the Round Table agreement were negative as they 
delayed the transition and 'had an unforeseen hannful effect on Poland's efforts to 
create the political institutions necessary for democratic consolidation'. 69 
In the complex trade-off a compromise was reached at the Round Table in 
1989 in which the communist representatives agreed to the abolition of the 
communist monopoly of power, to create an upper parliamentary chamber and to 
organise free and competitive elections for that chamber in return for a contractual 
election and guaranteed majority in a lower parliamentary chamber, the Sejm. A 
67 Scott Mainwaring, 'Transitions to Democracv and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and 
Comparative Issues', in in Mainwaring, O'Donnell, Valenzuela (eds. ), Issues in Democratic, p. 323. 
69 Linz, Stepan, Problems, pp. 264 - 269. 
69 Linz, Stepan. Problems, pp. 267. 
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replacement of the collegial presidency of the Council of the State by a one-person 
presidency was another important condition. The presidency was the key institution 
designed to guarantee that the vital interests of the regime would not be violated and 
to secure political leverage of the communist party. To this end, extensive powers in 
the realm of internal security and national defence were granted to the president, 
among them the function of the Commander-in-Chief of the An-ned Forces and 
chairmanship of the Home Defence Committee (a powerful body infamous for its 
role in the introduction and administration of the 1981 martial law). emergency 
powers, and influence over govemynent composition and policy. Only the fact that 
the president was elected by the combined parliamentary chambers known as 
National Assembly somewhat weakened his otherwise powerful position. 70 
The Round Table settlement was not intended to pre-shape democratic 
institutions, but only to carry out a limited liberalisation 71 of the system and boost 
the regime legitimacy through the partially free elections. But the June 1989 vote in 
Poland repeated the pattern of 'stunning elections' described by Huntington 72 and 
brought a disastrous defeat to the regime representatives running in competitive 
election to the Senate: out of 100 seats only one was won by an independent 
representative associated with the ruling party. The electoral results corrected the 
settlement of the Round Table that was over-favourable for the already weak 
communist side and Poland entered the path of full democratisation, though with 
70 Maurice D. Simon, 'Institutional Development of Poland's Post-Communist Sejm: A Comparative 
Analysis', in David M. 01son, Philip Norton, The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe 
(Portland, Oregon and London. Frank Cass Ltd., 1996), pp. 61 - 63. 
For a discussion on the concept of liberalisation versus democratisation, see Guillermo O'Donnell, 
Philippee C. Schmitter. Transitions Froin Authoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain 
Democracies (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press. 1986), pp. 7- 11. 
72 Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 174 - 192. 
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some key institutions of democracy already pre-designed. Additionally, the 'power 
ministries' had been designated to the communist politicians at the Round Table 
deal and that had to be observed by the first non-communist minister. While such a 
solution may have had a protective influence on the Polish transition, it made 
national defence the last sector to be reformed. 
The Round Table agreement also caused legal problems: this de facto 
constitutional reform was carried out in a non-constitutional way, by a body of 
negotiators without democratic mandate. Therefore, after the June 1989 elections the 
Constitution from 1952 had to be promptly amended in order to sanction the 
changes. Thus, the particular mode of opening in Poland weakened the legitimacy of 
the dernocratisation process in the long run and laid the foundations for a hybrid 
political system where presidential - parliamentary conflict was inherent to the 
system. Similarly, many institutional problems of civilian control of the military 
originated from the awkward solutions of the Round Table agreement, the 
provisions of which were incompatible with modern democratic civil-military 
relations. Finally, the practice of forming an institution around a particular person 
the way the presidency had been designed for general Wojciech Jaruzelski at the 
Round Table pushed Polish politics toward personalisation and was detrimental to 
the systemic, institutional reforms. 
With regard to the Czech case, it may be said that the country experienced two Z: ' 
transitional openings, yet both of them weak. The first one took place in November 
1989 and initiated dcmocratic transformation. The second one was the Velvet 
divorce of 1992/19933 and it marked the birth of the Czech nation-state. 
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The first opening was a typical 'transition through collapse' initiated through the 
snowballing effect of other openings in Central Eastern Europe, rather than the 
'transplacement' proposed by Huntington 73 . In the 
Czech conditions of frozen 
communist orthodoxy the external initiation of the change was probably the only 
possible one. 74 The Czechoslovak society essentially lacked the self-organising 
qualities, its dissident movement was very weak and therefore could not be a 
75 
partner for regime representatives to negotiate a transaction with . Instead, the 
communist regime remained in the frozen condition until a combination of external 
and internal factors literally pushed the communist incumbents out of power. 
Among the external factors that were decisive for the regime collapse in 
Czechoslovakia was the Warsaw Pact summit of early November 1989 where the 
1968 invasion on CSFR was condemned, effectively depriving the Czechoslovakian 
communist leadership of the basis of its legitimacy and paving the way for the 
change of regime. 76 It was not, however, until the massive demonstrations in Prague 
and the general strike in the country broke out that the communist regime realised 
the extent of its weakness and alienation and stepped down. There is some evidence, 
however, that the Czechoslovak communist party leaders attempted to use force 
against the opposition. The regime sought support from the army, interior troops and 
workers militias as its last resort, and only when those efforts failed, the party-state 
finally collapsed and the process of democratisation began. 77 However, the 
discovering of the regime's efforts to organise the army operation against the 
73 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 113. 
7' Linz, Stepan, Prohlems (? f'Dcmocralic. pp. 320 - 322. 
75 Timothy Garton Ash, Czechoslovakia under the Ice', in Timothy Garton Ash, The Uses (? f 
A dversio,. - Essa. vs o" the Fate of Ce"tral Europe (New York: Random House, 1989), p. 62. 
76 Sch6pflin, Politics, p. 235. 
77 Sch6pflin, Politics, p. 238; Bradley, Czechoslovakia's Felvel, pp. 78 - 93. 
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opposition movement had a tremendous impact on the post-communist civil-military 
relations in the Czech Republic and contributed to the attitude of suspicion and 
distrust of the society towards the military. 
The Czechoslovak velvet revolution occurred with unexpected ease and 
speed. Due to that very swift development of events Czechoslovak society failed to 
organise itself into a strong, supra-national and self-conscious movement that would 
be later able to take the leadership of the federal country and proceed with rapid 
political transformation. Instead, two separate and nationally- based movements 
emerged in the aftermath of the November 1989 transitional opening: the Civic 
Forum in the Czech Republic and the Public against Violence in Slovakia. A bitter 
debate about the future of the country and a personal conflict between the leaders of 
the two movements ensued and resulted in the weakening of the legitimacy of the 
common Czechoslovak state and stalling of the constitutional reforms. 78 From such 
a perspective, the first opening in 1989 initiated the dernocratisation process, but at 
the same time it was a lost opportunity to strengthen the identity of the 
Czechoslovak state; instead, the Velvet revolution gave the impulse to the 
subsequent break up of Czechoslovakia. 
The second opening came on I January 1992 in the form of the 'Velvet 
divorce' which constituted a final act of revision of the myth about Czechoslovak 
common purpose 79 and was important for the identity of the Czech nation-state. A 
"' While historical. social and ethnic differences played an important role in the break up of the 
Czechoslovak Federation, Linz and Stepan offer an institutional explanation and stressed the 
importance of the institutional weakness of the federal system in Czechoslovakia. In their opinion, 
lack of early and radical political reform of a constitutional system were determinates of the 
subsequent split. See Linz, Stepan, Problenis, pp. 328 - 333. 
'9 Carol Skalnik Leff. * Democratisation and Disintearation in Multinational States', in World Politics, 
Vol. 5 1. No 2, January 1999, p. 217. 
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very gentle mode of separation and the public acquiescence to the political decision 
in spite of a good degree of uncertainty regarding the possible consequences of the 
split were both conducive to the security and stability in the separating countries and 
the region as a whole, but as a result, the moment of the 'Velvet divorce' lacked a 
distinctive character as an historical event, or as a symbolic watershed and founding 
moment of the nation-state. Instead, it had a taste of an administrative decision and 
remained void of emotional connotations for the majority of the Czech population. 80 
in that sense, both Czech openings were weak - they were almost too velvet. 
Ukraine could be classified as a case of 'regime initiated change'g' 
suggesting a pre-arranged, co-ordinated action of the ruling regime. However, in this 
particular case the regime representatives in fact turned themselves into the regime 
renegades and began to pursue their own agenda. The opening in Ukraine took place 
in the conditions of a rapid decline in the legitimacy of the USSR, under which 
circumstances the former communist functionaries turned to national ideology and 
political pragmatism as viable alternative that would allow them to remain in power. 
The former communist incumbents sided with the nationalists, particularly from the 
largest nationalist organisation Rukh and led the republic to independence. 82 In that 
context, Huntington's term 'transformation', understood as a process where 'those in 
power in the authoritarian regime take the lead and play the decisive role in ending 
"' Interview with JiN Sedivy, Director, Institute of International Relations, Prague, interview in 
Birmingham, October 2000. 
81 Linz, Stepan, Problems, p. 373. 
92 'Independence was won by people who for most part had fought for independence with their lives. ' 
So succinctly summarised Motyl and Krawchenko the Ukrainian march to independent state. See 
Motyl, Kravchenko, 'From Empire', p. 257. 
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that regime and changing it into a democratic system', 83 seems best suited to 
describe the Ukrainian opening. 
The drive for power of the communist elite was the crucial factor in the 
opening of communist regime in Ukriane; the ever growing economic expectations 84 
and environmental protests 85 were also instrumental. Yet, the military issues were 
already high on the political agenda even before the transformation began. In some 
sense, the civil-military transformation in Ukraine began even before full 
independence was gained. Already in 1989 the idea of creating a separate Ukrainian 
armed forces was considered, and the 1990 Declaration of Sovereignty enshrined the 
right of Ukraine to form a republican armed forces. 86 The acceptance of the idea of 
creating republican level militaries was accepted in the prQject of the new Union 
Treaty in 1991 and signalled a demise of the Soviet Union. 87 Another contentious 
issue was the maltreatment of the Ukrainian conscripts in the Soviet army and non- 
recognition of the October 1990 republican law on the ukrainisation of the armed 
forces that granted Ukrainian conscripts the right to serve only in the home republic. 
One obvious result of the Ukrainian mode of opening was that it enabled the 
former communist republic elite to remain in power in the independent state and to 
83 'in transplacements democratization is produced by the combined actions of government and 
opposition. ' Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 124. 
Motyl, Krawchenko, ' From Empire, pp. 244 - 246. 
85 Motyl, Kravchenko, , *From Empire', pp. 244 - 246. Environmental hazards were later recognised 
as a potential security threat to independent Ukraine. See Phillip Petersen, 'Security Policy in the 
Post-Soviet Slavic Heartland and Moldova', European Security, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Autumn 1992), pp. 321 
-322. 
'ý" Taras Kuzio. 'Civil Military Relations in Ukraine, 1989 - 1991', Armed Forces & Societj,, Fall 
1995, Vol. 22, No 1, pp. 25 - 42. 
87 Robert V. Barylski, 'The Soviet Military before and after the Au-gust Coup: Departization and 
Decentralization', Armed Forces & SocielY, Vol. 19, No 1, Fall 1992, pp. 35 - 37. 
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take advantage of the changed circumstances to secure their position and interests. 88 
The presence of the old elites in the post-independence government had a 
moderating influence on the process of Ukrainian emancipation from the Soviet 
Union; later, however, the former communist politicians carried over the political 
culture from the USSR as well as the methods of government, stalling systemic 
reforms and delaying institutional transformation. 89 
In Lithuania, the context for opening was strikingly different. The opening 
in Lithuania had a mixed character, combining several characteristics from various 
modes of transitional opening. One of the defining features of the early transition 
period in Lithuania was a close co-operation and co-ordination of the opposition 
activities in the three Baltic states. This co-operation, although not free from 
problems, gave an additional moral strength and a political leverage to the dissidents 
in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and laid the fundaments for the prospective Baltic 
co-operation. The development of the so called Popular Fronts from 1988 onwards 
in all of the three countries was particularly significant for the liberation movement 
and for subsequent co-operation. 90 
The initial dissident demands in the Baltic republics focused on the issues of 
ecology, economy and military as well as including some moderate political 
postulates. However, the radicalisation of the popular fronts quickly became evident 
and in 1988 the rights to national self- determination and independent statehood were 
put on the opposition agenda. 91 The anti-Soviet, nationalist mobilisation reached the 
greatest intensity in Lithuania between 1989 and 1991 where it was spearheaded by 
"' Prizel. 'Ukraine', p. 345. 
89 Motyl, 'State, Nation-, p. 9. 
')0 Hiden, Salmon, The Baltic Nations, pp. 148 - 150. 
9' Smith, The Nationa4, pp. 128 - 136. 
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the nationalist movement Sajudis and its charismatic leader V. Landsbergis. The 
secessionist pressures were growing and in May 1989 Lithuania announced the 
declaration on sovereignty where it asserted that only the laws adopted by its 
Supreme Soviet and republican referendum would be valid. However, despite the 
visible radicalisation of the opposition movement the transition was taking place in 
co-operation with the local communist party and negotiated with Moscow up until 
April 1990. During that time, both the Sajudis movement and the Lithuanian 
Communist Party participated first in the 1989 elections to the USSR's Congress of 
People's Deputies in Moscow, and in the following year to the Lithuanian Supreme 
Council. Also, the Lithuanian Communist Party split with the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union and despite Gorbachev's persuasion to renegade on that decision, 
the Lithuanian chairman of the party showed an inclination to work with the Sajudis 
movement. 92 Until then, Lithuania seemed to be looking towards a pacted transition 
mode. 
The change came in April 1990 with the imposition of an economic blockade on 
the Lithuanian republic by Gorbachev, and when it failed, a military crackdown in 
January 1991.93 That attempt to quell the Lithuanian nationalist movement by force 
reminded the indigenous population of the worst historical experiences of relations 
with Russia and destroyed the last opportunity for the pacted transition. Instead, the 
Russian troops met with popular resistance from the Lithuanian society and that 
action by the civilian population was decisive for the liberation of the country. The 
dramatic circumstances of the Lithuanian opening boosted national confidence and 
strengthened the resolve with Nvhich the Lithuanian authorities were striving to get 
rid of tile Soviet institutions; however, the legacy of the transitional opening was not 
Senn, 'Lithuania', pp. 357 - 359. 
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so good for the future of the national military because it lowered the prestige of the 
military as an institution, a prestige that was already low from the communist 
period. 
Polity - Demos Congruency. 
A degree of congruency between the nation and The state constitutes an 
important sub-variable of the stateness, having a direct and significant impact on the 
overall legitimacy of the state. The congruency may be measured against the 
nationality situation, territorial problems, cultural and linguistic issues and the 
citizenship formula. The assessment of each of these factors allows for an 
assessment of the legitimacy of any individual state, or rather to identify the 
substantial legitimacy problems if the situation is one of a serious mismatch between 
the nation and the state. While the situation where the nation is contiguous with the 
state does not automatically guarantee legitimacy to that state, the relation of the 
extreme discongruency between the polity and the demos would always weaken the 
condition of stateness, unden-nine the legitimacy of the state and threaten internal 
agreement on the political system. Under such circumstances, weak nation-states are 
always tempted to carry out the policies of national homogenisation and that may 
lead to ethnic conflict and the disruption of the democratisation processes. The 
polity-demos congruency sub-variable helps define the stateness condition of the 
four selected case countries at the start of democratic transition and determines, to a 
certain extent, the prospects for democratic consolidation in each of the countries. 
')-' Hiden. Salmon, The Baltic Nations, pp, 162 - 170. 
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As a homogenous nation-state, Poland was in an advantageous nationality 
situation compared to most other post-communist countries in the region. The 
country became a genuine nation-state only after the Second World War as a result 
of post-war border shifts and massive resettlement of minorities through which it 
acquired a compact territory and near-homogenous national composition. According 
to the 1990 estimation, 97.6% of the population was ethically Polish, with minorities 
representing only a tiny percentage: 1.3% German, 0.6% Ukrainian, 0.5% 
Belorussian. 94 There were also very small populations of Lithuanians, Slovaks and 
Roma people. That national composition made Poland the only post-communist 
country ethnically homogenous where the nation was fully contiguous with the state, 
eliminating most of the possible stateness problems that might occur in the course of 
democratic transition. 94; The absence of minorities did not entirely free the Polish 
population from ethnic prejudices which are sometimes manifested, particularly 
towards Gypsy and Jewish populations, yet the problem of the treatment of the 
residual minorities in Poland is more the problem of paternalism rather than all-out 
96 discrimination. It is also continuously monitored by official institutions, among 
them the Parliamentary Standing Commission for National and Ethnic Minorities. 
Similarly, Poland is free from territorial problems. In the aftermath of the 
events of the 1989 - 1991 Poland found itself sharing borders with seven new 
countries. Thus, it is a measure of success of Polish foreign and security policy that 
within a few years the Republic of Poland concluded border treaties with all the new 
neighbouring countries, regardless of the fact that some of them were traditional 
94 Source: CIA - the World Factbook 2000, hap: /ww\ý-ocici, gov'cia publicationytactbooký 30 
December 2000. 
')r' Linz, Stepan, Problenis, p. 25. 
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enemies of Poland. 97 Post-communist Poland was not involved in any international 
or territorial disputes. 
The national homogeneity resulted in cultural homogenisation. An 
overwhelming majority of the Polish population, over 95%, is Roman Catholic. 
Under totalitarian rule, the Church offered an alternative system of values to 
communism and effectively became a source of measured pluralism in the society, 
The Polish Church also supported the Solidarity movement and during Marshall law 
remained the only institution independent of the official authorities. This attitude 
gained the Church a powerful position and moral prestige in Poland at the start of 
democratic transition. Initially, the Catholic hierarchy found it difficult to adjust to 
the conditions of democratic pluralism in public life, however, with time the Church 
accepted the democratic rules of the game and does not constitute a threat to 
democratic consolidation. Polish language is the only official language, enshrined in 
article 27 of the Constitution. 
The sustained statehood prevented the emergence of citizenship problems in 
Poland. The existing regulations remained mostly in force and the only amendments 
concerned the Polish emigrants and expatriates who had left Poland for various 
reasons during the war and in the post-war period of the communist regime. The 
issue of citizenship was not contiguous and essentially irrelevant to Polish post- 
communist transition. 
Poland was well predisposed to democratic transition and consolidation. The 
near absolute congruency between the nation and the state, lack of territorial, 
linguistic or cultural disputes, and a general public support for democratic 
Hieronim Kubiak, 'Poland: National Security in a Changing Environment', in Karp, Central and I= 
Eastern Europe, p. 73. 
97 For details see Kubiak, 'Poland', pp. 75 - 84 and Michta, The Governmem., pp. 22 - 23. 
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institutions were important assets. The presence of an organised opposition 
movement provided necessary resources to take over power from the communist 
regime and at the same time the popularity of the 'Solidarity' and its ethos assured 
the popular acceptance for the democratisation process, giving the post-communist 
state a very strong legitimacy, additionally underwritten by the Church. 
While Czechoslovakia was a country with an inherent nationality problem 
concerning the Czech-Slovak relationship, the 'Velvet divorce" gave the Czech 
Republic a high degree of ethnic homogeneity and nation-state congruency. At the 
time of the split, the Slovaks and Roma constituted the largest minorities, each 
numbering about I% of the population. 98 However, the Roma population is regularly 
subjected to ethnically motivated disrimination and deteriorating socio-economic 
conditions. There has been widespread violence directed against the Roma as well as 
occasional racist murders in the Czech Republic. The Roma problem does not have a 
typical character of an ethnic exclusion and minority issue, it rather illustrates a 
domestic political problem of the Czech Republic where racism and xenophobia 
toward the Roma people are often authorised by the official policy of local and 
central authorities. Despite numerous protests of the human rights organisations and 
international pressure, Czech politicians refuse to recognise the problem as a 
minority problem and insist that the Roma population is not an ethnic minority, but 
rather an economic migration. 99 
The territorial situation of the Czech Republic actually improved in the 
aftermath of the split. It emcrued as a countrv territorially more compact and 
geopolitically located more westward. The state is now situated in the region of 
"Simon, Czech oslovak ia 's Velvel Divorce, p. 3. 
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political and economic stability. bordering with Austria, Germany and Poland, while 
Slovakia became a buffer zone between the Czech Republic and the unstable post- 
Soviet region and the Balkans. 100 
Following the split, the Czech Republic regulated all border issues. In 
November 1998 an agreement was signed with Slovakia regarding the redistribution 
of the former federal land, but the Czech parliament delayed ratification. The only 
potential territorial problem is linked to the claims of individual Sudeten Germans 
expelled from their lands after the Second World War who demand restitution of 
property. The problem created tension in Czech - German relations and caused 
anxiety in the Czech population in view of possible entry to the EU. However, the 
German Republic recognised the inviolability of the Czech border. 101 
The cultural and linguistic situation is very close to the nationality situation: 
after the separation the only nationality group culturally and linguistically distinct is 
the Roma population. However, due to their pariah social status no meaningful 
cultural exchange appears possible between those two national groups. 
The issue of citizenship was more complicated and the separation required 
new regulation of the problem. The basic provisions for Czech citizenship were 
already regulated by a legal act in January 1993.102 Citizenship was granted to the 
people who were permanent residents in Czechoslovakia and applied for it. With 
that, a preferential treatment was given to Slovak nationals for two years in the form 
of a shortened period of obligatory residency (2 years) and a simplified 
99 Ciech Republic: Annual Report 1997. http: /ai-ciiive. to(. cz'coLintric, ý, 'czeii-1)7. htmi: 8.12.2000. 
'o')Simon, Ciechoslovakia's f'elvet Divorce, pp. 2-4. 
1 () 1 CIA - The World Factbook-. 
102 Law No 40/1993. 
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administrative procedure. Other nationalities had the obligatory period of 
Czechoslovak residency extended to five years. ' 03 
Certain provisions of the Citizenship Law and even more than that, certain 
administrative practices in its application led however to the discriminatory use of 
the law in some cases. Controversies arose with regard to the rule of single Czech 
citizenship, which led to the rejection of the citizenship applications from the people 
whose loss of citizenship rights was due to the communist persecutions and forced 
migration. Similarly, the Law denied continuation of the Czech citizenship to the 
Czech nationals who chose Slovak citizenship between January and December 1993. 
Even the ruling of the Constitutional Court in favour of one such person did not 
change the practice of the Ministry of Interior. The issue was finally taken up by the 
Helsinki Committee Citizenship Counselling Centre and in September 1999 
appropriate legislative changes were adopted to rectify the 1993 Law. ' 04 
The real victims of the citizenship changes were however the Czechoslovak 
Roma people whom the Citizenship Law left in the Czech lands stateless for a 
variety of reasons. Some of them were denied citizenship on the grounds of criminal 
record or inability to prove their former residence, but in a great many cases the 
legal regulations were used in such a way as to reject their applications due to 
formal shortages. 105 Lack of legal advice and bureaucratic indifference of the Czech 
officials indicated that the Law was in fact used to eliminate Roma people as Czech 
citizens. 
10-1 Michta, The Governmem, p. 43. 
104 'Citizenship issues. Activities of the CHC Citizenship Counselling Centre and the Legislative 
Changes in 1999% Report on the State qf Human Rights in the Clech Republic 1999, 
8.12.2000. 
107 
The separation of the Czech Republic from Slovakia eliminated most 
stateness problems. Despite some confusion with which the public opinion in the 
Czech lands received the divorce from Slovakia, the new Czech state does not suffer 
from deficient legitimacy. On the contrary, the Czech Republic became a true 
nation-state, very homogenous in terms of nationality, language and culture. In 
addition, the Czech Republic maintained control over the central institutions of the 
state, therefore the Czechs were better positioned to see the new state in terms of the 
continuity of the previous one than the Slovaks were. Czech patriotism was 
traditionally less emotional and more 'withdrawn' than in most Eastern European 
countries; however, it was oriented towards institutions and the rule of law which 
gave a more civic character to Czech nationalism. The Czech attachment to 
democratic values and law are the main foundations of the post-communist 
legitimacy of the Czech Republic; it appears that the nationally motivated affiliation 
with the Czech state still needs to be fostered. 
Ukraine could not claim any of the homogeneity advantages that Poland or 
the Czech Republic had. The nationality situation in post-Soviet Ukraine was very 
complex. The last Soviet census showed 72.7% Ukrainian, 22.1 % Russian and 5.2% 
other nationalities in the Ukrainian republic. 106 However, the criteria for determining 
ethnicity were unclear and what in fact the census showed was that the declared 
national affiliation in Ukraine often did not match the language used. In fact, the 
main line of division in post-communist Ukraine was not ethnic, but ran between 
Russophones and Ukrainophones. 
, ý's Czech Republic: Annual Report. 
106 All data quoted in Mykola Riabchouk, 'Civil Society and Nation-Building in Ukraine', in Kuzio, 
ContemporarY, pp. 88- 89. 
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The policy of an independent Ukraine had to aim at improving the 
congruence between the nation and the state and increasing the identification of the 
population with the state in order to build a viable statehood, increase its legitimacy 
and democratise the political system. However, the very definition of what should 
constitute the Ukrainian nation presented numerous difficulties. A purely ethnic, 
territorial or linguistic criteria could lead to the narrow and exclusionist formula that 
would alienate great parts of Ukrainian population from the nation. In contrast, an 
open formula of the nation potentially threatened the Ukrainian claim to self- 
deten-nination vis-d-vis Russia and worsened the stateness problems. The dilemma 
was reflected in a parliamentary debate over the constitutional preamble, but in the 
end an open, civic formula was adopted. 107 The Ukrainian nation was defined as the 
citizens of Ukraine of all ethnicities. 108 This, however, did not prevent ethnic 
disputes in the course of parliamentary works nor did it stop the parliament from 
adopting a policy of ukrainisation in the armed forces. 
The most important territorial problem of Ukraine was not some formal 
dispute, but the insecurity surrounding the Ukrainian - Russian border. If one does 
not count the minor Ukrainian - Romanian dispute over the continental shelf of the 
Black Sea, 109 the only real Ukrainian territorial problem was the pro-Russian, 
separatist tendencies in Crimea. The desire for separatism grew between 1991 and 
1995, yet in 1995 the parliament in Kiev severely limited Crimean autonomy and the 
government defeated local leaders in the Peninsula, preventing further escalation of 
107 Kataryna Wolczuk, *The Politics of Constitution Makin-, in Ukraine, in Kuzio, Contemj)orary, 
pp. 130 - 136. 
108 First article of the Preamble to Ukrainian constitution. 
109 Listed in CIA Factbook. 
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the conflict by constitutional means. ' 10 Other than that, the Ukrainian territorial 
problems are of a psychological nature and are linked to the general uncertainty 
surrounding Ukrainian statehood. 
Until 1991, the border between Russia and Ukraine was purely 
administrative. Russian authorities continued a similar approach long after that date, 
showing little or no respect for Ukrainian independence. ' Thus, for Ukraine the 
problem of the Russian border was the problem of gaining the factual recognition in 
the eyes of Russia as an independent state. The first Ukrainian president, 
L. Kravchuk, carried a very reluctant policy towards co-operation with the CIS, 
aimed at assuring viability of the Ukrainian state in the eyes of Russians, but with 
little success. 112 The surveys carried out in 1992 in the Russian Federation 
demonstrated Russians favouring reintegration with Ukraine over all the remaining 
post-Soviet republics; the October 199' ) poll showed the sense of 'oneness' that the 
Russians felt with Ukrainians: 81% of the respondents felt that Ukraine is a natural 
part of the RE In addition, Ukrainian fears could be fuelled by successive surveys of 
1993 which proved that the Russian were willing to defend their co-ethnics living in 
former Soviet republics and that that the empire-saving sentiments were on the rise 
in military circles with Ukraine and Belarus indicated as priority targets. 113 
The problem of the Russian-Ukrainian border and Ukrainian insecurity was 
obviously connected to the problems of an identity crisis in Ukraine and the lack of 
"' Roman Laba, 'The Russian - Ukrainian Conflict: State, Nation and Identity', European Secllriýv, 
Vol. 4. No. 3, (Autumn 1995). pp. 457 - 487. 
"' Buk-k-voll, Uklwinc, p. 63. 
1 12 Paul D'Anieri, 'Interdependence and Sovereignty in the Ukrainian - Russian Relationship', 
European Security, Vol. 4, No. 4, Winter 1995, pp. 603 - 621. 
All surveys' results quoted in John B. Dunlop, 'Russia: in Search of Identity? ', in Bremmer, Taras, 
New States, New Politics, pp. 57 - 64. 
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self-confidence of the Ukrainian power elite toward Russia. But, apart from its 
psychological aspects, the territorial dispute featured a real security dimension: 
Ukraine feared resurgent Russian and this fear was further aggravated by the strong 
pro-Russian sentiments of a large part of the population and a bitter dispute over 
division of the Black Sea Fleet. The tensions caused by the Russian dismissive 
stance on Ukrainian independence and the state border was reflected in the first 
military doctrine of independent Ukraine. 114 
The problem of state language and linguistic differences quickly became a 
sensitive issue in the post-Soviet Ukraine. In that country, however, language 
preferences represent a poor and potentially misleading instrument for determining 
ethnic composition or even national orientation of the Ukrainian citizens. In 
Ukraine, the language spoken seldom denoted national identity, which greatly 
complicated nation-building policy choices for the authorities. ' 15 
The last Soviet census of 1989 revealed a lack of correlation between 
ethnicity and the native language. H6 While only 22.1% of the population declared 
themselves Russian, over 33% of the total population of the Ukrainian Republic 
confirmed Russian as their 'native language'. That indicated that for a significant 
part of ethnic Ukrainians Russian was their native language. The results were even 
worse for the Ukrainian language when the respondents were asked about the 
Ianguage of convenience. Here the survey showed that Ukrainophone Ukrainians 
make up over 40% of the population, Russophone Ukrainians - some '14% and 
1 14 Bohdan Pryskir. *The Silent Coup: the Building of Ukraine's Military, European Securitv, Vol. 2 
No. 1, Spring 1993, p. 146. 1 
Dominique Arel, 'A Lurkin Cascade of Assimilation in KievT, Post-Soviet, 4. ffýirs, VoL 12, No. 1, 
1996, pp. 73 - 90. 
116 All datat quoted in Mykola Riabchouk, 'Civil Society and Nation-Building in Ukraine. in Kuzio, 
Contemporatý,, pp. 88- 89. 
Russian -21%. The survey result confirmed the empirical observations that Russian 
language prevailed in Ukraine, particularly in the big cities where Russophones were 
traditionally privileged. The Ukrainian language historically had a lower status than 
Russian and was spoken mainly in the rural areas, especially in Western Ukraine. 117 
The linguistic divisions presented a complicated dilemma: on one hand, a 
4national' language is a typical component of national identity and therefore its 
promotion was a logical element of a nation-building processes; on the other hand, 
an official pursuit of a ukrainisation policy would inevitably alienate Russophones 
in Ukraine, ' 18 that is a significant part of the population. The policy finally adopted 
by the Ukrainian authorities was one of promoting Ukrainian language without 
persecuting Russian. The Ukrainian Constitution reflected that policy: while denying 
Russian language the status of a second state language, the Constitution guaranteed 
the 'freedom of development' to Russian and all other minority languages. ' 19 Despite 
such self-restraint in the official language policy, the results of building a nation- 
state in Ukraine were expected to cause shifts in language preferences in favour of 
Ukrainian. 120 
The language became a contentious issue also in the Ukrainian post- 
communist military. The Soviet army in Ukraine was 100% Russian-speaking and 
so was the 'Ukrainian' army shortly after its establishment in 1991. Yet, as one of 
the more important institutions in the new state and a symbol of national sovereignty 
and independence, the army could not speak a 'foreign' language for ever. The 
1" Smith, Nation - Building, pp. H9- 13 8. 
Khmelko, Wilson, 'Ethnic, p. 76. 
Kataryna Wolezuk, *The Politics of Constitution Making in Ukraine, in Kuzio, Contemporag, p. 
1334. 
12' David D. Laitin, Tanguage and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Republics', Posf-SovietA#ýfirs, Vol. 
12. No. 1,1996, pp. 4- 24. 
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Ukrainian authorities in the early 1990s implemented a fervent policy of 
administrative linguistic ukrainisation of the armed forces, as a result of which the 
armed forces turned into a battlefield between Russophones and UkrainoPhones and 
the ethnic relations inside the military were seriously affected. 
The citizenship policy was even more self-restrained and inclusive than was 
the language policy. 121 Already in November 1991 the Supreme Council of Ukraine 
issued a 'Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Ukraine' which guaranteed 
equal rights to everyone. 122 In October 1991, the parliament adopted a citizenship 
law, which unconditionally offered Ukrainian citizenship to all persons who had 
been residents of Ukrainian Republic at the time when the law was passed. 123 
Ukraine represents a country of an 'ahistoric' nation with weak identity and 
an underdeveloped concept of statehood, )24 where the collapse of the Soviet Union 
left an institutional vacuum. ' 25 Those features hardly predispose Ukraine to a fast 
and efficient transition. On the contrary, the extent of the stateness problem in 
Ukraine caused serious legitimacy problems and forced the authorities to put nation- 
building and state-building at the top of the political agenda, prioritising it over 
democratic reforms. The legitimacy of the Ukrainian state is one of the lowest in 
Central Eastern Europe; Ukraine as a nation-state was too weak to command the 
obedience of its people, also because at least some part of the population did not 
'2' Susan Stewart, 'Ukraine's Policy toward Its Ethnic Minorities' RFEIRL Research Reporl, Vol 2, 
No. 36,10 September 1993), p. 55. 
122 'Dicklaraciya prav nacionalnostiey Uraini'. published in Pravo Ukraini, No 1,1992, p. 5 (in 
Ukrainian 
Paula J. Dobriansky, 'Nationalism and Dcmocracy in Ukrainc', The Ukiwinian Quartei-4', Vol. LI, 
No. ], Spring 1995, p. 38. 
124 Prizel, National [dentitY, pp. 300 - 338. 
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want to be a part of this particular policy nor did they feel an ethnic or national 
affiliation with the Ukrainian state. The inclusive policy pursued by the authorities 
on nationality, citizenship and language were likely to improve the situation in the 
long run, yet the serious discongruity between the nation and the state at the start of 
the transition deprived the state of the fundamental legitimacy. As such, Ukraine 
was more than likely to have problems with completing democratic reform of the 
system. 
Although Lithuania before the war was a relatively homogenous country, the 
treatment of minorities by Smetona's authoritarian regime was far from acceptable 
by today's standards. The constitutional changes and policies pursued by Smetona's 
authoritarian regime limited the political representation of the non-Baltic minorities, 
restricted their cultural autonomies and access to material resources of the state and 
excluded them from economic activities. 126 Polish - Lithuania relations were 
particularly bad due to the unresolved conflict over the city of Vilnus, and those 
anti-Polish resentments resurfaced after independence in 1991. 
After the incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union the authorities in 
the USSR encouraged a large scale internal immigration of Russians to the Baltic 
republic turning a relatively homogenous republic into a multi-national entity. 
However, despite those trends, the indigenous population continued to dominate 
local administrative and managerial posts, and by the late 1980s Lithuanians 
represented 91.5% of the cadres in the state apparatus. 
Against the background of the other Baltic states, Lithuania on the eve of 
independence had a good nationality situation because ethnic Lithuanians 
constituted a rnýjority in their republic and their quest for independence was 
12'ý Motý I, Dilemmas, p. 54. 
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motivated by ethnic nationalism. 1 27 The last Soviet census in 1990 gave the 
following results: Lithuanian - 79.6%; Russian - 9.4%; Poles - 7.0%; Belorussian - 
1.7%; Ukrainians - 1.2%, Jews - 0.3%. 
128 Over the next few years the nationality 
situation further changed in favour of the ethnic Lithuanians, and by 1993 there were 
81.1% of them, while the percentage of all the minorities declined to 8.5% Russians, 
1.5% Belorussians, 1.0% Ukrainians, 0.2% Jews, 0.7% of other nationalities. Only 
the share of Poles remained stable at 7.0%. 129 
The relations with two of those minorities, that is Russian and Polish, 
features particular uncertainty and aggression at the start. Russia continued to 
symbolise a Soviet Union for the ordinary Lithuanian citizens 130 and the Russian 
declarations on protection of the Russian- speaking minorities in the near abroad did 
not help to improve the situation either. ' 31 As C. Stankevicius, then a Vice President 
of the Lithuanian Supreme Council remarked, the Lithuanians could not 'agree that 
the Soviets or Russians would treat our territory as part of their security zone. This 
notion is an extension of the Molotov - Ribbentrop Pact. 
1 32 With time, however, the 
Lithuanian authorities accepted the fact that co-operation with Russia was necessary 
because it was the largest neighbour and trading partner, therefore the ethnic issues 
126 Hiden, Salmon, The Baltic Nations, pp. 55 - 58. 
127 Gerner, Hedlung, The Soviet, p. 54. 
128 Source: Vardys, Sedaitis: Lithuania: the Rebel, p. 7. 
121 Saulius Girnius, RFE, /RL Daily Report No 40,28 February 1994. 
*Wielki przegraný' (Great Defeated), iiitervievN ý, ýith VN'tautas Landsber,, is, Polska Zhroina, No 
49, December 2000 in Polish. 
13 ' Birthe Hansen, Bertel Heurlin, The Baltic States in World Politics, (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1998), 
p. 6. 
Petersen, *Security Policy in the Post-Soviet Baltic States', p. 33. 
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of the Russian minority were rather unlikely to cause Lithuanian - Russian 
conflict. ' 33 
The Lithuanian - Polish relations were burdened by their pre-war history and 
in the early 1990s Lithuanian treatment of their Polish minority provoked popular 
protests both in Lithuania and Poland. 134 An intensified security co-operation with 
Poland contributed to the improvement of the situation of the Polish minority in 
Lithuania, although the policy often lacked grass roots. ' 35 
The most serious problem however, may not be from the present, but comes 
from the past. Pre-war Lithuania had a large Jewish minority that was exterminated 
during the war. The ethnic Lithuanian population collaborated with the Germans in 
mass Jewish killings, but the problem of responsibilitY was a taboo topic during the 
Soviet years. Consequently, the contemporary generation refused to recognise the 
Lithuanian participation in the mass killings of the Jewish population and argued 
that they had been victims themselves. Over the eight years of independence, little 
progress was made in Jewish - Lithuanian reconciliation. 
136 
As a rule, border problems of the Baltic states do not result from their 
policies, but from the attitude of Russia. Lithuania was the last state among the three 
former Baltic republics to raise a territorial claim against Russia and it was more a 
matter of border delimitation and adjustment than a territorial claim. This restraint 
might be partly explained by the historical precedent of 1940 when Russia had 
I"3, Saulius Girnius, 'Back in Europe, To Stay, Transition, 4 April 1997, p. 8. 
Karpi6ski, 'Poland and Lithuania', p. 17 & 56. 
Wojciech Zaj4czkowski, 'Polish - Lithuanian Relations: the Complexities of Geopolitics. ', in 
Monika Wohlfeld (ed. ). The Ef 
. 
feels ql' Enlargement on Bilateral Relations in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Chaillot Papers. No 26, June 1997. pp. 26 - 32. 
136 Ina Navazelskis, 'Conflicting Claims to Victimhood in Lithuania', Transition, 4 April 1997, pp. 
24-27. 
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returned the city of Vilnus to Lithuania, therefore Lithuania was apprehensive of any 
revision of the post-war borders. ' 37 
Lithuania and Russia concluded a border treaty in 1997, however the agreement 
was not ratified by the Russian parliament. 138 The Russians made no secret of the 
fact that they treat the ratification of the border treaty as an instrument of political 
leverage and therefore are consciously delaying it. 139 Lack of ratified protocols 
complicate the issue of border control in all of the three Baltic countries., 40 as well 
as having a negative impact on Lithuanian attitudes towards Russia. ' 41 
Lithuania had a dispute with Latvia concerning oil exploration rights in the 
Baltic shelf, other than that, all the border issues were regulated. 
Lithuanian cultural and linguistic situation features considerable homogeneity. 
The national culture combines secular and religious features and the two are closely 
intermingled. 142 The dominant religion is Roman Catholicism and the Catholic 
Church was also the institution which greatly influenced post-communist transition 
in Lithuania. 143 But, although traditionally the Church had close relations with the 
Lithuanian society, the years of Soviet occupation destroyed those relations and 
consequently in the post-communist Lithuania they are slowly being rebuilt. 
137 Olav F. Knudsen, *Cooperative Security in the Baltic Sea Region', Chaillot Papers, No 33, 
(Institute for Security Studies WEU, November 1998), pp. 17 - 18. 
13 S 'W64_2ý nieuregulowana granica' (Borders Still Not Regulated), Biuletyn 09rodka Studi6w 
Wschodnich, No 38,21 October 1999, p. 12 (in Polish). 
139 Statement by Sergiey Baburin, Deputy Chair of the Russian Duma, quoted in Biuletyn Oýrodka 
, ýtudi(5w Wschodnich, No 30,19 August 1999, p. II (in Polish). 
140 'Our Problems Are Europe's Problems', interview with Vytautas Landsbergis, Transilion, 4 April 
1997, p. 19. 
'-" Interview with Laura Tupyte, Third Secretary, Security Policy Division, Political Department, 
Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 1999. 
Interview with Dovile Survilaite, Warsaw, Poland, April 1999. 
Vardys, Sedaitis, Lithuania, pp. 116- 117. 
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Lithuanian people showed great attachment to their lifestyle during the 
communist years and defended their culture and language as mainstays of their 
identity. 144 The research on the perception of security threats, conducted in 
Lithuania in the early 1990s revealed that the possibility of destroying the 
Lithuanian culture and lifestyle was recognised as a serious security threat. 14ý By the 
same token, the preservation of language and cultural identity were prioritised in 
independent Lithuania. The cultural policy was included in the Law on the Basics of 
National Security as an integral part of domestic policy to ensure Lithuanian 
security. 146 According to the Law, it is the duty of the state to 'foster Lithuanian 
language and safeguard the intellectual potential and the cultural heritage of the 
Lithuania nation and ethnic communities'. 147 The Lithuanian constitution included 
provisions for the special protection of the language and culture. Article 14 of the 
Constitution recognised the Lithuanian language as the only official language of the 
state. The requirement of the use of the Lithuanian language was a source of anxiety 
among the minorities in the early 1990s, but the enforcement of those laws was 
much more lenient in Lithuania than was the case in other Baltic countries. 
In contrast to the remaining Baltic states, Lithuania adopted an open and 
inclusive approach to the issue of citizenship. Article 12 of the Constitution stated 
that: 
(1) Citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania shall be acquired by birth or on 
other bases established by law. 
144 Interview with DoviI6 Survilait6, Warsaw. Poland, April 1999. 
145 Petersen, ISCCUrity Policy, in the Post-Soviet Baltic States', p. 32. 
146 Luii- on the Basics qfNational SecuritY, 1996, No VIII - 19, Chapter 5, p. 5. 
147 Interview with Dovile Survilait6, Warsaw. Poland, April 1999. 
118 
(2) With the exception of cases established by law, no person may be a citizen 
of the republic of Lithuania and another state at the same time. 148 
Already in November 1989 the appropriate law was adopted in Lithuania. then 
still a part of the Soviet Union, adopting a ýzero alternative' option which granted 
citizenship to all people resident and employed in the republic for at least ten 
years. 149 The law also automatically extended the citizenship to post-World War 
Two immigrants and their descendants. "() The sticking point, however, was the 
treatment of the former Soviet servicemen who acquired Lithuanian 'citizenship 
certificates' while being Soviet citizens in military service and as a result had dual 
citizenship. In April 1994 the Lithuanian Constitutional Court ruled that they 
received certificates unlawfully and their naturalisation was hatted. 15 1 Although the 
situation affected only some 800 people, it immediately provoked negative response 
from the whole Russian minority. Generally speaking, however, the Lithuanian open 
policy on citizenship indicated that the nation felt relatively secure as a 
community. 1 52 
On the whole, the Lithuanian 'credentials' as a nation-state at the beginning 
of the democratic transformations were relatively strong. The country featured a 
very strong and well established national identity and the tradition, however short 
and shattered, of the modem statehood. As the Soviet republic, Lithuania was one of 
the leaders in the processes that led to the dissolution of the USSR, and the 
14' The Constitution of Lithuania. of 25 October 1992. Official translation: Parliamentary Record 
(Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania), Publishing House of the Seimas, Vilnius, No. 11, 
1992, pp. 2-31. 
Senn, 'Lithuania's'. p. 85. 
Vardys, Seclaitis, Lithuania, p. 212. 
Dzintra Bungs, RFE/RL, Daily Report No. 73.18 April 1994. 
152 Graham Smith, Aadne Aaslan, Richard Mole, 'Statehood Ethnic Relations and Citizenship', in 
Smith, The Baltic States, p. 183. 
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deten-nination of the population in defence of its territory and independence 
confirmed the popularity of the idea of national-self-determination. It appears that 
the legitimacy of the Lithuanian state was not questioned by any significant political 
force in the process of liberation from the Soviet Union. even the republican 
communist party embraced the idea. Certainly, the independence was contested by 
the Russian and part of the Polish minorities, yet they represented a negligible part 
of society in terms of their size and political leverage. However, the post-communist 
legitimacy of the state was built mainly on patriotic sentiments and satisfaction with 
regained statehood. The Lithuanian early post-communist nation-state lacked a civic 
component to its national identity and its development. Gaining this through 
building the democratic institutions of a modem nation-state was the most important 
challenge for post-communist Lithuania. 
Summary 
The stateness disparities between the case countries can account for a 
number of differences in transitions in otherwise similar conditions. Where a state 
represents a well established entity and a nation has a strong sense of identity, then 
the interaction of the two processes is unlikely to cause problems for the stateness 
and democratisation. On the contrary, where identities are weak and the processes of 
state- and nation-building do not overlap, the stateness-related problems occur and 
are likely to hamper civil-military transition and democratic consolidation in the 
country. 
The condition of stateness in each of the case countries was different. 
Judging by the stateness variable, Poland was the country best positioned for 
democratic transformation. because not only did it feature a many centuries long 
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tradition of nation and state and a high degree of nation-state congruity in the 
contemporary Polish Republic, but also the transition from communism to 
democracy did not discontinue its stateness. 
Lithuania was for many centuries closely tied with Poland which 
complicated the task of national self-identification at the beginning and fostered 
some ethnically hostile attitudes and political tendencies in the early 1990. But, 
while the Lithuanian national identity survived Russian and Soviet occupations and 
remained strong, as the inclusive policy toward minorities demonstrated, the country 
has only modest and mainly undemocratic state traditions and therefore building 
democratic institutions should be its priority. 
Czech Republic represents a reverse of the Lithuanian case: the Czechs are 
the only people in Central Eastern Europe who had a tradition of a sustainable 
democratic system and its traditional political culture was characterised by a strong 
civic component and respect for the institutions of democracy. At the same time, the 
national identity of the Czechs remained somewhat underdeveloped in the common 
Czech-Slovak state and was confused by the recent split. Therefore the national 
confidence of the Czech population should be more rooted before their stateness is 
finally established. 
Ukraine is in the most difficult situation. Lacking both national and state 
traditions, having a difficult national, cultural and language situation and deficient 
legitimacy, it is unable to command full obedience from its citizens typical of other 
welt established states. The persistence of Soviet elites is also a difficult problem to 
overcome. Ukraine was facing a very difficult path for transition, however, the 
cautious nationality policy pursued by the Ukrainian authorities and some progress 





The importance of the military tradition for the post-communist civil-military 
transformations stems from two factors. First, the military tradition is an element of 
the national identity of any nation-state, and as such defines its stateness to some 
degree. Secondly, the legacy of a particular military history defines the place of the 
military in the contemporary state, the prestige of the army and potential political 
leverage. These factors, in turn, have a direct impact on the development of civil- Z=1 
military relations in the countries undergoing democratisation processes. As the 
cases in this study demonstrate, a very high social prestige of the military as an 
institution can be detrimental to democratic transformation; however, an extremely 
low prestige of the military in a society may negatively influence the consolidation 
of democratic civil-military relations as well. 
The post-communist Poland was singled out as an example of a direct 
correlation between the traditionally high social prestige of the military and 
problems with establishing democratic civilian control. Jeffrey Simon's explicitly 
wamed that 
One has to keep in mind that Polish society holds the military in very high 
esteem and that historically the military has been used a number of times for 
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internal political purposes. Hence the ambiguity of command authority and 
weak civilian control over the military could be a recipe for disaster. ' 
But, while the military traditionally enjoyed a high social prestige in Poland, 
it was suggested by Simon that the relationship between the military tradition and 
the political leverage of the post-communist military was more complex. The Polish 
concept of statehood featured a strongly nationalistic component, added to the 
concept of motherland through the I 91h century uprisings against foreign rule. 2 The 
history of heroic independence struggles provided the foundations for military 
traditions and prestige in Poland, yet the formative period of the modem identity of 
the Polish military was in the Second Polish Republic between the wars. The 
nucleus of the inter-war Polish army was formed by the wartime legionaries of J6zef 
Pilsudski, the founder of the modem Polish state, and the participation of the legions 
in the liberation of Poland and achievement of independence earned the army great 
prestige and legitimacy. The army was regarded as the school of patriotism and 
preserve of national virtues in the pre-war society. 3 The victorious Polish war with 
Russia further added to the popularity of the an-ned forces. 4 
' Jeffrey Simon, 'Central European Civil - Military Relations and NATO Expansion', in Anton Bebler 
(ed. ), Civil - Military Relations in Post-Communist Slates. Central and Eastern Europe in Transition 
(Westport, Corm.: Praeger, 1997), p. 120; a similar approach can be found in R6ka Szemerk6nyi, 
'Central European Civil - Military Reforms At Risk', Adelphi Paper No 306 (London, IISS: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), pp. 54 - 55; Ben Lombardi, 'An Overview of Civil-Military Relations in 
Central and Eastern Europe, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 12, No 1, March 1999, , P. 
22. 
2 For a concise history of Poland in English, see Norman Davis, Gods Playground- A History qf 
Poland (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). 
-3 Romuald Szeremietiew, Cýy mogli, ýmy pr: etrwaý? Polska a Nien7cy w latach 1918 - 1939 (Could 
We Have Survived? Poland and Germany 1918 - 1939). (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Bellona, 1994). 
pp. 292 - 293, in Polish. 
-' Wladyslaw Pob6g-Malinowski, Najnows--a historia politycina Polski, (The Modem Political 
History of Poland), Vol. 2, (London: Gryf Printers, 1956), p. 342, in Polish. 
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Direct military involvement in politics in the inter-war state did not however 
begin until the successful military coup of 1926 and reached its peak in the mid- 
1933 Os. ' It was also in that period that the military developed a greater autonomy and 
institutions of self-government allowing an extremely strong corporate identity to 
emerge in the Polish armed forces. 6 This part of the pre-war military heritage was 
incorporated into the official view of the Polish military tradition with particular 
willingness by the General Staff after 1989, especially in the milieu of general 
7 
Tadeusz Wilecki, the Chief of General Staff in Poland between 1992 and 1997 . 
References to the pre-war standing of the military, its corporate ethos or institutional 
autonomy and many publications on this subject contributed to the revival of the 
tradition. 8 
The issue of communist heritage for the Polish military tradition was much 
more difficult to deal with. As Rakowska-Harmstone noted, the communist military 
in Poland were always 'a schizophrenic anny, ashamed of its role as a tool of 
foreign hegemony and responsive to the strong pull of national tradition'. 9 The army 
helped to rig the first post-war elections of 1947 and install a communist regime in 
5 Pob6g-Malinowski, Nqjnowsla, pp. 454 - 654; Zý 
6 F. Kusiak, Zycie codzienne qficer6w Drugiej Rzecý7pospolitej, (The Everyday Life of the Officers of 
the Second Republic) (Warszawa: Bellona, 1992), in Polish. 
7 Interview with general Tadeusz Wilecki, Polityka, Nr 36,9 September 1995, by Janina Paradowska 
and Jerzy Baczyhski. 
Marek Brzezinski, Jerzy Zalewski, 'Ogniwa przedstawicielskie kadry zawodowej Wojska Polskiego' 
(Representative Institutions of the Professional Military in the Polish Army), Studia i Materiaty No 6, 
(Warszawa: BPI MON. 1996), pp. 8- 11; Tadeusz Sokolowski, Apolityczno, ý6c i apartyjnoý6. 
Podslai+y prawne udiialu _ýolnierzi- w ýfyciu public--nym 
(Being Apolitical and Non-partisan. Le0al 
Foundations of the Military Participation in Public Life) (Biuro Parlamentame MON, 1996), pp. 14 - 
M in Polish. 
9 Teresa Rakowska- Harm stone, Christopher D. Jones, Jahn Jaworski , 
Ivan Sylvain and Zoltan 
Barany, Warsaw Pact: Question of Cohesion Phase II, Vol. l. The Greater Socialist Arnýw 
Integration and Reliability (Ottawa: Dept. of Defense, Canada, 1984), p. 205. 
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Poland, helped quell the workers protests on the Baltic coast in December 1970 
causing many deaths and casualties, and participated in the Warsaw Pact 
intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968.10 One of the most painful aspects of the 
communist heritage was the treatment of pre-war army officers and often wartime 
heroes by the communist military. Many of them were admitted to the army early 
after the war or even promoted, only to be purged, arrested and sentenced to capital 
punishment or long imprisonment after the 1947 campaign of libels and 
defamation. 11 
On the other hand, the withdrawn posture and passive resistance of the 
military in Poland on many occasions checked the power of the totalitarian regime 
and lowered its coercive capability. This was the case in 1956 when the support of 
the military for the new party leader was decisive for a peaceful ending of the 
political crisis. 12 Moreover, after 1956 the army underwent a partial re- 
nationalisation. symbolised by the removal of Soviet Marshal Rokossovsky from the 
post of Polish Minister of National Defence. Similarly, during the 1976 workers' 
strikes the Minister of Defence warned the Central Committee that the military 
would not intervene and this declaration was decisive in calling off the price rises, 
'0 Jan Kofman, Wojciech Roszkowski, Transformac/a i postkomuniim (Warszawa: ISPPAN, 1999), 
p. 68. 
'' The memoires of Zgen. 
Kuropieska illustrate vividly this sudden change. General J6zef Kuropieska 
was a pre-war officer, taken POW in 1939, he came back to Poland after 1945 to join the army and 
was nominated to prominent positions. Arrested in 1950, he was subjected to a long and cruel 
investigation., then sentenced to death. After Stalin"s death released in 1955 from prison and 
rehabilitated. J6zef Kuropieska, Niepr: ewidziane prz-ygody (Unexpected Adventures) (Krak6w: 
Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1988). 
12 Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern 
Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore & London: 1996), p. 260. 
125 
the original reason for strikes. ' 3 Even the successful proletarianisation of the Polish 
army' 4 and its increased professionalism in the 1970s and 1980s' 5 did not eliminate 
the nationalist undercurrent from the army. During the 1981 martial law in Poland, 
the military made an impression of being of two minds: while the highest ranking 
officers ousted and replaced the civilian communists, many soldiers, NCOs and even 
officers showed benign attitudes toward the opposition. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, a 
prominent Solidarity member and later two times post-communist minister of 
defence, recalled: 
It was rather militia troops who would shoot. The army during the martial 
law was rather aside. I myself remember an advice from that time: look at the 
shoes. If they are brown - then you deal with the military, that means you 
have a chance. If black, then it is militiamen and they may really batter 
16 
you. 
The Polish military entered the post-communist period having an uncertain 
and disturbed identity, presenting a 'blend of nationalism ... and communism, which 
1 -3, Andrzej Korbofiski, Sarah M. Terry, 'The Military as a Political Actor in Poland' in Roman 
Kolkowicz, Andrzej Korbofiski (eds. ), Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats. Civil - Military Relations 
in Communist and Moderniiing Societies ( London: George Allen&Unwin, 1982), p. 172 and 
footnote 4 1. 
14 J6zef Graczyk, 'Social Promotion in the Polish People's Army', in Jaques Van Doorn (ed. ), Military 
Pr(? Pssion and Military Regimes. Commitments and Conflicts (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1968), 
pp. 88 - 93. According to statistical data quoted by Graczyk, due to a consequent policy of 
preferential treatment of the candidate from worker's and peasant's milieu, by 1964 as much as 
81.1% of the officers were of worker's or peasant's origin, and only 18.9% had inteligentsia or 
craftsman descent. See p. 93. 
Michael Sadykiewicz, 'Jaruzelski's War', Survival No 26, Summer 1982. 
Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Ze sZciyt6w do NATO (From the Peaks of the Mountains to NATO), 
(Warszawa: Bellona, 1999), p. 103 (in Polish). 
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set clear limits on nationalism'. 17 The post-communist officer corps was also unsure 
how to perceive their communist experience. Onyszkiewiez remembered that when 
he came to the MOD in 1990 as one of the first two civilian deputy ministers, 'on 
one hand there was a hangover in the army that it had once been used to coerce the 
uprising (Prague Spring), but on the other hand - alas -a patronising attitude: "there 
you go, they did not even fire once"'. 18 Equally divided were the military attitudes 
on the martial law. But the single most striking legacy was the resentment against an 
obtrusive political control. In fact, that resentment against the political officers and 
the control of the Main Political Administration (Gl6wny Zarzqd Polityczny) 
reached such intensity by the late 1980s that it became difficult to contain. 19 The 
apprehension of the post-communist military toward civilian intrusion slowed and 
impeded an establishment of mechanisms of civilian democratic control in the post- 
20 
communist Poland . 
On the surface of things, it seemed that regardless of the complex communist 
history of the Polish military, the prestige of the profession remained intact. All the 
opinion polls indicated that the army was among the most trusted public 
institutions .21 But a closer analysis of the relations 
between the military and society 
revealed a weakening of the traditional bond of trust between the army and the 
17 Andrew A. Michta, The Soldier-Citizen: the Politics (? f' the Polish Armýy After Communism. 
(Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1997), p. 42. 
"' Onyszkiewicz, Ze s-7c--yt6w do, p. 94. 
'9 Interview with General Wladyslaw Stelmaszuk, former Chief of General Staff 1989 - 1992, 
Warsaw, September 1997; Lech Kowalski, 'Wojsko polskic w procesie transformacji ustrojowej' 
(Polish Army in the Process of Systemic Transformation), Studio Politvczne, No 6, Warszawa 1996, 
pp. 54 - 55 in Polish. 
20 Interview with colonel Adam Kolodziejczyk, Director, Military Institute for Sociological Research, 
Polish General Staff, Warsaw, April 1999. 
2' See for example opinion polls published by Rzecýpospolita daily newspaper, 21 - 22 February 
1998 and 30 - 31 May, 1998, in Polish. 
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public. The Polish military experience similar problems with the draft as do other 
post-communist countries: draft - dodging, worsening quality of the conscript pool, 
and negative attitude of the youth toward the service. 22 At the same time, the surveys 
carried out in the officer corps demonstrate the erosion of self-confidence among the 
23 
officers and their growing frustration with the conditions of work . In 1998 nearly 
90% of officer corps negatively assessed the situation. But most importantly, there is 
a disparity between the society's high opinions on the military and the military's self 
image, according to which their profession lost prestige and social respect. The table 
below illustrate this process. 24 
Table 1. 
Question: In your opinion, did the attractiveness ol'the military profession generally 
change over the last 5-6 years compared to other professions in our country? 
% SOCIETY PROF. MILITARY 
Increased significantly 7 6 
Increased a little 27 19 
Did not change 3) 5 17 
Diminished a little 15 19 
Diminished significantly 4 36 
Hard to say 12 
22 Wfodzimierz Kaleta, 'Pob6r bez wyboru' (Draft With No Choice), Polska Zbrojna No 18, May 
1998 (in Polish). 
2-3 Col. Tadeusz Mitek, 'Nastroýie pod Kreska' (Feelings Below Average), Polska ZbrQjne No. 39, 
September 1998, p. 20: 'Gorzki smak reform' (A Bitter Taste of Reforms), Polska Zbrqjna No 18, 
May 1996, p. 18 (in Polish). 
21 Source for both tables: Stanislaw Jarmoszko, 'Spoleczne aspekty przemian w Wojsku Polskim' 
(The Social Aspects of Chanoes in the Polish Army), Studia i Materialy, No 48, (Warszawa: BPI t, 
MON, 1998). p. 140 (in Polish). 
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Table 2 
Question: In your opinion, did the prestige and social esteem (? f the military 
profession change over the last 5-6 years in our country? 
% SOCIETY PROF. MILITARY 
Increased significantly 7 7 
Increased a little 27 28 
Did not change 37 26 
Diminished a little 16 22 
Diminished significantly 4 16 
Hard to say 9 1 
The military tradition in Poland in itself did not offer a strong foundation for 
military involvement in politics. The military history featured a traditional bond of 
trust with the society and that was not entirely ruined in the communist period. Yet, 
based on the revival of the pre-war tradition of strong corporate autonomy and self- 
government, motivated by the resentment of civilian intrusions and encouraged by 
some post-communist politicians, the post-communist military in Poland developed 
an approach which aimed at 'achieving institutional independence from the civilian 
government without challenging the principal systemic foundations of the state'. 25 
Unchecked by the politicians, gradually such attitudes developed to such an extent 
as to jeopardised democratic civil-military relations in post-communist Poland. 
The situation of the military was traditionally different in the Czech lands. 
The first regular armed forces in the Czech lands were founded by emperor t, 
'5 Miclita, Soldier - GiLen, p. 9. 
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Ferdinand III in 1649 as part of the Austrio-Hungarian army. In 1781 a compulsory 
military service was introduced, of which however the noblemen, clergymen, 
intelligentsia and other higher classes were exempt. The Czech population generally 
perceived that army as an alien and hostile institution and although attitudes of 
passive resistance dominated, nevertheless occasional violent clashes between 
Czech nationalists and the military occurred. 26 During the First World War 
numerous Czech soldiers defected from the Habsburg army, and subsequently 
created Czech Legions in France, Italy and Russia as well as fighting against the 
Habsburg army. However, that distance and distrust of the military as an institution 
remained a defining feature of the popular Czech attitude to the armed forces untill 
today. 
The Czechoslovak army that was created after the abolishment of the 
Austrio-Hungarian empire represented an improvised mixture of volunteers, 
legionnaires and members of the former Austrian army. This heterogeneity caused 
tensions, for example some soldiers refused to salute personnel from the former 
Austrian army. Gradually the situation calmed down, thanks to the new recruitment, 
but also because of the growing German threat. In 1920 the Czechoslovak 
parliament established a regular army and introduced compulsory military service. It 
is interesting to note that at that period soldiers usually served at units located near 
their homes, something that the post-communist Czech government wanted to 
introduce in the ACR in 1990s as a novelty. 
The years 1920 - 19338 were a period of intensive investment in the 
Czechoslovak military, and despite persistent anti-military attitudes in the society, 
26 Marie Vlachova, ýtefan Sarv8, 'From the Totalitarian to the Post-Totalitarian Military', in Anton 
Bebler (ed. ), Civil - Militag Relations in Post-Communist States. Central & Eastern Europe in 
Transition (Westport, ConnectiCLIt and London: PRAEGER, 1997), pp. 93 - 94. 
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pre-war Czechoslovakia managed to create a modern and relatively strong army. 27 
The time around the Munich conference of 1938 was perhaps the only period when 
the military enjoyed great popularity and prestige in Czechoslovakia. There were 
high expectations that the army would defend the territorial integrity of the 
Federation and the mobilisation of 1938 seemed to confirm that. However, although 
the government took the decision to avoid armed resistance, it was the military that 
got the blame for the subsequent national humiliation and loss of sovereignty. The 
Czechs seemed confirmed in their opinion that the military was a useless 
institution. 28 
The Munich dictate came to symbolise treachery and treason in Czech political 
dictionary. When President Vaclav Havel wanted to warn against negative 
consequences of non-enlargement of NATO, he said that 'the Munich danger is 
again hovering over Europe'. 29 However, the resulting national trauma had a lasting 
and damaging impact on the Czechoslovak armed forces. The anny never managed 
to recover its good name in the eyes of Czechoslovak society and the subsequent 
good performance of Czech divisions on many foreign fronts of the Second World 
War - Tobruk, Buzuluk, Dunkirk - could not save their prestige. 
Following the 1948 communist putsch, the Czechoslovak anny turned into the 
reg, ime's mainstay, constitutional guardian of internal order and the major zn 
instrument of coercive power. The public perceived the military as the most solid 
Hislotý, ol'the Cýech Arn7Y, materials of the Radio Praha, http: `search. radio. czý nato, 08.12.2000, p. 
I. 
'8 Otto Pick, 'Contribution', in Behind Declarations. Civil - Military Relations in Central Europe 
(papers presented at the workshop in Budapest, March 22 - 23,1996). Defence Studies, special 
edition (Budapest: Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, 1996), p. 19. 
21) RFE, 'RL Ncwsline, 13 March 1996, http: ', wwNv. rferl. or, -,. 
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part of the communist control apparatus and widely despised it. 30 Twice the 
communist army was used against civilians: in Plzeh in 1953 and in Prague and 
Bmo in 1969 where it dispersed demonstrations commemorating the Prague 
Spring. 31 But perhaps the most shameful role assigned to the military was the re- 
educating mission, that is the task of reforming the 'bourgeois' and aristocratic 
elements of the society through work in the special construction units where they 
were put to hard, physical work. The slang name for such units was 'Black Barons' 
because of distinctive black epaulets on the uniforms and because of aristocratic 
origin of most 'soldiers'. At the same time the poor education, primitive behaviour 
and narrow-mindedness of the commanders of construction units became legendary 
in the Czech society. 32 
Under communist regime the Czechoslovak anny became completely deprived 
of autonomy, both within the framework of the Warsaw Pact and the state apparatus. 
33 Despite a very high ratio of party membership in the officers and NCO's corps , the 
military influence on political decisions was negligible or moderate at best and if so, 
34 
on regional or local level. Due to the extreme importance of Czechoslovakia for 
the Warsaw Pact strategic planning, numerous Russian advisors were affiliated 
permanently in the MOD and their position was reinforced by a heavy presence of 
Antonin Sv&ýk, 'Democratic Control of Armed Forces in the Czech Republic, in Coqference on 
Civil - Militarj, Relations in the Context (? f an Evolving NATO (Budapest: Ministry of 
Defence/Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 - 17 September 1997), p. 209. 
More on Czechoslovak army characteristics and activities under communist regime in Rakowska - 
Harmstone et al., Warsaw Pact, pp. 107 - 113. 
Otto Pick, Stefan Sarvas, Stanislav Stach. Democratic Control Over Security Policy and Armed 
Forces (Praha: Institute of International Relations, October 1995), p. 18 and footnote 16. 
Vlachova, Sarv8, 'From the Totalitarian', p. 97. 
,4 Vlachova, Sarvas, 'From the Totalitarian'. p. 95. 
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Soviet troops and military installations on the Czechoslovak territory. 35 
Czechoslovakia was so bereft of control over its own defence that in 1983 the 
deployment of nuclear missiles on Czechoslovak territory started without the 
approval of the Czechoslovak govemment. 36 
The public image of the Czechoslovak military suffered another blow when the 
army did not resist the invasion of Warsaw Pact 'friendly armieS, 37 in 1968 that 
brutally terminated the Prague Spring. Afterwards, the military underwent the 
biggest purge of all state institutions, when some 6 thousand military professionals 
were sacked. 38 Then in 1989 during the 'Velvet revolution' the Czechoslovak anny 
39 
was the only communist military to consider an armed intervention. When that 
became public, the distrust of the military only deepened in Czech society. The 
public assessment of the communist period was generally damaging to the good 
name of the army: 'during the 40 years of communist rule, life in the barracks 
degenerated into a training ground for alcoholism, substance abuse, aggression, bad 
language and shirking. 40 
35 Miloslav P66k, 'The East - West Security System and the Czechoslovak Army in the First Half of 
the 1960s', The, Journal of the Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4, December 1997, pp. 50 - 62. 
,6 Pick, Sarva§, Stach, Democratic Control, p. 19. 
37 Andrew A. Michta, The Government and Politics of Postcommunist Europe (Westpoint, 
Connecticut & London: Praeger, 1994), p. 33. 
Miroslav Purkrabek, Anton Ra§ek, 'K politicke, socialni a vojenske rekonstrukci Cs. armady v 
demokraticke revoluci', Vývber Stati, August 1991, pp. 5-7. 
19 Some sources indicate the General Staff involvement in preparation of two operations: Zasah and 
I'Ina: there were also rumours that on 20 November 1989 the army was given orders to assist security 
forces in putting down demonstrations. See Jeffery Simon. Central European Civil - Military, 
Relations and AA TO Enlargement (Washington D. C.: National Defence University). ý p. 
306; Thomas 
S. Szayna, The Military in a Post-Communist Czechoslovakia, A RAND Note, N-3412-USDP, 199 1, 
p. 20. 
40 Ilislorv (? ý the C--ech, -IrinY, p. 3. 
1 
1 ). ) 
The military tradition was only a minor element of the Czech national 
identity. Some people even claim that the Czech do not have a real military tradition 
at all .41 The army was made a scapegoat of a series of political 
disasters that befell 
Czechoslovakia in the twentieth century, because 'the public is not interested in the 
political and military consequences of (political) decisions ... but in the results of 
military inaction. ' 42 Furthermore, historical events led to the formation of the Czech 
national myth of the impossibility of conducting a successful defence and so the 
army was always treated as an unnecessary luxury. Last but not least, the Czech and 
Slovak officers did not merge into one identity within the Czechoslovak officer 
corps, partly due to a conscious party policy 43 but instead maintained their separate 
national identities. Consequently, ethnicity issues additionally weakened the prestige 
of the army and played a significant role in the break-up of the Federation. 44 
However, certain aspects of the Czech military tradition represent a positive 
legacy for the development of democratic civil-military relations. Most of all, this is 
the tradition of an unambiguous subordination of the military to the civilian 
superiors throughout its history and the implacable record of army non- intervention 
in political affairs. The Czech army is the only army in the Central Eastern European 
region that was never involved in the governing of the country. 45 
In Ukraine, the issue of military tradition was equally as complicated and 
wrought with controversies as the issue of national identity. The problem became 
41 Otto Pick, 'Contribution', pp. 19 - 20. 
'2 ýtefan Sarva§, 'Attitudes of the Czech Republic toward National Security, the Military, and NATO 
Mernebership, The Journal (? f the Slavic, lfilitatýv Studies, Vol. 11, No 3 (September 1998), p. 6 1. 
43 P66k, 'The East - West, pp. 71 - 73. 
44 Dale Herspring, "'Refolution" in Eastern Europe: The Polish, Czech, Slovak and Hungarian 
Militaries', European Security, Vol. 3, No. 4, Winter 1994, pp. 678 - 679. 
4 Daniel N. Nelson, 'Civil Armies, Civil Societies, and NATO Enlargment', Armed Forces and 
Society, Vol. 25. No. ], Fall 1998, p. 139. 
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relevant in 1991 when the Ukrainian authorities were forming a 4national' army 
from the Soviet troops. Tradition was to foster the national self-determination of the 
soldiers and serve as a frame of reference for the new identity of the military. 
46 
Furthermore it was important to offer the military a 'national' model alternative to 
the Soviet legacy that could promote Ukrainian patriotism in the army. 
The problem was, the Ukrainian military tradition was not truly 'national' 
but rather belonged to the histories of the countries that had ruled Ukrainian 
territories in the past. Therefore, Ukrainian authorities based national military 
tradition on celebrating Cossacks military achievements. The Cossacks were 
portrayed as the people of honour and patriotism, and the bearers of the traditional 
virtues of the Ukrainian people. 47 In order to avoid difficult issues such as the 
delicate problem of the Cossack service for the Russian Tsars, Ukrainian authors 
tended to concentrate on 'safer' aspects of the Cossack traditions, for example their 
struggle with the Turco-Islamic world . 
48 The overall goal was to substitute the 'cult 
of Suvorov and Zukov' with the names of famous Cossack hetmans, like 
Sahaydachni, Mazepa and others. 49 In 1992 special courses were organised for the 
officer corps, educating them in a 'patriotic' version of the national tradition of 
Ukraine. 50 
46 Ilya Prizel, National Identiýy and Foreign Policy. Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia 
and Ukraine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 2. 
47 Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s. A Minoriýv Faith (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997); p. 186. 
4' For example Orest SubteIny, 'Cossack Ukraine and the Turco-Islamic World', in Ivan L. Rudnytsky 
(ed. ), Rethinking Ukrainian Histoty. (Edmonton: The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 
University of Alberta, 1981), pp. 120 - 135; see also Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 187. 
49 'Novie w sistiemi vihovania', Ukrainskie Slovo, April 1997, p. 3. 
ýO 'Ukrainoznawchi studii viyskovih', Ukrainskie Slovo, April 1997, p. 3. 
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The issue of military tradition became really problematic when it came to 
reinterpreting the actions of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the 
Organisation of Ukrainian NationaliStS5 1 and 'the military journals began slowly 
chipping away at the Soviet image of the UPA'. 52 What for the nationalist circles 
symbolised Ukrainian bravery and heroism and was a part of the myth of resistance 
and liberation struggle, 53 was unacceptable for the former Soviet officers who had 
been socialised to the image of the UPA as a fascist force compromised through 
collaboration with the Germans. Attempts at rehabilitating the UPA received a 
mixed reception from the Ukrainians and were condemned by the Russians. 54 
The issue of UPA activities became so contentious because for the majority 
of the Ukrainian officer corps the Soviet military tradition and particularly the 
victory in WWII was the only viable military legacy. 55 Therefore, those officers in 
many instances felt force-fed with the national tradition of Ukraine, and protested. 
Fostering Ukrainian tradition at the expense of the Soviet heritage could even 
threaten an inter-ethnic accord inside the military and was often received as a 
repetition of Soviet style indoctrination. As one journalist put it, an idea to form the 
Ukrainian army 'in a way of mechanical replacement of internationalism into 
nationalism' collapsed. 'Stories about the heroic uprisings of the insurgents did not 
manage to replace the war history of the Soviet Army from which the absolute 
See Petro L. Sodol, 'UPA - The Ukrainian Insurgent Army. An Overview. ', The Ukrainian 
Quarterly, Vol. 2 1, No. 2-3, Summer -Fall 1995. 
ý2 Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 186. 
5- i S. Marchenko, 'Na storozi doli Ukraini', Ukrainskie Slovo, No 48,1997 (in Ukrainian). 
ý4 , Whatever one would say, the attempts to rehabilitate banderites represent a intention to rehabilitate 
the regime no less cruel and murderous than stalinist. ' This is an opinion of a Soviet historian 
D. Tabachnik, in 'Krasnaya Zviezda'. Quoted in Yuriy Lukanov, Trietiv prie--idient. Politichnýy 
portriet Lieonida Kuchmi (Kiev: Taki Spravi, 1996), p. 129. 
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majority of the officers derives its position'. 56 The attempts to invent a national 
military tradition for Ukraine were unconvincing, and if anything, only contributed 
to the politicisation of ethnicity of the an-ny. 
Lithuania had a much clearer idea regarding a national military tradition, but 
although some problems of the legacy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth held 
a potential for controversy, the main concern of the Lithuanian authorities was rather 
the Soviet heritage. In total rejection of the Soviet heritage, the Lithuanian 
parliament had already in 1990 declared the re-establishment of the pre-war 
Lithuanian state 57 and so stressed the continuity of the national statehood. Guided by 
the same desire, on 19 November 1992 the Seimas re-established the Armed Forces 
of the Republic of Lithuania as a continuation of the inter-war Lithuanian military 
and later set the date of the Lithuanian Army Day on 23 November, on which day 
the armed forces of the newly independent Lithuania had been formed in 1918.59 In 
that process of resurrecting the pre-war military traditions, the role of the 
Lithuanian military in ending democracy in Lithuania and installing the authoritarian 
regime was not however mentioned. The military was selected to be yet one more 
symbol of the glorious inter-war statehood. 
Historically, the military did not play any significant role neither in the 
assertion, nor in the loss of Lithuanian independence. Consequently, whilst the 
military were never popular, neither were they particularly unpopular and the end of 
55 Yuriy Borisov, 'Ultra-nacyonalisti predlagayut sformirovat' novuyu armiyu', Sievodnia, No 169,7 
September 1995 (in Russian). 
5' G. Kliucznik-ov, 'Soyuz Sovietskih Oficierov z'diot vriemieni 'CH', Nie.: avisimoye Voyennoye 
Obo--ricnniye No 22,28 November 1998 (in Russian). 
57 Alfred Erich Senn, 'Lithuania's First Two Years of Independence', Journal qfBaltic Studies, Vol. 
XXV, No. 1, Spring 1994, p. 81. 
59 Albert M. Zaccor, *Lithuania's New Army', The Journal (? f Slavic Militaq Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, 
June 1994, p. 203. 
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Soviet rule did not change that. As Lieven observed, none of the Baltic armies had 
to 
fight wars of independence. It follows that the various national paramilitary 
forces, and the new national armies, lack the prestige which comes from 
being seen as the 'saviours of the nation'... Some of today's paramilitary 
groups would like to portray themselves in this light, but the reality is that it 
was crowds of ordinary, unarmed Baltic civilians who saved their countries 
in January 1991 by placing their bodies in the path of the Soviet tanks. -ý9 
Only in the inter-war period did the Lithuanian army enjoy a high prestige in the 
society as an attribute of sovereignty. The prestige of the military crashed and 
vanished however after the Soviet occupation of Lithuania in 1940, when the 
Lithuanian army failed to stage even a symbolic struggle. It was because in 1940 the 
Red Army seized all the military and technical equipment of the Lithuanian forces, 
including the military stores, so preventing military mobilisation and armed 
resistance. 60 The population, however, completely lost confidence in the military 
and the trauma was so deep that even in 1990 Lithuanians used to say that they 
would not repeat the mistake of 1940 and were prepared to fight with the Soviets if 
necessary. 61 
The wartime experience led to the replacement of the respect for the army 
with a cult of partisans. The large guerrilla forces that were formed during the war 
and in the years 1944 to 1953) wage a partisan war against German and Soviet 
occupation had a great influence on the shaping of the military tradition in 
ý9 Anatol Lieven, The Baltic Revolution. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence 
(New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 78. 
60 I. Skrastins, 'The Armed Forces of the Baltic States. Current Status and Problems of Development', 
TheJournal ol'Slavic Militaty Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 1995, p. 36. 
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Lithuania. The respect for partisan warfare later was visible in the defence doctrine 
and security policy of independent Lithuania. 62 
The military in contemporary Lithuania do what they can to eliminate the 
Soviet 'odour' from the army, revive national military tradition and prestige in 
Lithuania. The roots of contemporary formations of the anny are not only traced 
back to the inter-war period (the example of the 'Iron Wolf' division is a case in the 
point), but also to the more remote historical periods of 15 th and 16"' centurie S. 63 
Despite those efforts, the Lithuanian army enjoys little social prestige, although the 
principle of the 'blank state' and progress of democratisation slightly improved the 
standing of Lithuanian army in the eyes of society. 64 
De-communisation, De-politicisation, Re-nationalisation. 
De-communisation of the military was the first priority of the post- 
communist government because of the need to discontinue party - army bonds. 
65 
The goals and mechanisms of de-communisation and de-politicisation were nearly 
identical and their implementation also served to boost the legitimacy of the army 
and liberate it from the Soviet legacy. 66 Re-nationalisation was necessary to a 
" Lieven, The Baltic Revolution, p. 80 
12 See Albert M. Zaccor, 'Guerrilla Warfare on the Baltic Coast: A Possible Model for Baltic Defence 
Doctrines TodayT, The Journal qf Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4, (December 1994), pp. 682 - 
702. 
63, Zaccor, 'Lithuania's New', p. 203. 
61 Interview with Bartas Trakymas, Assistant to the Chairman of Parliamentary Committee on 
National Security and Defence, Vilnus, February 1999. 
6ý James Gow, Carol Birch, Security, and Democracy. - Civil - Military, Relations in Central 4nd 
Eastern Europe, London Defence Studies No 40 (London: published by Brasseys for Centre for 
Defence Studies. September 1997), p. 12. 
66 See Anton Bebler, 'The Evolution of Civil - Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe', 
NA TO Review, August 1994, pp. 28 - 32. 
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varying degree in each of the countries, yet it was a more contentious process 
because it touched on the issues of nationality and ethnic relations inside the post- 
communist military. In that there were stateness problems involved, the issues 
related to tradition and identity would inevitably be conflict-prone. 
In Poland, the processes of de-communisation and de-politicisation of the 
military were moderate in form, and did not cause additional divisions in the army. 
This was partly due to the 'protection' of the armed forces guaranteed by the Round 
Table agreement (both the first post-communist president and minister of defence 
were communist representatives), but also to the ease with which the Polish army 
shook off the political structures thanks to the deep resentment of the professional 
military towards MPA and political officers. 
The most important changes took place in 1990. The infamous MPA 
(Gl6wny Zarz4d Polityczny) was disbanded, and following the verification process, 
over 2000 political officers were transferred to the newly established educational 
services, while the rest of them was discharged from the armed forces. The second 
important step was the elimination of the Military Internal Service (WSW) and the 
creation of a new body, the Military Police, with only a fraction of former WSW 
functionaries re-employed for the service. Finally, the former military intelligence 
and counterintelligence services were reorganised into the new Military Information 
Service. 67 Only the personnel of the special services was subject to a regular and 
systematic screening procedure, as a result of which over 60% of the original staff 
67 For more detailed data on the de-communisation process in Polish Armed Forces see Paul 
Latawski, The Transjbrmalion qf1he Polish Armed Forces: PreparingjbrNA TO (London: The Royal 
I Jnited Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1999), pp. 6- 11. 
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changed by 1997.68 Dismantling the communist party structures and the withdrawal 
from politics were received favourably by the armed forces, 69 but the idea of large 
scale screening of the officer corps was compromised by the first civilian Minister 
of Defence Jan Parys. 'O His aggressive anticommunist attitude combined with 
obsessive distrust of the military and fear for his personal safety isolated him from 
the officer corps and earned a bad reputation for the de-communisation policy he 
represented and the civilian leadership in general. 71 He was dismissed after 
denouncing an unspecified 'plot of the generals' in the end in 1992 during the 
meeting in the General Staff Headquarters, allegedly inspired by the presidential 
office, but the memory of the Tarys affair' haunted the MOD - General Staff 
relations for a long time. 
The official abandom-nent of the idea of screening the officer corps preserved 
the cohesion of the Polish post-communist army, and prevented possible political 
conflict between the government and the president. Nevertheless, the idea of 
lustration 72 enjoyed some support in the armed forces. Surveys of the professional 
cadres proved that the majority of officers consequently backed the idea of 
68 'Tudne pytanie o gwarancje' (A Difficult Question about Guarantees), interview with admiral 
Kazimierz Glowacki, Chief of Polish Military Intelligence (WSI), Polska Zbrojna No 36, September 
1997, pp. 10 - H. 
69 Interview with Robert Lipka, Under-Secretary of State for Social and Parliamentary Affairs, Polish 
MOD, Warsaw, October 1998. 
70 Romuald Szeremietiew, 4' prawo mars--. ' 0 poflýyce i wojsku (Turn Right! On Politics and the Zý 
Military) (Warszawa: Chrze§cijafiski Klub Przedsiýbiorc6w, 1993), p, 170 (in Polish). 
Onyszkiewicz, Ze Y_-e.: p6iv, pp. 143 - 144; interview with General Wladyslaw Stelmaszuk, former 
Polish Chief of General Staff 1989 - 1992, Warsaw, September 1997. 
72 The term 'lustration' is used to describe the post-communist processes of de-communisation which 
differed from typical court trials in that the main aim of the screening procedures was to identify the 
collaborators of the former communist special services and ban them in one way or another from 
public life. 
141 
screening. 73 The majority of supporters came from the remote garrisons, where the 
military formed a small and hermetic society and the fact that politically 
compromised officers were left in service aroused bitterness here. 74 
The process of dismantling party structures in the military was completed by 
the military withdrawal from politics. The 1992 amendment of the Bill on 
Professional Military Service 75 introduced new regulations, which prohibited the 
officers' membership in political organisations or associations, banned electoral 
propaganda from military sites, and prohibited military engagement in political 
campaigns in their professional capacity. 76 Again, those measures were well 
received by the cadres. 77 
While the legal regulations provided for political neutrality of the military, 
the principle was not observed by the politicians, especially at the time of the 
parliamentary election campaign of 1993 and around the presidential elections of 
1995, during which president Walqsa and his associates were responsible for 
instigating numerous breaches of military neutrality. 78 The media reported several 
73 Tadeusz Mitek, 'Lustrowanie bez emocji' (Lustration without emotions), Polska Zbrqjna No 29, 
July 1999, p. 16. In 1999 55.1% of the surveyed military supported the idea of screening the military 
personnel. 
74 Interview with minister Robert Lipka, October 1998. 
75 Law of June 1970, amended, D.: ien"ik U5taw 1992, No 4, title 16. 
76 Sokolowski,, 4poflýyc.: no, ýý, pp. 29 - 38. 
77 Henryk Dziewulski (ed. ), Stan apolityc.: no, ýci wqjska i kadry Zawodowej w ýwietle opinii --olnierzy 
zawodowych WP (The State of Political Neutrality of the Army and Professional Military Personnel 
in the light of opinions of the Professional Soldiers of the Polish Army) (Warszawa: WIBS, October 
1995), p. 11, Czeslaw Ochenduszka, Swiadomoýýc obj,, vvatelska i orienlaýje spolec.: no - polityczne 
, ýrodoivisk ivqjskoivYeh. 
Dynamika pr--emian i ceehy s.: c.: eg6lne (Citizen consciousness and socio- 
political orientations of the military. Dynamics of the changes and its peculiar features. ) (Warszawa: 
WIBS, January 1997), p. 13. in Polish. 
78 Interview with colonel Krzysztof Pornmes, Deputy Director of Public Relations Office, Polish 
MOD, June 1997. 
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cases of canvassing inside the military establishment 79 and the additional guidelines 
on political neutrality, issued by the successive Ministers of Defence before each 
election, did not help to stop the abuses of military neutrality. go The practice ended 
after Lech Walýsa lost the presidential elections, and the parliamentary elections of 
1997 were free of such incidents. 
De-communisation and de-politicisation of the military in Poland had limited 
scope and objectives and did little to damage the army's cohesiveness. The 
elimination of political control, both in its structural and personnel dimension, was 
welcomed by the Polish military and so was the idea of political disengagement. 
However, after the removal of the party control bodies the civilian politicians did not 
fill the institutional vacuum, particularly after the ungrounded accusation of the first 
civilian minister of defence Jan Parys compromised the idea of democratic civilian 
control to the post-communist military. Thus, the Polish post-communist army 
emerged from the de-politicisation process as an institution with 'a core of highly 
79 Gazeta Wyborcza, August 16.1995. 
Flo Before each election the Minister of Defence was reminded of the principle of neutrality. 
1. Wytyczne Ministra Obrony Narodowej Z dn. II cierwca 1993 r. w sprawie przestriegania w 
kampanii iiývborczej do Sejrnu i Senatu ustawowo okreglonych zasad apolityczno, ýci Sil Zbrojnych i 
apaqyjno, ýci Zolnierzy (Ministry of National Defence Directive of II June 1993 on Observance 
during the Parliamentary Election Campaign of the Statutory Principles af the Political Neutrality an 
the Armed Forces and the Non-Partisanship of Servicemen). Completed by additional guidelines 
issued on 22 July 1993 by Janusz Onyszkiewicz. 
2. Wyoýczne Ministra Obron, v Narodowqj _- 
dn, 27 mqja 1994 wsprawie wybor6w do rad gmin oraz 
u.: upeIniqjqcjPch wybor6w do Senatit RP (Ministry of National Defence Directive of 27 May 1994 in 
the election to local governments and complimentary elections to Senate), by Piotr Kolodziejczyk. 
3. Wyývc--ne Ministar Obrony Narodowej w sprawie udiiaht -ýolnieri. v w wyborach 
Prelydenta 
Rieczpospolitej Polskiqj 5 listopada 1995 (Ministry of National Defence Directive on the 
participation of the soldiers in presidential elections), by Zbigniew Okofiski. Zý 
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professional officer corps and limited direct civilian oversight over them', 81 which 
greatly complicated the subsequent reform of the defence management in Poland. 
None of that benign, restrained policy towards the post-communist military's 
de-communisation could possibly be traced in the Czech Republic. The Czech 
process of de-politicisation and de-communisation had its own, internal dynamics 
and differed from most countries in the region in the prolonged and highly 
oppressive character of the screening processes. 
On discovering the military preparations for intervening in 1989 the first 
post-communist administration prioritised the de-communisation de-politicisation of 
the anned forces over other military reforms for the safety of the transition. And, 
contrary to Poland, 'the Czechoslovak leadership did not presume that its officer 
corps was loyal. In fact, it made exactly the opposite assumption; namely, that they 
were disloyal until they proved otherwise. ' 82 Between December 1999 and May 
1991 the Main Political Administration was dissolved, political officers abolished, 
and party organisation declared illegal in the army. By order of the Minister of 
Defence all the military were to resign their membership of political parties. In 1991 
the parliament adopted a Law No. '161/1992 which prohibited political activities of 
the military or electoral campaigns on military sites. Also, it banned military 
membership in trade unions. 83 Still, minister Vacek and the subsequent ministers: 
Dobrovsky, Baudyý, and Holah were criticised for not being bold enough in the 
8' Thomas S. Szayna, F. Stephen Larrabee, East European Military Refbrm After the Cold War. 
Implicationsfiv the United States (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND, 1995), p. 34. 
Herspring, 'Refolution', p. 675. 
833 Szernerk6nyi, 'Central European Civil - Military', p. 38, 
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implementation of de-politicising measures 84 and their sometimes symbolic 
character. For example, the Klement Gottwald Academy for political officers was 
simply renamed the Advanced Military School of Pedagogy and political structures 
remodelled into the Directorate for Training and Culture. 95 In general, the 
Czechoslovak military welcomed the disengagement from politics and only very few 
of them resigned from the army to continue political activities. The elections of 1992 
and 1994 (municipal) demonstrated that the interest of the professional military in 
political careers was low. 96 
In 1990 the new oath was presented to the Czechoslovak armed forces, 
which provoked some unrest in the military and caused some 24% of the officer 
corps (usually younger officers) to leave the service. 87 Parallel with the 
Czechoslovak de-communisation the large scale rehabilitation process of the officers 
dismissed from service in 1948 and 1968 was initiated. The rehabilitation processes 
took an unprecedented scale and pace - in the years 1990 - 1992 according to the 
ministerial sources 9500 former military personnel were rehabilitated and among 
them 1120 restored to service. 88 Between 1990 - 1992 the representatives of this 
group held most prominent positions in the military, for example general Karel Pezl 
was the Chief of General Staff, Antonin Ra§ek (also former military) - civilian First 
Deputy Minister of Defence and Head of Department of Education and Culture, 
94 Pick, Sarva§, Stach, Democratic Control, p. 32. 
85 Herspring, Refolution', p. 675. 
S6 Interview with Jifi Dluko§, Personnel Division, Legislative Directorate, Czech MOD, Prague, 
September 1999. Vlachova, Sarva§. 'From the Totalitarian', p. 98, Szemerk6nyi, ' Central European', 
p. 5 0. 
87 Pick, Sarv8. Stach, Democratic Control, p. 44. 
Miloý BalabAn. 'NevWni or-oanizace a armdda', in Stefan Sarv8 a kolektiv výzkumneho týmu, 
Bezpeenost a armýda v moderni spoleenosti (Praha: University Karlovy, Fakulta socidlnfch vOd), 
6/1997, p. 13 1. 
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General Greiner was the Head of Personnel Department, and they were the greatest 
proponents of the harsh de-communisation policy. 
The Czechoslovak authorities carried out a large scale policy of lustration. 
Screening of the officer corps began in 1990, and sped up after the enactment of the 
Czechoslovak Lustration Law at the end of 1991. Following the division of the 
Czechoslovak Federation, a similarly bold Lustration Law was passed by the Czech 
parliament in July 1993, after which in April 1994 another round of military 
screening was approved. 89 The law obliged every professional soldier at the rank of 
colonel or above to apply for a certificate that he had not collaborated with the 
communist special services. The process covered over 7,000 officers and around 
18% of them had to leave the army due to a positive verdict (that is, that they were 
collaborators). 
The de-communisation of the military in Czechoslovakia and later the Czech 
Republic is difficult to assess. Its proponents indicated the fact that the entire 
communist leadership of the Czechoslovak army was replaced by the new cadres; 
some 15% of the total officer corps left the army, and the majority of them were the 
highest ranking communist military from the MOD and the General Staff. The 
lustration also led indirectly to the replacement of the military minister of defence 
Vacek by the first civilian Minister of Defence, Luboý Dobrovsky in October 1990. 
According to the supporters of harsh de-communisation, this process was necessary 
for the recovery of the social trust in the military and conducive to the introduction 
of civilian control. 90 
"9 Michta, The Governments, pp. 41 - 42. 
90 Interview with general General Karel PezI, former Chief of Defence Staff 1991 - 1993 and 
presidential security advisor, Officer of the President, Czech Republic, Prague, September 1999. 
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The opponents of the severe de-communisation indicated the uncontrolled 
loss of young and dynamic cadres from the military, 91 humiliation of the soldiers by 
the never-ending screening procedure and their growing resentment against civilian 
authorities as well as lowering of the cohesion and combat readiness of the Czech 
army. Last but not least, the method of screening was unjust because a number of 
colonels and generals avoided the lustration simply by being moved to a lower grade 
position. 92 Finally, there is a measure of bitter irony in the fact that the country with 
such a degree of 'experience' in screening was the one that was forced to withdraw 
several of its representatives from NATO structures after accession to the Alliance 
due to delays in security screening. 93 
A measured de-politicisation was also carried out in Ukraine, however the 
authorities in the newly established state faced a different set of challenges than the 
problems encountered in Poland or the Czech Republic. Technically speaking, 
Ukraine inherited the Soviet military already without the MPA structures. The MPA 
was officially abolished in the Soviet military by Gorbachev's decree in the 
aftermath of the failed Moscow coup, on 30 August 1991.94 Ukrainian authorities 
replaced the MPA formed in 1992 with an influential Social-Psychological Service 
under Volodymyr Muliava, who championed the nationalising policy of 
91 Jifi Obrman, 'The Czechoslovak Armed Forces: The Reform Continues', RFEIRL Research Report, 
7 February 1992, pp. 48 - 49. 
92 Interviews with Captain ýtefan Sarvaý, Senior Research Associate, Research Department, Czech 
MOD, Prague and colonel Adam Zajqc, Polish Military Attach6, Embassy of Poland, Prague, 
September 1999. 
91, Press conference of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army of the Czech Republic, Lt. General 
Jifi Sedivy, httr): -ýk\k\N. annyxz. zpra-vý'english 'ledeWj)res,;, -, enj1tml: 04.12.2000. 
94 Robert V. Barylski, 'The Soviet Military before and after the August Coup: Departization and 
Decentralization'. Armed Forces & Society,, Vol. 19, No. 1, Fall 1992, p. 41. 
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'ukrainisation' in the armed forces for about a year. 95 Also, the first package of laws 
on defence and security in Ukraine, passed by the parliament in 1992, included a ban 
on military political activity in service and prohibition of military membership in the 
political parties. 96 Article 37 of the Constitution later confirmed those legal 
provisions. These steps were about as far as the process of 'de-communisation' and 
de-politicisation went in the post-Soviet Ukrainian armed forces, which was hardly 
surprising, given the communist provenance of the ruling elite. 
Under the pressure of the stateness problems, the authorities chose to 
concentrate on nationalising policy instead. In an effort to build loyalty to 
independent Ukraine and its constitutional authorities, the so called 'ukrainisation' 
policy was introduced in the armed forces. The policy was also motivated by the fact 
that the persistence of the Soviet officers in the Ukrainian army was recognised as a 
threat to independence and to be a potentially explosive issue in 1992.97 It was 
understood that: 
the professional officer who joined the armed forces of the USSR, served 
in various areas of the old union and the former Warsaw Pact, and in general 
believed in the rectitude of the union and the ideals (insofar as he understood 
them) it represented: internationalism, socialism, Marxism-Leninism. This 
might well be called a kind of 'Soviet nationalism'... The attachment of these 
95 Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 186. 
96 Valeriy lzmalkov, 'Ukraine and her Armed Forces: the Conditions and Process for their Creation, 
Character. Structure and Military Doctrine'. European Security, Vol. 2. No. 2, (Summer 1993), pp. 
298-299. 
97 Phillip Petersen, 'Security Policy in the Post-Soviet Slavic Heartland and Moldova', European 
Securio% Vol. 1, No. 3 (Autumn 1992). pp. 298 & 342 - 343. 
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officers ... to the old union was more visceral than 
intellectual, and the present 
situation seems to them both abhorrent and temporary. 98 
The main goal of the military ukrainisation was building a reliable tool of 
defence for the young Ukrainian state, and the fear of the influence of the Soviet 
officersý persistence in the army fuelled the nationalising efforts. Apart from the 
educational element, the ukrainisation was based on the forced administration of the 
oath of allegiance and the promotion of the ethnic Ukrainians in cadres. The policy 
was implemented by the first Minister of Defence, Konstyantyn Morozov, and the 
then powerful Union of the Ukrainian Officers, headed by V. Martyrosian, whose 
members took all the prominent positions in defence sector in the first year of 
independence. 99 
The exact national composition of the officer corps in Ukraine in 1991 is not 
known, but Soviet estimates showed 44.5% Russians, 40.5% Ukrainians and 15% 
other nationalities. ' 00 Ukrainian sources quote even higher numbers of Russian on I 
December 1992: 48% of Russian officers, 45% - Ukrainian and 7% - other 
nationalities. 10' Under first Ukrainian minister Morozov, the highest positions and 
9' Thomas M. Nichols, 'An Electoral Mutiny? Zhirinovsky and the Russian Armed Forces', Armed 
Forces & Society, Vol. 21, No. 3, Spring 1995, p. 332; for more general overview of characteristic 
typical Soviet mindset see the results of various polls carried out in 1992 and 1993 in Roy Laird, 'The 
Soviet Legacy 1994: Homo Sovieticus is Alive If Not Well', European Security, Vol. 4, No. 2, Summer 
1995, pp. 225 - 240. 
99 According to Martyrosian, at its peak 15% of the serving officers were the UOU members and 
some 40% sympathised with its activities. Taras Kuzio, 'Civil Military Relations in Ukraine, 1989 - 
1991', Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 22, No 1, Fall 1995, p. 41. The organisation lost its political 
leverage and most members after minister Morozov's departure from office in 1993. G. Kliucznikov, 
'Soyuz Sovietskih Oficerov Zdiot vriemiem 'CZ', A, 'ic:: avisitnoYc FoYennolve Ohozriennilve No 22,28 
November 1998 (in Russian). 
100 Data of to the Soviet General Staff Organisation and Recruitment Directorate, cited by PAP 
(Polish Press Agency), Foreign Division, News No 154,3 January 1992. 
'Nacionalniy sklad Zbroynih Sil Ukraini', Noviy Shliah, No 40 / 1995 (in Ukrainian). 
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ranks were progressively staffed with ethnic Ukrainians in the belief that ethnic 
allegiance would guarantee sufficient levels of patriotism and loyalty to the 
Ukrainian state. 102 The ethnic proportion of the officer corps gradually altered in 
favour of the Ukrainians: on I December 199' ) the Ukrainians already represented a 
ma ority of the officers, that is 52.9%, while Russians - 41% (the remaining j 
percentage represents other nationalities); on I December 1994 - 55.3% Ukrainians 
and 38.7% Russian; on I Dec. 1995 - 59% Ukrainian officers and only 36% 
Russian. Moreover, by 1995 the heads of the main directorates in the central 
structures of the Ministry of Defence as well as all deputy ministers of defence were 
of Ukrainian nationality. 103 
As a rapid and effective instrument of ukrainisation, the oath of allegiance to 
the Ukrainian state was imposed. The procedure was initiated by Minister Morozov 
shortly after the referendum on independence and was administered in the beginning 
of 1992. The oath was partly a reaction to the Moscow August 1991 coup attempt, 
but it was also an element of the official ukrainisation campaign as well as allowing 
for a partial reduction of oversized forces through voluntary departure of certain 
numbers of professional officers to Russia. By administering the oath, the Ukrainian 
administration also wished to reiterate Ukrainian rights to the Black Sea Fleet 
(without success) and break the Soviet corporate structure of the officer corps. ' 04 
102 "If an individual was born in Ukraine, has Ukrainian roots or a connection with Ukraine because 
of familial relationships and serves Ukraine conscientiously, then there is no question about the 
individual's nationality. If an officer considers Ukraine and only Ukraine to be his homeland, if, as we 
sino in our national anthem, he is ready to give his life and soul for our liberty, then he should find a 
position in our armed forces. He should be allowed to serve Ukraine, the Ukrainian people". 
Interview with Konstantyn Morozov, The Ukrainian Quarterýv, Vol. XLIX, No. 3, Fall 1993, p. 250. 
'Nacionalni sklad Zbroynih Sil Ukraini', NovOy Shliah, No 40,1 1995. 
'0' Bohdan Pryskir, 'The Silent Coup: the Building of Ukraine's Military', European Security, Vol. 2, 
No. 1, (Spring 1993), p. 146. 
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Failure to take the oath resulted either in posting the officer abroad or retirement, 
and for the enlisted personnel there was an additional option of being sent to their 
home republic. In the peculiar situation of Ukraine the oath had a strong anti- 
Russian and anti-CIS edge and put an end to the plans of a unified CIS army. which 
in 1991/92 were still under discussion. ' 05 The oath read: 
1, (name), upon entering military service, solemnly swear to the people of 
Ukraine to always be faithful and devoted to them, to conscientiously and 
honestly fulfil military duties, the orders of commanders, steadfastly uphold 
the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, safeguarding state and military secrets. 
I swear to defend the Ukrainian state, firmly stand for her freedom and 
independence. 
swear to never betray the people of Ukraine. ' 06 
The administration of the oath was carried out generally in a moderate and 
non-selective manner, nevertheless some local authorities appeared over-zealous and 
in some places taking an oath was accompanied by filling a questionnaire with the 
question 'Are you ready to fight against Russians'? 107 There were also rumours that 
officers not taking the oath would not keep full pension rights. ' 09 
Excluding the Black Sea Fleet, only around 9500 officers refused to take the 
oath. 109 Among them there were some top commanders, for example the 
105 Jacob Kipp, 'The Uncertain Future of the Soviet Military, From Coup to Commonwealth: the 
Antecedents of National Armies', European Securiiy Sudies, Vol. l, No 2, Summer 1992, pp. 207 - 
238, Sergei Rogov, 'Military Reform: Now or Never', European Security, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1992, 
pp. 5- 12. 
"'6 Quote from Pyskir, 'The Silent', p. 157. 
107 Interview with Galina Starovoytova, Stolica, No 23 (185), June 1994. 
108 'Druga potýga Europy', (ptsz) My. ýl Polska, I- 15 October 1993, p. 8. 
'09 'Ukraine to Transfer Officers Who Refuse to Swear Allegiance' , 
The Ukrainian Qziarterýj,, No 3, 
October 1992, p. 367. 
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commanders of Kiev, Carpathian and Odessa military districts, who were promptly 
replaced. 110 However, many of the officers took the oath of allegiance for 
opportunistic reasons. The newspaper Narodna Gazieta estimated that only '30% of 
the officers swore loyalty for patriotic reasons, the remaining 70% was motivated 
economically or had other reasons. " Therefore, the success in numbers was hardly 
a guarantee of Ukrainian military loyalty against the Russians, and met with official 
protest from Russia and a counter-oath, administered to Russian troops. 
The imposition of the Ukrainian language represented another element of the 
ukrainisation policy, and perhaps the most antagonising one. 112 Since the linguistic 
ukrainisation had not progressed since independence, in April 1993 a decree was 
passed which enforced the use of 'national' Ukranian language. The policy of 
linguistic ukrainisation was enthusiastically backed by Minister of Defence 
K. Morozov who blamed military commanders for the failure of the policy. 113 
Linguistic policy of ukraininsation met with the growing resistance of the officer 
corps and was one of the factors behind the Morozov's departure. His successors, 
Radetskiy and Shmarov, adopted much a lower profile on the language issue. And 
while Minister Morozov was accused of the conscious discrimination of non- 
Ukrainians in the armed forces, his successors in turn were accused by nationalist 
110 Pryskir, 'The Silent.. ', p. 148. 
Vzom ti, armie, biezboronna? ', Narodna Gazieta, No 36, September 1992 (in Ukrainian). 
'Na zahist nacii', Ukrainskie Slovo, 31 December 1998, pp. 5-6. The newspaper published a series 
of abusive letters from the sixth army brigade denouncing linguistic ukrainization and expressing 
their outrage at not having Russian as a second official Ian-uaoe and letters from the commanders of 
the brigade and higher officials reactin, with anger at the abuse of national language, anti-patriotic 
attitudes, calling for trials etc. The overall publication captured the nature of the conflict that such 
state-sponsored promotion of the Ukrainian language provoked. 
'Kak po - ukrainski Rawnieys', Smirno! ', Kurano,,, No 166,2 September 1993, p. 3. 
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newspapers of exactly the opposite. 114 On the whole, however, the policy of forced 
nationalisation of the Ukrainian army inflicted ethnic tensions and politicised the 
national issue of the military, but failed to achieve its goals of building national 
identity and loyalty to the new state. 
Similarly, the attempts to disengage the military from current politics proved 
hardly successful. Although the appropriate laws were adopted, the military political 
neutrality was regularly breached. Practically all political parties competed for 
military votes and wanted to include military figures into their leadership. ' 15 At the 
same time, the social organisations of the officers, like an All-Ukrainian Union 
Vitchizna, created in 1996 under the leadership of gen. Vilen Martyrosyan (founder 
and former head of the Union of the Officers of Ukraine) or the National- Patriotic 
Union of Service Personnel Honour and Fatherland, were actively lobbying for 
military corporate interests and protection of the interests of the officer corps in the 
political elite. 116 This process had already started in the last years of the Soviet 
Union and continued in the independent Ukraine. ' 17 In 1997 there were over 30 
various 'social' organisations of the military in Ukraine and their number was 
increasing. 1 18 
The other trend characteristic of the post-independence Ukrainian military 
was the relatively large numbers of professional soldiers running for parliament. 
This was with active support being provided by the MOD who was driven by a 
114 For example S. Lisniy, 'Z ukrainskoy armii viganiayut usie ukrain'skie', (Everything Ukrainian is 
0- in Ukrainian), Shliah Peremohi, No 29,1995. got rid of 
in Ukrainian army 
G. Kliuchnikov, V. Larciev, 'Elliektorat <cvieta khaki>, s kiem ty? ', Kievskive Viedomosti, 5 
September 1997. 
'"' G. Kliuchnik-ov, V. Larciev, 'Eliektorat'. 
117 Yang Zhong, 'The Transformation of the Soviet Military and the Auoust Coup', Armed Forces 
Societ1j,,, Vol. 19, No 1, Fall 1992, p. 65. 
11" G. Kliuchnikov, V. Larciev, 'Eliektorat'. 
1533 
desire to create its own military lobby in the legislature. In the elections of 1998 
seventy senior officers ran for parliament, among them 19 generals and 26 colonels. 
Newspapers headlines read: 'Bad is a colonel who does not want to run for 
parliament'. 1 19 Among the candidates was the former Minister of Defence Vitaliy 
Radet'sky and head of logistics in the MOD, gen. Dmitriy Rukovodsky who both 
had a permission granted by the Minister of Defence gen. Kuz'muk. 120 Another 
interesting feature of the military candidates was that a great majority of them 
represented the 'educational' structures within the MOD or from military academies, 
many of them former political officers. All of them lost in the elections. 
There can be little doubt that beyond getting rid of the MPA's political 
control, the Ukrainian military did not welcome the de-politicisation or nationalising 
policies that were implemented by the authorities. Contrary to the official 
expectations, the policy of ukrainisation induced more identity confusion into the 
military than it built its loyalty to the new state. Similarly, the legal efforts to 
separate the military from current politics were invalidated by the tacit agreement to 
military political involvement on the part of the politicians and the higher military 
echelons. However, it must be noted that on no occasion did the Ukrainian army try 
to blackmail the authorities or threaten the government into a change of policy. 
Rather, the military were interested in fostering their corporate interests and 
protecting autonomy, and their opposition to the ukrainisation policy was expressed 
in general through passive resistance. Despite its own identity and professional 
problems, at no point of the transformation did the Ukrainian army pose a direct 
9 S. Z-, uriec, 'Ploh tot polkovnik, kotoriy nie hochiet stat' dieputatom', D.: ien', 10 March 1998. 
120 Interview with gen. Kuz'muk. 'Voyenniye pokajeszczio vieriat', Zierkalo Niedzieli, No 49 (166), 6 
December 1997. 
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threat to the government or the political system of the country. Under Ukrainian 
circumstances, that must be regarded as success of transition. 
In Lithuania, there existed an equally great potential for harsh lustration as 
there was in the Czech Republic, due to a widespread fears of the subversive 
activities of the former KGB agents 121 whose large, though incomplete, archives had 
been left intact in the territory of Lithuania. ' 22 Yet, in the end the screening 
procedures were limited to civilian politicians and carried out with a margin of extra 
tolerance for ethnic Lithuanians. 123 
Upon asserting the independence, Lithuania decided against the use of the 
Soviet army remnants as the basis for its national army. The problems of de- 
politicisation, de-communisation and re-nationalisation were solved in Lithuania by 
the way of a total rejection of the Soviet model and the re-establishment of the pre- 
war Lithuanian military on 19 November 1992.124 By doing that, the Lithuanian 
parliament symbolically stressed the continuity of the national military tradition and 
at the same time, initiated the process of building the Lithuanian army from scratch. 
The three processes of de-politicisation, de-communisation and re-nationalisation 
were in fact blended into one process of getting rid of the Soviet armed forces and 
starting with a clean slate. In October 1992 the Constitution of Lithuania was 
'2' Philip Petersen, 'Security Policy in the Post-Soviet Baltic States'. European Security, Vol. 1, No. 
I (Spring 1992), p. 34. z: l 
122 Senn, ' Lithuania's First", p. 83. 
12 - Anton Steen, 'Consolidation and Competence: Research On the Politics of Recruiting Political 
Elites in the Baltic States', Jow-mil qf'Baltic Sludies, Vol. XXVIL No. 2, Summer 1996, pp. 143 - 
146. 
124 The forming of national anny started in Lithuania prior to this date, thus the decision of the 
Lithuanian parliament had primary a symbolic dimension. See Gintaras Tamulaitis, National Secuirty 
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adopted which included harsh regulations on military political neutrality. Article 141 
provided that people in military or police service of any kind were not allowed to be 
members of Seimas (parliament) or local councils, neither could they hold elected or 
appointed posts in the State civil service. Political membership or activity while in 
service were also prohibited. 12S These regulations are more severe than in most other 
post-communist countries. Furthermore, their inclusion in the constitution gave them 
a high priority and emphasised the importance of excluding the military from 
Lithuanian political authorities. 
In the aftermath of the parliamentary decision on establishing the national 
army, the situation of the Soviet armed forces stationed in the Baltic republic 
changed to one of a foreign, occupational force. In the popular referendum in May 
1992 the Lithuanian population called for their immediate withdrawal. After 
complex negotiations and some foot-dragging on the part of Russian military 
leadership, in August 19931 Russia completed withdrawal of the military from 
Lithuania in accordance with the agreed deadline. ' 26 
The Lithuanian army obtained the status of a national force, unburdened by 
Soviet legacy. But while such a radical approach had many advantages, nevertheless 
the image of a new start was largely an illusion. Although the Lithuanian authorities 
made an attempt to base the formation of the an-ny on the paramilitary voluntary 
forces, for example National Defence Volunteer Force or even some sport 
and Dqlýnce Policy qf'the Lithuanian State, Research Paper No 26, (New York and Geneva: United 
Nations Institute for Disarmament, 1994). p. 14. 
,2 Chapter Thirteen, article 141, Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. 
1 26 V. Stanley Vardys. Judith B. Sedaitisý Lithuania: the Rebel Nation (Boulder, Colo. And Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1997), p. 196; & Alfred Erich Senn, 'Lithuania: Rights and Responsibilities of 
Independence', in Ian Bremmer, Ray Taras, Nea, States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet 
Nations (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 373. 
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associations, 127 nevertheless it quickly became evident that the creation of a modem, 
effective force required military experts, and the only military specialists available 
in sufficient numbers were ethnic Balts with a history of service in the Soviet 
army. 128 The former Soviet officers brought Soviet type military culture and routine 
into the national Lithuanian army and liquidated many advantages of the radical 
rejection of the Soviet military legacy. Those 'red colonels' later became an obstacle 
in the process of implementing democratic principles to the civil-military relations 
in the Lithuanian armed forces, yet the problem was primarily a generational one. 129 
Moreover, the assistance from NATO experts and co-operation with Nordic 
countries helped to overcome this problem in the course of transition. ' 30 
New Mission of the Post-Communist Military. 
Redefining the military mission in the post-communist states and formulating 
the national defence doctrines was a difficult, but necessary task for all the former 
Warsaw Pact members. Its primary significance lay in the reorientation of the army 
from an offensive to a defensive force and its subordination to the national chain of 
command. Secondly, a revised definition of the military role in the state had to 
exclude possibility of the internal use of the military, except for situations allowed 
by law, for example the assistance in the situation of a natural disaster. Thirdly, the 
formulation of defence doctrines was necessary to define the security interests of the 
127 While Paper '99, Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, Vilnus 1999, p. 29. 
"' Albert M. Zaccor, 'Problems in the Baltic Armed Forces', The Journal of'Slavic Military Studies, 
Vol. 8. No. 1, March 1995, p. 53. 
129 Al-irdas V. Kanauka, 'Virtues and Pitfalls of Civilian Control of the Military, in Conference on n 
Civil - Militatýy Relations in the Context (? f an Evolving NATO (Budapest: Ministry of Defence 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 1997), p. 57. 
130 Interview with Major Rimas Litvinas, Defence Attach6, Embassy of Republic of Lithuania, 
Warsaw. Au., Wst 1999. 
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post-communist states in the changed political and security environment and 
consequently to determine the direction of the military reforms. 
Unstable domestic situations, the hamstrung national capacities of strategic 
planning within the Warsaw pact, lack of the necessary resources, of expertise and 
particularly civilian expertise, fluctuating international environment, and identity 
problems in some of the countries complicated the task. The draft doctrines were 
completed in all the countries with varying speed and skill, yet everywhere the 
doctrines had a character of interim documents, waiting for some definite changes in 
domestic or international situation. 
The first attempt to revise the security fundaments of the communist regime 
in Poland was undertake very early on, in 1990. Later this document was elaborated 
into a 'Security Policy and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland', adopted in 
November 1992 by the Home Defence Committee (KOK), in the conditions of an 
unpredictable international security environment. The doctrine formulated a concept 
of defence in all directions, but at the same time acknowledged the asymmetry of 
threats and the smaller probability of total war compared with an outbreak of a small 
scale conflict. The document stressed the importance of international co-operation 
and included integration with WEU and NATO as the goal of Polish security and 
defence policy. Thus, from the military point of view, the doctrine 'presented a 
contradictory agenda'. 
131 
The 1992 doctrine was clearly a transitional document, aimed at making a 
clear break with the communist concept of security. It included declaration that 
Poland did not regard any country as its enemy, and formulated the new tasks for the 
, -3 ' Latawski, Trun, ýfbrniation, p. 14. 
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Polish military, defined in a traditional way as a national defence and humanitarian 
missions. The document did, however, depart from hard - security orientation in 
Polish defence policy and took note of non-military security factors, such as 
economic strength and legitimacy of the socio-political system. ' 32 
Despite the repeated declarations from the Polish officials that the defence 
doctrine needed revision, the new document was not prepared before Poland 
acceded to NATO in 1999. Similarly, the traditional notion of the military mission 
was not reformulated and according to the Polish Constitution of 1997, the mission 
of the Polish Armed Forces is to protect the independence of the state, the integrity 
of its territory and inviolability of its borders. ' 33 This definition, in view of the high 
profile given to Polish participation in the humanitarian and peacekeeping 
operations in the 1990s, appeared obsolete as well, but at least separated the military 
from a police role. And, despite the lack of up-to-date doctrine, the profound 
reforms of the Polish defence sector and legislative changes that took place in the 
meantime radically reoriented the Polish defence system from the Warsaw Pact 
offensive posture to defensive tasks. However, on defence doctrine Poland adopted a 
wait-and-see approach, and left the fon-nulation of the national defence strategy 
waiting for the accession to NATO. 
Even more important difficulties were encountered by the Czech Republic. A 
process of formulating the new mission for the post-communist military in Czech 
Republic was slow and carried out primarily in connection with NATO enlargement. 
Hieronim Kubiak, 'Poland: National Security in a Changing Environment', in Regina Cowen Karp 
(ed. ), Central and Eastern Europe: The Challenge of Transition (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
and SI PRI, 1993)ý pp. 90 - 10 1. 
Constitution of the Republic of Poland. art. 26. 
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which is hardly surprising given the Czech general scepticism regarding its national 
defence capabilities. The Czech public thinking on security presented a strange 
paradox: on one hand there was a conviction that the national defence was 
impossible, on the other hand public support for NATO enlargement was also low 
and one of the reasons for that was fear of losing sovereign control over the Czech's 
own defence resources. 134 But the 'Velvet divorce' was yet another, often 
overlooked factor which delayed the preparation of defence doctrine: the separation 
of the Czech Republic from Slovakia radically changed the Czech strategic view of 
its situation in Europe. 
The relative geographical shift of the Czech Republic westward and its 
separation from Ukraine and unstable post-Soviet area by the Slovak 'buffer zone' 
dramatically altered the Czech perception of external political environment and 
policy perspectives. 1 35 The new government decided to reorient Czech foreign 
policy towards rapid integration with the Western structures, and the priority was 
given to economic integration over the defence policy. This was carried out at the 
expense of regional co-operation, partly because the Czechs feared that due to their 
small size and limited defence capabilities the country could be sidelined in the 
regional politics. It was also argued that the country faced no military threat and 
therefore the resources should be utilised for economic transformation. 136 In the 
aftermath of the 'Velvet Divorce' the Czech Republic practically withdrew from the 
ýtefan Sarvaý, 'Attitudes of the Czech Public towards National Security, the Military, and NATO 
Membership', Thedournal qfSlavic Militaij, Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 60 & 73. 
Jeffery Simon, Czechoslovakias 1, 'elvet Divorce', Visegrad Cohesion, and European Fault Lines. 
McNair Paper 23, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University (Washington 
D. C., October 1993), pp. 1- 6. 
1 _3 6 On co-operation in the Visegrad Group and Czech changing position, see Ferenc Gazdag, The 
V'isegrad Countries Towards N, 4 TO, Defence Studies (Budapest: Institute for Strategic and Defence 
Studies, 1997), pp. 32 - 37. 
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Visegrad Group and ended security and military co-operation with Poland, Hungary 
and Slovakia. However, the main reason for freezing co-operation was the 
conviction in the Czech goven-u-nent that the country would stand a better chance of 
rapid integration with the West while acting alone and that other Central European 
countries would only slow down the Czech accession processes both to the EU and 
NATO. 137 
That new orientation in Czech foreign and security policy was reflected by 
the first post-communist defence doctrine adopted by the government in December 
in 1994 and approved by the parliament in January 1995. The document, called 
*Military Strategy 1996 - 2005', outlined the ways of development, preparation and 
use of the army. The *Strategy.. ' stated that the Czech Republic had no enemy and 
that military aggression on its territory in the near future was not likely. 13 8 That 
official approach corresponded with a noticeable decline in public security 
concerns. 139 But while downplaying the risk of major military confrontation, the 
'Strategy.. ' pointed to other military and non-military security threats, which could 
possibly draw the Czech Republic into armed conflict. These were political and 
economic instabilities in Eastern Europe or the Balkans, regional crises, terrorist 
attacks, mass migrations or industrial disasters. The document also reflected the 
political priorities of the Czech govermnent's policy. It stressed the non-aligned 
status of the Czech Republic and the principle of all-round defence. The 1994 
doctrine assumed that the Czech Republic would become a member of NATO in the 
1-, 7 Sylwester Przybyla, Podej, ýcie Republiki Cýeskiej do heýpiec-zehstwa w regionie (Czech Approach 
to the Regional Security). Ministry of National Defence (Warsaw: MON, Wydawnictwo Adam 
Marszalek, 1996), pp. 5-7&II- 17, in Polish. 
1,18 Stephane Lefebvre, *The Army of the Czech Republic: A Status Report, The Journal of Slavic 
Miluar-j, Studies, Vol. 8, No. 4 (December 1995), p. 724. 
"9 Sarvaý, 'Attitudes', p. 60. 
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future, it did not, however, contain any provisions for development of regional 
security co-operation. Instead, the document stressed the readiness of the Czech 
arrny to participate in the operations conducted under the auspices of the global and 
regional organisations, mainly UN and OSCE. 140 
The 1994 doctrine was an interim document which soon became obsolete 
and needed revision. The Strategy failed to produce a definite plan for the armed 
forces development, which in turn resulted in the random restructuring of the 
military and a poorly defined, oversized and unclear procurement policy. 141 
Secondly, the Czech policy of distancing itself from the other countries in the region 
backfired. Devaluing regional co-operation was received negatively in the West, and 
so the Czech government was forced to reinterpret its foreign policy concept and 47 
came back to selected regional co-operation structures. 142 Finally, as the NATO 
enlargement process accelerated, the Czech Army urgently needed a long-term 
strategy of development that would allow the ACR to meet NATO standards. 143 In 
fact, the drive to join NATO was at the core of Czech thinking on security doctrine. 
In 1997 Prime Minister Klaus admitted that a number of legislative documents on 
security strategy were adopted or pushed forward 'because the govemment was 
induced indirectly to approve the documents by the realisation that NATO would 
decide at its 1998 summit about future members. 144 
"' White Paper on Defence qf the C.: ech Republic, (Prague: Ministry of National Defence, 1995), pp. 
10-19. 
'Country Briefing: the Czech RepUblic'_Jane's Dýfence Weekly, 20 May 1998, p. 21. 
"2 Gazdag, The Visegrad.., p. 36, Przybyla, Podejýcie Republiki Czeskiej, p. 35. 
14 , ' Rený Nastoupil, 'The Czech Approach', in Evolving Sccuritv Concepts and Defence Doctrines in 
Central und Eastern Europe, Papers from the ISDS Conference, II- 13 June 1998, Defence Studies 
No 27 (Budapest: Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, 1999). pp. 24 - 26. 
144 ýtefan Sarv8, One Past, Two Fulures? The VATO Enlargement Debate in the Cý7ech Republic 
and Slovakia. Harmonic Paper 4 (Groningen: Center for European Security Studies, 1999), p. 27. 
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Driven by the prospect of NATO membership, the Czech authorities between 
1997 and 1998 prepared a revision of the Military Strategy. The new National 
Defence Strategy of March 1997 was followed up by the 'Conceptual Plan for the 
Development of the Czech Armed Forces till the Year 2000 with a Perspective till 
the Year 2005'. This plan in turn became the basis for the final 'Plan for the Armed 
Forces till 2005 With a Perspective till 2008'. Then, at the beginning of 1998 The 
Constitutional Law on the Security of the Czech Republic was adopted. 145 
These documents were consistent with the former definition of security 
threats and assumed that conflicts of limited objectives and local spheres of activity 
constitute were the most important potential military risks to the country. 146 it 
defined the mission of the military as defence of the country, but the strategy 
stressed the preparations for inclusion of ACR into NATO collective system. 
However, the new doctrine also brought to the fore the need to create a credible 
territorial defence. 147 The National Defense Strategy defined types of security 
situation (peace, emergency, and danger to the state, war) and laid out tasks of state 
bodies, e. g. government, parliament etc. correspondingly to the situation. 148 The 
military part of the doctrine brought the Czech strategic concept in line with NATO 
doctrinal principles, signalled the final move to the brigade system in the ARC, laid 
out the organisational structure of the anny, assigned the forces under NATO 
command and earmarked for NATO, and finally specified the command and control 
, 4- ý Law No 110/ 1998. 
146 'Country Briefing', p. 19, 
147 Sarva§, One Past, p. 28. 
148 Ren6 Nastoupil, 'Current Czech Defense Policy' The Journal (? f Slavic MilitarIv Studieýv, Vol. 12, 
No. 2 (June 1999), pp. I 10 - 114. 
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systems on strategic, operational and tactical levels. 149 However, as some critics 
observed, the documents failed to streamline the organisational structures of the 
MOD and General Staff which later became a hindrance for the progress of military 
reforms. 1ý0 
Commenting on the Czech approach to military and defence issues, external 
observers noted that *the drive to join NATO ... served as a substitute for a 
comprehensive defence strategy' in the Czech Republic. 15) It was even reflected in 
the Czech attitude to international missions. The authorities consistently supported 
Czech participation in international operations, from the presence of Czechoslovak 
personnel in the Gulf in 1991 to participation in all peacekeeping operations in the 
former Yugoslavia from 1992 onwards. 152 Czech troops were praised for their 
conduct, but unlike most regional PfP members, the Czech Republic had not created 
C a joint unit with another _oUntry. 
153 Rather than that, the Czech Republic had treated 
peace-keeping operations as a NATO 'useful pre-entry service, boosting military 
morale and enhancing the ACR's image. ' 54 
The process of formulating the new defence and military policy of the Czech 
Republic was slow, often inconsistent and lacking inter-agency co-operation. But 
above all, problems with definition of the geopolitical place of the Czech Republic 
149 Sebesty6n Gorka, What; s in the Pack-Sack' - Contribution to European Securityftom Poland, the 
C.: ech Republic and Hungary. Defence Studies No 26 (Budapest: Institute for Strategic and Defence 
Studies, 1999), pp. 38 - 43-, Nastoupil, 'The Czech Approach', pp. 26 - 29. 
"0 Conversation with Jih Sedivy, head of Institute of International Relations in Prague, November 
1999. 
'Country Briefing', p. 19. 
Nastoupil, 'Current Czech'. pp. H7- 118. 
Country Files: Czech Republic. Annual Report 1997. http: '/archivejol. cz, ý' ýountrjesiczear97. html, 
08.12.2000, p. 2. 
' i' Interview with Col General Jiti Nekv8il, Chief of General Staff, Jane's Defence WeeklY. II 
March 1998, p. 40. 
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and corresponding role of the military revealed the existence of problems from the 
sphere of stateness. After the separation from Slovakia the Czech Republic needed 
to redefine its strategic interests and establish its place on the international scene, 
and the process of elaborating national defence policy was influenced by the policy 
change that occurred in the aftermath of the Velvet divorce. 
The making of the doctrine in Ukraine was from the start dominated by the 
problems of Ukrainian relations with Russia and by the desire to establish the 
country as a viable state on the international arena. In 1991 independent Ukraine 
was seen as a temporary aberration by Russia and only hesitantly recognised by 
post-communist Europe, while the US administration showed a considerable degree 
of confusion over the situation in post-Soviet republics and preferred to concentrate 
on Russia instead, where the possibility of internal destabilisation was seen as 'life- 
155 
threatening' .A paradox of the Ukrainian geopolitical situation was that the ruling 
elite wanted to pursue a broadly understood pro-European policy, while the current 
political and security situation was detennined by Russia and issues of Russian - 
Ukrainian relations as well as the general uncertainty surrounding Ukrainian 
independence. ' 56 Under such circumstances, formulation of a projected foreign and 
security policy of Ukraine was an extremely complicated conceptual task. With that, 
Ukrainian authorities faced the need to determine the nuclear status of Ukraine, set 
the priorities in foreign policy, and formulate a prospective character and mission of 
the national army. 
155 Michael Gfoeller, John Blaney, 'The US - Russian Relationship: Building an Economic Alliance', 
European Securily, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 1993, p. 274. 
156 Bohdan Nahaylo, The Ukrainian Resurgence (London: Hurst&Co.. 1999), pp. 440 - 447. 
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The extremely cautious approach of U. S. administration and European 
countries to an independent Ukraine rendered the state politically isolated. Ukrainian 
authorities reacted to the international isolation by holding back on de- 
nuclearisation. Ukraine inherited both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons from 
the USSR, but the Ukrainian authorities repeatedly stressed their commitment to 
future non-nuclear status of Ukraine. 157 However, in 1992 the parliament delayed 
ratification of the START I Treaty' 58 and the authorities halted the transfer of 
missiles and demanded additional security guarantees from the US in an effort to 
achieve higher international status for Ukraine, and possibly boost national self- 
respect. 
14; 9 
The Ukrainian foot - dragging on the nuclear issue, although understandable 
in view of the uncertain Russian security policy toward the 'near abroad' and 
uncertain position of American diplomacy nevertheless brought more han-n than 
good to Ukraine. The possibility of Ukraine renouncing its non-nuclear status also 
caused concern in Central Eastern Europe. ' 60 The country found itself in complete 
international isolation, and gained the image of a belligerent, assertive state, thus Z: ' 
157 In the Declaration of SovereiOnty in 1990, ' Declaration on Nuclear Armaments' of 21 December 
1991 in Alma-Ata and 30 December 1991 Minsk Agreement on Strategic Forces. See Jason Ellis, 
'The "Ukrainian Dilemma" and US Foreign Policy', Europcan Securitjý, Vol. 3, No. 2, Summer 1994, 
p. 252. 
158 In 1991 one of the signatories of START I Treaty, the Soviet Union, disappeared. In order to 
avoid complex re-negotiations of the treaty with five post-Soviet nuclear partners, United States 
diplomacy led Russia, Ukraine, and the three remaining nuclear post-Soviet states to sign the Lisbon 
Protocol in May 1992, in which they pledged to ratify the START I and accede to the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty, Ukraine sioned the Lisbon Protocol, therefore the delay in ratification signified a 
serious change of policy. n 
159 John C. Baker, 'Non-Proliferation Incentives for Russia and Ukraine', Adelphi Paper 309 (London: 
IISS, 1997), p. 33. 
"" Oleksandr Pavljuk, 'Ukraine and Regional Cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe', Securiýy 
Dialogue, Vol. 28, No. 3, September 1997, pp. 351 - 352. 
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confirming the worst case scenarios presented by enemies of Ukraine. 16 1 Therefore, 
after two years of political struggle and international negotiations, Ukraine signed a 
trilateral treaty in January 1994 in Moscow with Russia and the United States, 
pledging to dismantle nuclear weapons in exchange for financial assistance and 
security assurances. 
It was the nuclear controversy that caused the rejection of the first draft of 
military doctrine in 1992 and delayed the adoption of the full document. 162 The 
revised document was adopted on 19 October 1993. Ukraine reiterated its position 
of not holding territorial claims against any country or not perceiving any country as 
the enemy. However, the doctrine had a visible anti-Russian edge in the declaration 
that Ukraine would regard as a potential enemy any state whose policy consistently 
put its military security in jeopardy, interfered in its internal affairs, threatened its 
territorial integrity or infringed the national interests of the state. 
The document declared the goal of gradual departure from a conscript to a 
professional anny, and prohibited the use of the armed forces for the resolution of 
internal political problems. This was an important statement of intent to move away 
from Soviet practice toward democratic standards. 
The nuclear question was treated in the 1993 document in an evasive 
manner, and only guaranteed that Ukraine would not strike first. The transient 
document indicated that Ukraine was determined to keep an independent military 
posture, but also demonstrated a Soviet type preoccupation with hard security and 
161 Stephan Blank, 'Russia, Ukraine and European Security, 1991 - 1993', European Securitj,, Vol. 3. 
No. 1, Spring 1994, pp. 182 - 207. 
162 lzmalkov. 'Ukraine ', p. 299. 
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inclination to attain security through the creation of large and heavy armed forces. 
capable to deter aggression or repulse the enemy. ' 63 
The revised doctrine was approved by the Supreme Council of Ukraine (the 
parliament) on 16 January 1997 with the National Security Concept of Ukraine. By 
then, the international and security environment had changed in favour of an 
independent Ukraine. Therefore the Security Concept of 1997 was more balanced 
and less centred on Russia. One of the new themes was the inclusions of non- 
military national security threats to the document, such as political, economic, 
technological and environmental disasters and demand for a better understanding of 
the non-military dimension of national security by the armed forces. ' 64 The 
document also departed from Soviet era thinking of conflicts in ten-ns of massive 
scale operations toward understanding the low-intensity, regional character of most 
contemporary conflicts. 165 The elaboration of the 1997 National Security Concept 
proved that Ukraine had developed a national political elite, capable of thinking in 
terms of state interest, analysing potential security threats and formulating mature 
responses to it. In the conditions of volatile Ukrainian stateness it was an 
achievement worth noting. However, the internal and external environment make the 
Ukrainian defence policy dilemma unresolvable. The country remained caught 
between Russia and the West, it co-operated with the CIS and NATO, participated 
in various international peacekeeping operations and continued to wait for a definite 
security option to emerge. 
Charles J. Dick, *The Military Doctrine of Ukraine', The Journal qfSlavic Militaty ! Ytudies, Vol. 7, 
No. 3, September 1994, pp. 516 - 520. 
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Lithuania, obviously, did not face many of the Ukrainian dilemmas, yet the 
formulations of the national defence doctrine was nevertheless a daunting task, 
given the limited resources and the size of the army that constituted primarily an 
attribute of the state sovereignty. Even the very idea of creating a national army was 
not initially very popular in Lithuania, the Ministry of Defence was originally called 
the Social Security Department and its personnel sbowed a degree of commitment to 
non-violent methods of resistance. 166 As many as 72% of the population did not 
regard army defence abilities deserving of credibility. 167 
Popular threat perceptions were very important for the formulation of the 
national doctrine. The population was concerned with internal and external threats 
equally as were the Lithuanian authorities. Among the external threats, the 
Lithuanian population stressed the proximity of Russia and the asymmetry in the 
regional balance of power as the major source of tension around the Baltic Sea. 168 
Lithuania had the smallest Russian minority of all of the three Baltic states, so its 
presence was not recognised as a threat to national identity or domestic stability. 
Still, Russia was seen as the greatest source of safety hazards: the presence of 
Russian troops stationing on its territory, 169 heavy militarisation in the Kaliningrad 
region, 170 and military transit problems' 71 caused concern. The Russian military 
166 Petersen, 'Security Policy', p. 36. 
167 Ronaldas Kacinskas. 'Lithuanian Public View on National Security in a Changing Environment', 
conference paper, 1998, p. 6. 
168 Olav F. Knudsen, 'Cooperative Security in the Baltic Sea Region', Chaillot Papers, No 33 
(institute for Security Studies WEU, November 1998), pp. 20 -21. 
169 Petersen, *Security Policy, p. 34. 
"' Tam ulaitis, National Securio,, pp. 7-9. 
17 ' RFE/RL Daily Reports: No. 178,19 September 1994, No. 168,5 Sept. 1994, No 219,18 Nov. 
1994, No 220,21 November 1994. 
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transit demands to and from Kaliningrad were particularly feared in Lithuania 172 due 
to frequent violations of rules. 173 The withdrawal of Russian troops alleviated the 
security tensions in Lithuania, nevertheless the problem of a post-Soviet security 
vacuum remained. Still, in evaluating possibility of all - out conflict with Russia 
Lithuanians merely admitted that it could not be excluded. 174 The real type of 
conflict to which Lithuania had to be prepared was a 'highly charged, tense political 
situation' in the region' 75 and the spill-out of instability and violence from Russia, 
possibly provoked by terrorist action. Also, internal problems were a cause of 
concern: crime and corruption began to be seen as threats to the country's security 
and stability as well as the possibility of a nuclear disaster at the Ignalina power 
station. 176 
In keeping with the popular views, the 1998 Lithuanian National Security 
Strategy eniphasised the importance of those domestic security factors. The strategy 
emphasised the importance of economic and social development and political 
stability, together with credible defence forces, good bilateral relations and Euro- 
Atlantic integration'. ' 77 The realisation of the limited capabilities was reflected in 
the National Military Defence Policy which declared the prevention of threats to 
Lithuanian sovereignty and territorial integrity and its armed defence in the event of 
conflict as the main objectives, but at the same time admitted that Lithuanian 
deterrence 'is not based upon military superiority, but rather the ability to cause the 
172 Petersen, 'Security', p. 15. 
M ichta, The Government, p. 140. 
174 Petersen. 'Security Policies'. p. 34. 
175, Knudsen, 'Cooperative'. p. 9. 
176 Rolandas Kacinskas, 'Lithuanian Public View', pp. 2 -I 
177 Oveniew. Lilhuanian Nalional Dqlýnce Sjwem '99 (Republic of Lithuania: Ministry of National 
Defence, 1999). 
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enemy sufficient material and moral losses to outweight any benefits gained through 
aggression, to defend the countryýs population, its territory and its national 
valuesý. 1 78 And after 'giving the enemy two black eyes, a broken nose, and a 
headache' 179 the war would continue as a partisan struggle or Lithuania would be 
defended by its allies. 
The defence policy of Lithuania was theoretically based on two pillars: 
preparation for total and unconditional defence of the territory with the use of all 
available means and resources, known as the territorial defence concept 180 and the 
simultaneous policy of seeking membership in NATO as the only guarantee of 
political independence. )81 This strategy was supplemented by inter-Baltic co- 
operation. However, the concept of territorial defence remained an under-developed 
and under-invested 'buzz-word' 182 and the Baltic co-operation was developed into 
an institutional structure lacking in substance; the only defence strategy objective 
pursued with great determination by the Lithuania authorities was an entry into 
NATO. 183 Lithuania continuously rejected the Soviet proposals to form an 
alternative security architecture or conclude military accords providing security to 
the Baltic states' 94 and the entire international military activity and co-operation was 
directed at achieving the goal of membership in the Alliance. Among other things, 
178 While paper '99, Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, Chapter 11: National 
Military Defence Policy, p. 11. 
179 Peter Vares, Mare Haab, 'The Baltic States: Quo Vadis? ', in Carp (ed. ), Central and Eastern 
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Lithuanian participation in the peacekeeping operations had a much higher profile 
after January 1994's formal application for membership. ' 95 The objective of full 
membership in NATO remained the cornerstone of Lithuanian defence and security 
policy and in fact, the majority of the defence reform was subordinated to that 
principle of achieving compatibility with NATO standards. 
Selected Issues of Structural Reform. 
Due to a common legacy of the Warsaw Pact, the structural reform of the 
post-communist military featured considerable similarities. All the armed forces had 
to be downsized and reoriented towards lighter, more mobile and defensive forces 
organised into the brigade and corps system with restructured command and control 
lines. These changes were necessary, if anything to ensure democratic control over 
the military, yet their implementation was complicated by the budget constrains and 
inconsistent policy directives, and the varying degree of control that each of the case 
countries had over their armed forces in the aftermath of transition. The better 
controlled the military, the more likely was the success of structural reforms. 
However, regardless of the individual circumstances, everywhere in the post- 
communist countries the restructuring reforms brought about the loss of the young 
and dynamic cadres. 
In the aftermath of the Warsaw Pact dissolution, Poland faced the necessity 
to carry out a radical downsizing, restructuring and redeployment of the army. 186 But 
although the reforms had been underway since 1990, a definitive plan of army 
"ý Ronaldas Kacinskas, 'Lithuanian Public '. 
186 Szemerkenyi, 'Central European, pp. 42 - 44. See also Szayna, Larrabee, Easl European, pp. 26 
--36. 
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restructuring dubbed Army 2012 was accepted by the government only in 1997.1 87 
Until then, the restructuring processes were chaotic, political guidance inconsistent, 
and the political conflict between the president and the prime minister hindered the 
introduction of reforms and frustrated the professional cadres as well as weakening 
civilian authority and control of the army. The only policy consistently applied to 
the military between 1990 and 1997 was the policy of budget cuts. 
The lack of long term definitive plans for reforin resulted in the frequent 
changes of priorities and consequently in a waste of human and material resources. 
The story of the reorganisation of the military districts in Poland vividly illustrated 
the shortcomings of Polish restructuring. This system of military administration and 
logistics, a 'standard' piece of communist legacy for all post-communist arn-fies 188 
needed to be changed into a structure better suited to light and mobile forces of 
defence. Additionally, the Polish army was deployed unevenly around the borders 
and therefore the reorganisation of the districts was connected to the task of 
redeployment of troops along the eastern and southern borders. 
In 1992 the fourth military district was created in Cracow, in southern Poland 
in order to enable partial redeployment, provide new military infrastructure and 
introduce a modernised system of command and logistics within the district. 189 Its 
creation was a lengthy process and required substantial funds - over 247 military 
units were disbanded or re-deployed in the course of establishing the new district. 
The district was completely formed by 1998. However, in 1997 the Ministry 
changed the reform concept and planned the formation of two military districts, the 
For detailed information on the Plan 2012 see Latawski, The Trauýformation, pp. 37 - 60. 
Gow, Birch, Securitv, p. 21. Szayna, Larrabee. East European, p. 27. 
"'9 Interview with general Henryk Szumski, Chief of General Staff 'Miqdzy wizjq a realiami' 
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North and the South, out of the four existing ones and the creation of the sub-system 
of military corps within the districts. 190 The concept was included in the 1997 Plan 
Army 2012, yet the work on details lasted two more years. Then, on I January 1999 
the implementation of the reform was initiated and the first step of reform was a 
dissolution of the Cracow district. In place of the district, the corps command 
structures were introduced with a greatly reduced number of military posts. The 
reform was introduced without prior information, therefore many officers were 
caught by surprise and lost their jobs without warning, causing a waste of material 
resources and frustration of the personnel. 191 The adoption of the plan Army 2012 
improved the overall co-ordination of the restructuring process, but it was largely 
done in connection with the preparations for NATO enlargement and the fulfilment 
of 31 interoperatibil ity goals. ' 92 
The Polish armed forces were the second largest army in the Warsaw Pact 
and in 1989 numbered 413 000 servicemen and officers. 193 Therefore personnel 
reductions were necessary. Early plans for reform forecast the overall manpower at 
the level of 220 000, but in 1997 the target figure was reduced to 180 000 by 
2004.194 The aim of the reductions was to downsize the army as well as to change its 
personnel structure. In the future, the Polish army was to be 55% professional and 
"0 Interview with general Henryk Szumski, 'Miqdzy wizj4ý. 
'9' Tadeusz Dytko, 'Niepotrzebni' (Unwanted), Polska Zhrojna No 16, April 1999. 
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the share of NCOs was to rise rise from 23% to 40%, changing the 'reverse 
pyramid' structure of the cadres in favour of junior officers and NCOs. 195 
Obviously, personnel reductions were not popular among the military, and 
the Chief of General Staff frequently called them an 'endless bleeding of the Polish 
army'. 196 Nevertheless, the majority of the professional military understood the need 
for radical reforms, including the restructuring of the cadres. 197 What frustrated them 
however, was the scarce information on planned reductions and resettlement 
assistance, frequent and unexpected changes in personnel policy, and above all 
constant uncertainty regarding career prospects. 198 And although the Polish army 
was radically downsized, the early reductions resulted in the loss of the youngest 
and most valuable military personnel and the conservation of the top-heavy 
structure of the Polish armed forces. 199 By budget slashing and the elimination of 
many officer posts the reform gave incentives to leave the army to the young and 
dynamic cadres, while the older ranks were determined to stay at all costs. 
Consequently, in 1997 there was one colonel for every 28 conscript soldiers. 200 The 
adoption of the reform plan in 1997 improved the personnel policy in the army, 
particularly in connection with the prospective NATO membership, however the 
"5 Ryszard Choroszy, 'Urodzaj na programy' (Abounding Programmes), Polska Zbrojna, No 2, 
January 1997, p. 2 1. 
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much talked about re-grading of the military posts (etalyzacja), one of the most 
important goals of personnel policy reform, did not start until 1998 and the target 
date for its completion - January 1999 - was not met. 
201 Also, the retention of the 
specialists in service became a growing problem for the army in Poland, due to 
competition from the civilian job market. 202 
Czech restructuring of the armed forces was based on similar principles. In 
the years between the 'Velvet revolution' and the 'Velvet divorce' Czechoslovak 
authorities implemented several important reforms of the military. The conscript 
service in Czechoslovakia was shortened from 24 to 18 months (in Czech Republic 
it was further cut to 12 months), and alternative service for conscientious objectors 
was introduced. In November 1990 the government approved the Conception qf 
Army build-up by the end of 1993 and based on this reform plan, significant 
manpower reductions, structural changes and redeployment of troops were initiated 
which transformed the Czechoslovak army from a Warsaw Pact force to a national 
military. 203 Based on the constitutional act, 204 on I November 1992 the process of 
the division of Czechoslovak military property was initiated and on 31 December 
1992 the Protocol on Separation of the Czechoslovak Anny was signed by the 
plenipotentiaries of both governments. The distribution was based on the 2: 1 ration 
201 Interview with colonel Sowa. Au'gust 1999. 
102 Latawski, The TransfOrmalion, p. 25. 
203, Czech White Paper. pp. 23 - 24. 
104 Law No 541/1992 'On the Division of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic's Property between 
the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic and Its Transfer to the Czech Republic and the Slovak 
Republic'. 
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between Czech and Slovak, respectively 205 and the process of separation was 
essentially completed within a year and in an orderly manner. 206 But while the 
division of assets was carried out by mutual agreement of both sides, the Czech 
Republic was in a privileged position in the aftermath of the divorce because major 
centres of military management and command were located on Czech territory and 
were left in the Czech hands, including the federal MOD in Prague. 207 
Although the retention of command and control structures helped prevent 
organisational chaos in the Czech military, still the situation of the armed forces in 
the aftermath of the 'Velvet Divorce' was difficult. The break up of the federal army 
weakened the cohesion of the military 208 and in the Czech nation-state the apathy of 
the public toward defence issues and reluctance to spend public money on the 
military became much more conspicuous. Therefore, programmes of equipment 
modernisation were suspended, and the army soon faced recruitment shortages, 
worsening social problems of cadres and a survival budget. 209 It was only the 
preparations for NATO membership that finally helped 'encourage order in planning 
and procurement' 210 and led to the adoption of the 1998 conceptual plan of 
development up to the year 2003 in which reduction, professionalisation and 
restructuring of the army in accordance with NATO structures and procedures were 
205 For more on the military problems of the break-up of the federation, see Jan Urban, 'The Czech 
and Slovak Republics: Security Consequences of the Break-up of the CSFR', in Karp (ed. ) Central 
and Eastern Europe, pp. 120 - 12 1. 
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prioritised and 31 interoperability goals were set to be achieved by the end of the 
year 2000.211 
Radical manpower reductions were part of the restructuring programme in 
the Czech army. The army was reduced from 93 000 in 1993 to 65 000 by the end of 
1996 and the revised reform concept envisaged further reductions to the level of 56 
000 212 . But also in the Czech case the process of personnel reductions and 
restructuring went out of control and contributed to the net deterioration of the 
personnel structures. The aggressive decommunisation policies, decline in salary 
and prestige of the military profession, housing problems and lack of career 
prospects attracted younger and more dynamic staffs to civilian professions, while 
the older generation of officers were determined to stay in the military as long as 
possible. As a result, the negative personnel trends such as ageing of the officer 
corps, reverse proportion of older to younger officers and slow increase of the 
NCO's corps were preserved in the Czech military. 213 
In the case of the Czech Republic, military recruitment and retention of 
qualified cadres soon became a burning problem. The young male population had a 
negative opinion of the social and economic standards of the service and perceived 
military equipment and training being below the modem requirements of the 
military profession. 214 Moreover, in the Czech Republic the occupational prestige of 
2"' Statement of Minister of Defence Michal Lobkowicz, 'Country Briefing, p. 21. 
211 'Service Branches Face Fight over Resources In Modernisation Efforts', Jane's Defence Weekly, 
20 May 1998, p. 22. 
212 'Service Branches', p. 22. 
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nrd the military profession in the 1990s fell to a disastrously low 3-) position, behind 
the bricklayer (21) or tractor driver (23) ). 215 The image of the army was additionally 
tarnished by repeated cases of bullying 216 and instances of the breaking of human 
rights in the army 217 and maltreatment of conscripts, 218 all of which received wide 
press coverage. 219 In fact, the press was so keen on portraying negative aspects of 
life in the ranks that one can speak about the 'control through scandals' in the case 
of the Czech Republic. 220 All these factors indicated the likelihood of the prolonged 
recruitment shortages in the Czech army. 
However, two aspects of Czech military reform deserve special attention. 
One is the ambitious program of professionalisation of the armed forces, which 
since 1993 was gradually implemented regardless of the recruitment problems and 
public controversies. 221 Priority was given to troops on foreign missions and forces 
selected for NATO co-operation (Immediate Reaction Forces, Rapid Reaction 
Forces and forces assigned under NATO command). Certain specialised units 
215 Jifi Hodný, 'The Prestige of Professional Czech Soldiers in the Eyes of the General Public', The 
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already approached 100% professionalisation (chemical platoon, transportation and 
helicopter unitS)222 and the target level for the entire army was around 60% . 
223 
The second important element of the reform was the introduction of the 
PPBS which began in December 1993 by the decision of the Deputy Minister of 
Defence M. Kalousek. The implementation of the Planning, Programming and 
Budgeting System utilised in NATO countries was an important achievement for the 
Czech Republic which was the first post-communist state to introduce it. 224 
However, the system was introduced too hastily and with an aim to demonstrate 
Czech quick convergence with NATO defence planning, and as a result a number of 
problems arose, the worst of them was that PPBS was not integrated with the overall 
budgeting system in the Czech Republic and suffered from inflexibility and 
excessive centralisation. 225 
In Ukraine, the problems related to military structural reform were immense. 
The Ukrainian national army was built on the basis of the Soviet anny troops and 
military installations which in 1991 were situated on the territory of the Ukrainian 
republic. A series of laws, decrees and the campaign of the 'oath of allegiance' in 
1991/92 sanctioned the take-over and 'nationalisation' of the large share of Soviet 
military assets and helped establish a Ukrainian chain of military hierarchy. That 
operation was carried out swiftly and was largely successful as it allowed the new 
state to quickly establish large armed forces and gain an important attribute of 
- 1999 Training Year Review. Czech MOD materials, httr):, ýýýýv"w. at-mN,. czý'zpravv, lenLIisliý 
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sovereignty. 226 However, in the aftermath of this operation the Ukrainian army as a 
national military existed only on paper. The non-selective take-over of the large 
chunk of the Soviet military machinery burdened Ukraine with an expensive., 
oversized, Soviet-type force and made the subsequent restructuring extremely 
difficult. Moreover, the large size of the post-Soviet 'army' had a psychological 
impact on perceived military power on the Ukrainian political elite and the 
necessary manpower reductions or selling of surplus equipment were received with 
distrust and resisted, particularly in the parliament. 227 
It is difficult to establish precisely the size of the Ukrainian share of the 
Soviet armed forces, but certainly it was disproportionately large. Most estimates 
oscillate between 600 and 800 thousand troops, 229 and some sources cited an even 
higher number. 229 Along with the military personnel, Ukraine came into possession 
of a number of other military assets, such as combat aircraft, vehicles, army 
infrastructure, defence industry with nuclear plants, and military academies, 230 
22' Andrea Chandler, 'Statebuilding and Political Priorities in Post-Soviet Ukraine: the Role of the 
Military', Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 22, No 4, Summer 1996, p. 582. 
227 For example testimony of Stepan Hmara, member of Defence And Security Committee, in 'Sud i 
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Kiyev, special issue, 1996, pp. 98 - 102. 
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altogether estimated at between 10% and 15% of the total defence potential in the 
231 USSR. 
One of the persistent Ukrainian problems inherited from the Soviet Union 
was the multitude of military organisation. Along with regular army, Ukraine in 
1991 took over its share of KGB troops, Railway and Construction troops, Border 
Guards etc. That peculiar Soviet tradition was continued and so since 1991 
a variety of military organisations have been created. Apart from those 
subordinated to the Defence Ministry, i. e. Ground Forces, the Air and Air 
Defence Forces and the Navy, there are also Border Troops, the Interior 
Troops, the Ministry of Internal Affairs Troops, the National Guards units, 
the Security Service sub-units, the Tax Police and Custom Service sub-units, 
the State Communications Department sub-units, the Ukrainian National 
Space Agency units and other forces belonging to different ministries and 
232 
agencies. 
The coexistence of the multiple armed services, with often overlapping 
responsibilities, caused conflicts and terse competition for scarce resources between 
the various forces and 'their' ministries and a number of problems with legislative 
regulations. 133 The adoption of the National Security Concept in 1997 represented a 
step toward comprehensive legislative regulation of the situation of non-army 
troops. But while the phenomenon of the non-regular military forces was expected 
to wither away gradually, it did not disappear; in fact an opposite trend was 
observable. 
234 
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Although the Ukrainian army had the appearance of military power, it was in 
fact in a very difficult situation from the start. The army was on a survival budget 
and 50% dependant on Russian spare parts supplies; many weapons were 
approaching exploitation limits, 23 5 and quick conversion and large scale privatisation 
of military industry was necessary. 236 However, the administration of the first 
Ukrainian president Kravchuk prioritised the political use of the military as an 
engine in the nation- and state-building processes over its restructuring. Therefore 
the government was very cautious to implement reforms impinging on the corporate 
interests of the military. The first comprehensive programme of reforrns was 
prepared only in 1995 by the first civilian minister of defence in Ukraine, Valeriy 
Shmarov after president Leonid Kuchma took over from Kravchuk; however, the 
plan rnet with such a strong corporate resistance, mainly from the General Staff that 
it led to the removal of the reform-minded minister from the office next year and 
reforms were stalled. 
Minister Shmarov stopped forcible ukrainisation of the army and instead 
tried to promote de-politicisation of the military, he also intended to speed up the 
personnel reductions, reduce the amount of hardware maintained by the army and 
carry out administrative reorganisation. 237 Ukraine inherited the Soviet system of 
three military districts and retained two of them, Odessa and Carpathian, while on 
23,5 V. P. Kovalskiy, Tiehnichieskaya osnashchiennost' vooru-7iennyh sil Ukraini: ocienka i prognoz 
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the basis of the Kiev district the authorities organised a central military command 
and control system. Since this system was well suited to offensive operations on a 
massive scale, minister Shmarov wanted to depart from that Soviet system and 
reorganise it into an organisation of smaller operational -territorial commands, more 
suitable to the defensive doctrine and meeting the requirements of increased 
mobility of troops. 238 
Sharov's case is a perfect example of the meanders of Ukrainian military 
reform. The reorganisation of the military districts was received as a civilian 
intrusion, threatening the position of the highest echelons and the Chief of General 
Staff, gen. Anatoliy Lopata, became Shmarov's most outspoken opponent. The 
military accused the civilian minister of being incompetent and unprofessional, and 
his collaborators of drafting secret reform plans. The top military were supported in 
their struggle by the nationalist activists, who in turn accused Shmarov of 
purposefully ruining the national army in order to surrender it to the Russians. In the 
end, both Lopata and Shmarov had to depart from office, but the military reform was 
the real victim of that struggle. Sharov's successor, minister Kuz'muk, was again a 
military man, and he quickly backed away from deep restructuring in favour of very 
moderate and illusive cbanges. 239 
Personnel reductions were similarly resisted, yet army downsizing was an 
absolute necessity in Ukraine. In 1991 the proposed size of the army was set at the 
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23 ' Grytsenko, Defence Re fiorn? 
ý pp. 
13 - 17. 
239 *Sud i Osud. Ministr Oboroni proti Vichirnovo Kiyeva, Vichimiy Kiyev proti Szmarowshchiny', 
J'ichirni. y Kiyev, special issue, ) 996; Grytsenko, Dqpnce Reform, p. ) 7. 
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relatively high level of 420 000 - 450 000 
240 ; The State Plan for Reform and 
Development of the Armed Forces until 2005 provided for the total strength of the 
armed forces to be 375 000 by 2005, including 295 000 servicemen. Subsequent 
reform proposals went even further and suggested army reductions below 200 000. 
But the size of the army was not the only problem of the post-Soviet military 
in Ukraine. The armed forces showed other typical symptoms of the 'Soviet 
241 disease': reverse proportions of senior to junior ranks , ageing of the cadres, 
low 
cohesiveness of the forces, impoverishment of the cadres and declining combat 
readiness. The uncertainty regarding the projected size of the national army was as 
much due to political reasons as to the lack of definite defence doctrine. In the long 
term, the restraint with which the planned reductions were carried out appeared 
harmful because it resulted in the mass departure of the youngest and most 
promising cadres and persistence of the old officer corps, further deterioration of the 
state of exploited military equipment, but also in appalling living standards and 
human relations inside the anny, including the return of the infamous dietlovshchina 
(hazing). 242 All this was a great disillusionment for many officers, captured in the 
words of one of them: 
24" Alexander Goncharenko, Ukrainian - Russian Relations: an Unequal Partnership (London: 
RUSI, 1995), p. 33,35; Decree of the Supreme Council of Ukraine of 22 December 1998, No '327- 
XIV. 
211 G. Klicznikov, 'Vooruziennimi silami komanduyut "Dvoyechniki"', Niezavisimqva Galieta - 
Nie,: avisimiye Voyennoj, e Obozriennj, e, No 7,8 February 1997. According to the statistics quoted in 
article, the number of -enerals in the Ukrainian armed forces rose rather than diminished as a result I 
of military reforms. 
242 For a decade both pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian neNNspapers in Ukraine widely commented on 
the problems plaguing the armed forces. Numerous articles quoted statistical data, which, although 
sometimes imprecise, in general confirmed the dramatic human and technical problems of the armed =1 
forces. See in particular: E. Bogacka, 'Proukrainizaciyu zbroynih sit Ukraini' Gomin Ukraini No 35/ 
1995, A Lopata, 'Biez poddierzki obshchiestva rieformy w armii niewozmozni' Zierkalo Niediefl, No 
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The thing is, the majority of those who went to the Ukrainian army or fleet 
hoped that Ukrainian army should be a new model army, that in the first few 
months military reforms would be carried out, that everything will be 
established on new fundaments and the illnesses of the old Soviet army 
would be the thing of the past. But it did not happen ... As all too 
familiar 
symptoms of the old, rotten system, went into Ukrainian army hazing, and 
power abuses, and theft, and lack of proper discipline, and impunity of senior 
ranks in relation to the juniors. 243 
An additional obstacle to a radical reform was created by the enactment of 
the law 'On Defence of Ukraine', which delegated the task of drafting the 
programme of reforms to the Ministry of Defence. The MOD in turn delegated the 
bulk of the conceptual work to the General Staff and so created the situation in 
which the military were drafting the programme for reforming their own institution 
and naturally, they were unlikely to come up with anything radically violating the 
corporate autonomy of the military or impinging on their established position and 
interests. 244 
Ukraine shared the goals of refon-ns and many of the restructuring problems 
with the remaining post-communist countries which confirmed the influence of the 
similar communist legacy the countries shared between themselves on the aims and 
the framework for the reforms. Just as in Poland and the Czech Republic, the 
drafting and the implementation of the reforms were chaotic, ill-prepared, 
50/ 1997, S. Makeyev, O. Manachynsky, E. Lysytsyn, H. Perepelytsya, O. Bodruk, V. Krotykov, 
V. Haleyev. S. Vlasov, V. Halynovsky, 'Does Ukraine Have a Military Elite? '. Political Thought - 
Ukrainiai7 Political ScienceJournal No 1 (5) 1995. 
143 N. Siemiena, 'Oborona Ukraini: aplodismienty priezdievriemienni' (Ukrainian Defence: Too Early 
to Applaud), Zierkalo Niediieli. No 4, March 1997 in Russian. 
244 Grytsenko, De 
, 
Pnce ReO-m. pp. 13 - 17. 
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inconsistent and often hampered by the influence of the current politic. Yet, in the 
case of Ukraine two additional factors complicated the task of restructuring the 
armed forces, each having to do with the stateness problems. First, the Ukrainian 
army was used as a catalyst for the processes of building a nation-state and the 
priority given to that purely political goal put the issues of identity, tradition and 
national outlook over the problems of military capacities and combat readiness. 
Secondly, the Ukrainian complete lack of experience with government of the 
modem state delayed and hampered the progress of institutionalisation of the policy- 
making processes. The low institutional isation of Ukrainian politics and the 
generally poor quality of the state governance had an extremely negative impact on 
the Ukrainian military reforms. The Ukrainian restructuring was definitely the worst 
managed reform among the countries concerned and such features as inconsistent 
plans for reforms, lack of correlation between the budget and the projected reforms 
and the insufficient supervision of the restructuring by the government agencies 
were the norm in the course of Ukrainian civil-military transformation. 
In the case of Lithuania, the course of restructuring was different because the 
country was creating rather than reforming the post-Soviet military. The Lithuanian 
authorities made every effort to eradicate the Soviet heritage, yet it did not stop the 
army from acquiring certain traits characteristic of the post-communist militaries. 
The national armed forces were created on the basis of four separate programmes for 
the border guard, territorial defence, regular an-ny and civil defence; however 
initially each of the services suffered from an inadequate infrastructure and 
insufficient funds and scarce equipment, had unsuitable command and control 
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system and a low standard of military training, resembling the Soviet drill. 245 In a 
very Soviet way, the power ministries competed between themselves over control of 
each of the military formations, and at the initial period of transformations the 
attempt to establish a centralised system of military command by the MOD were 
trampled by the rival Ministry of Interior that claimed the right to command the 
border guards. 246 Moreover, as a result of employing the former Soviet specialists, 
inevitably the old animosity between the line officers and the General Staff 
reappeared, the typical feature of communist armies. 247 A certain threat was also 
posed by the paramilitary organisation the presence of which was also a 
characteristic legacy of Soviet rule, and in Ukraine the purview and activities of the 
ýaulai Union might for a while put a democratic credentials of the military 
formations in Ukraine in question. However, as the policy of co-operation with 
NATO developed, Litbuania overcame most of the post-communist problems and its 
army made considerable progress towards compatibility with NATO staDdards. 
In the early years after independence. the manpower of the Lithuanian 
national army was prognosticated at the unrealistic level of 30 000 people including 
the Home Guards. 248 These plans were eventually scaled down, and in 1999 
Lithuanian defence forces altogether reached the size of 11 600 personnel. The long 
term plan prognosticated total manpower to reach 23 000 by 2008 and 48% of the 
forces would be drafted . 
249 The problem of weapons was partially solved by foreign 
donations, and by 1999 the majority of the Lithuanian army equipment came from 
24' Bartas Trakymas, assistant to the Chairman of the Seimas Committee on National Security and 
Defence, Lithuanian Parliament, Vilnus, February 2000. 
'46 Skrastins, 'The Armed Forces, p. 38. 
247 Zaccor, 'Problems', pp. 53 - 72. 
248 Iieven, The Baltic Revolution, p. 336. 
24 L) Overview, p. 8. 
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foreign gifts. 2 '50 The Lithuanian authorities began preparations very early to structure 
the army in accordance with NATO standards. Therefore already in December 1990 
251 
the courses for NCOs had started and in 1993 the NCO's School was organised . 
The role of the NCOs was expanded successfully thanks to education reforms, yet 
the change was by and large limited to the elite units operating in accordance with 
NATO standards. 252 Lithuanian authorities also put some effort into establishing the 
military district system for territorial defence that was supposed to be the backbone 
of the Lithuanian defence, but the process is far from complete and lagged behind 
the structural changes in the regular army. 253 In general, the transformation of the 
Lithuania military was carried out successfully, underpinned by the stable political 
consensus of the main forces regarding the direction of military reforms. 254 
However, the experience of the Lithuanian military showed that the idea of starting 
from scratch was merely an illusion as a degree of the previous regime's legacy 
would always permeate the new force. 
Summary. 
The main principle underlying the restructuring processes was the removal of 
the communist features from the armed forces and from the post-communist defence 
systems and the strengthening of the national character of the military as well as 
250 Robert Rochowicz, 'A Way With Weapons, in Poland - Lithuania-NATO, Polska Zbrojna, 
special edition, 24 May 2000, p. 11. 
25 ' Lithuanian ff, hitc Paper '99, p. 18. 
252 Paul Goble, *Baltic States: Analysis from Washington. A Time for Seargyants' RFEI RL, 3 
November 2000. 
253 Interview with Major Rimas Litvinas, Defence Attache, Embassy of Republic of Lithuania, 
Warsaw, August 1999. Skrastins, 'Armed Forces', p. 38. 
2-51 Interview with Dr Algidras Katkus, MP, Chairman of the Seimas Committee on National Security 
and Defence, Lithuanian Parliament, Vilnus, February 2000. 
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fostering their attachment to the new political system and government. The 
communist legacy had a serious impact on the restructuring processes in each of the 
countries Yet, a strong military prestige and legitimacy facilitated the 
implementation of the refonns, as in Poland, while the unclear identity of the 
military, for example in Ukraine, or the low prestige of the profession, as in the 
Czech Republic, hindered the reforrns and delayed the profound structural changes. 
In all the case countries provisions were taken for the military to be de- 
communised to some extent, its ties to the party broken and the army disengaged 
from current politics. Yet, despite the similar legal provisions to that end, only in the 
Czech Republic, the only state boasting democratic traditions, was the principle of 
military political neutrality observed from the start. 
The fonnulation of national defence doctrines and the redefinition of the 
military missions were difficult processes in each of the countries concerned, due to 
the very same reason: underdevelopment of national capacities in strategic planning. 
However, the problems related to drafting the doctrines were considerably more 
difficult in the countries having the stateness problems, as for example Czech 
Republic did on that occasion, because it proved difficult to determine the security, 
interests and the long term defence policy of the state. And while everywhere in 
Central Eastern Europe the post-communist countries accomplished the 
transformation of their military from the offensive to defensive forces and separated 
the armed forces from police missions, none of them managed to prepare a doctrine 
that would be more than an interim document. 
Along with the reformulation of their defence policy, the post-communist 
countries undertook the task of structural reforms in their militaries. The change 
towards the defensive posture was associated with the significant downsizing of the 
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armies and reorganisation of the command and control structures. While the 
restructuring reforms had mostly a practical dimension of developing the defensive 
capabilities of the post-communist states, nevertheless aspects of the structural 
changes were necessary to implement the democratic management and control of the 
military. The Ukrainian example demonstrated that the strong corporate resistance 
of the military, if tacitly accepted by the politicians, could lead to the stalling of the 
reforms and inhibit the introduction of democratic civilian control. Finally, a clear 
security perspective and defence policy underpinned by political consensus, as in 
Poland, legitimised the reforms and facilitated their acceptance on the part of the 
military, while lack of policy orientation was likely to cause rejection of the reforms, 
as was the case of Ukraine. 
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Chapter 5 
RULES: LAWS AND PROCEDURES. 
'The foundation for democratic management of defence matters is the legal 
and procedural framework in which policy discussion and formation takes place. " 
Such a legal and procedural framework is a necessary pre-condition for an 
emergence of democratic institutions and a subsequent consolidation of democracy. 
Yet, the lack of legal rules and procedures as well as an absence of autonomous 
institutions was a characteristic feature of the post-communist conditions. Each of 
the post-communist countries faced the daunting task of redesigning the entire legal 
system of the country as the successful functioning of democratic institutions 
depended on putting the framework of rules and procedures in place. As such 
processes involved the distribution of powers and responsibilities within the 
institutions, the legislative works were inevitably hindered and delayed by political 
conflicts. Typically, the issues related to the control of the military and defence 
policy were subject to controversy, and consequently, the process of creating the 
democratic legal framework proved contentious, particularly in the sphere of civil- 
military relations. Nevertheless, introduction of new rules to the post-communist 
polities represented a crucial stage in consolidating the new democracies and 
nowhere was the connection between the civil - military transition and democratic 
consolidation more visible than in this process. 
192 
Constitutional Frameworks 
Democracy needs a legal framework to function properly, and the 
foundations of that framework are laid out in constitutions. Thus, the making of the 
post-communist constitutions should have been the priority in each of the countries 
but as the issue of the power distribution proved to be highly contentious in some 
cases, delays occurred and interim arrangements were adopted along the way. The 
study of the case countries demonstrated that the prompt adoption of permanent 
constitutions had a stabilising effect on the transformations in the Czech Republic or 
Lithuania whereas the interim constitutional frameworks were detrimental to 
democratisation in Poland and Ukraine and fuelled political conflicts in both 
countries. The prolonged uncertainly regarding the division of powers also created 
opportunities for military involvement in post-communist politics and thus distorted 
the transformations of the civil-military relations in the countries in question. In fact, 
the making of post-communist constitutions, with few exceptions, were amongst the 
most politically troubled processes in Central Eastern Europe. 
The making of the constitution in Poland was heavily burdened with the 
legacy of the transitional opening. The Round Table agreement of 1989 guaranteed a 
privileged position in defence and security matters to the president. The position of 
the president gained an additional weight when, under pressure from Lech Walqsa, 
the electoral law was changed and the popular ballot replaced the parliamentary vote 
in the 1990 presidential elections. Once elected for presidency, Walqsa made every 
effort to strengthen his executive position and subordinate the Prime Minister and 
' James Gow, Carol Birch. Security and Democracy Civil - Mililury, Relations in Central and 
Eastern Europe, No 40 (London: Brasseys for Centre for Defence Studies, September 1997). p. 27. 
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the govemment to himself. 2 His legislative proposals were rejected by the 
parliament which caused legislative and institutional deadlocks and significantly 
delayed an adoption of the post-communist constitution. In order to resolve the 
mounting political and legal problems at least on a temporary basis, the parliament 
adopted a provisional constitutional bill of compromise, the so called Little 
Constitution, on 17 November 1992. 
The Little Constitution sanctioned a hybrid presidential - parliamentary 
system in Poland, in which the presidential powers were disproportionately 
extensive in the realm of security and defence policy and rather limited in other 
fields. The unclear position of the president in the executive branch was unclear and 
thus likely to provoke conflicts. The provisional basic law sanctioned the election of 
the president by popular vote for a fixed, five-year term and the representative 
functions as the head of state and guardian of sovereignty. The president was the 
Supreme Commander - in Chief of the Polish Armed Forces with powers to appoint 
the Chief of the General Staff chiefs of other services and commanders of military 
districts after consultation with the Minister of Defence. Most importantly, the Little 
Constitution obliged the Prime Minister to obtain presidential approval for the 
appointment of the ministers for defence, foreign office and internal affairs. That 
article was not only imprecise, but also detrimental to the cohesiveness of the 
cabinet and subsequently provoked many conflicts. Finally, the president had limited 
emergency powers and chaired the National Security Council that was to replace the 
2 Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan, Problems qf Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern 
Europe, South America and Post-Coninninist Europe (Baltimore & London: 1996), p. 28 1. 
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infamous Home Defence Committee (KOK), notorious for its role in the 
introduction of martial law in Poland in 198 1.3 
The Little Constitution had a generally negative influence on the 
institutionalisation of Polish politics and hindered consolidation of the democratic 
system in Poland. It failed to clarify the roles of the executive bodies, distorted the 
relationship between power and accountability in the field of defence policy while 
its lack of legal precision caused an overlap of prerogatives and fuelled power 
struggles between the President and the government. 4 It secured a strong presidential 
position in military and defence matters, but gave very few instruments of 
constructive policy-making to the president. Moreover, the mechanism of 
countersignature originally introduced as a check on presidential power failed to 
perform its role and instead was used by the president to enhance his powers. 5 
Finally, the original parliamentary intention to make the president a stabilising factor 
in Polish defence policy backfired and politicised and destabilised the military 
instead. Finally, the strong presidential control over the military limited the scope of 
democratic control exercised by the remaining democratic institutions, that is the 
parliament and the government. 6 
The corollary of the Little Constitution was the dualism of executive 
competencies in executive control and management of the military, politicisation of 
military reform and the prolonged state of an interim legislative situation. This had 
3 Mark F. Brzezinski, Leszek Garlicki, 'Polish Constitutional Law', in Stanislaw Frankowski, Paul 
B. Stephan III, Legal Rejbrm in Post-Communist Europe. The V7eiv From Within (Dordrecht, Boston, 
London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 1995), pp. 40 - 43. 
4 Andrew Michta, The Government and Polilic%s (? f Postcommunist Furope (Westport, Connecticut 
and London: Praeger, 1994), pp. 19 -21. 
Interview with Tadeusz Dybowski, Member of the Constitutional Tribunal, Warsaw, August 1997. 
6 Interview with Robert Lipka, Under-Secretary of State for Social and Parliamentary Affairs, Polish 
MOD, Warsaw, October 1998. 
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adverse effects for the institutionalisation of the policy-making processes in Poland. 
The uncertain constitutional situation also delayed military legislative reform. 7 
Poland was the last country in Central Eastern Europe to adopt a permanent post- 
communist constitution in 1997. The Constitution did not radically change the 
political system already in place, it was rather a correction and supplement to the 
previous basic law. The most controversial articles of the Little Constitution were 
removed or rectified and the division of constitutional prerogatives and 
responsibilities clarified. As a result, Poland received a parliamentary system with a 
strong position for the president as an arbiter in politics. Yet, the presidency became 
more titular and less executive in character. This time, the legislature made its 
intention clear: under normal circumstances the conduct of state affairs, including 
the military and defence, is the government's prerogative and responsibility; 
presidential powers can take a more 'executive' form only in extraordinary 
conditions threatening the state existence. 8 
Still, the President retained certain important prerogatives. He kept the 
function of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, however the 
Constitution specified that in peacetime his duties are carried out through the 
Minister of Defence, and in the case of war the President should appoint the Highest 
Commander of the Armed Forces on the motion of the Prime Minister. The 
Constitution was not clear on who would be Commander. The president retained the 
right to invest military ranks on the motion of the Minister of Defence 9 and to select 
7 Stanislaw Koziej. Nalional Dctýnce Management Qf the Republic ofPoland (Warsaw: MOD, 1996), 
pp. 6- 12. 
8 Interview with Tadeusz Dybowski, Warsaw, August 1997. 
9 During Walqsa's term in office this prerogative was used as an effective instrument of enhancing 
presidential powers. For example, after the infamous 'Drawsko dinner' in 1994 Walqsa rejected all 
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the members of the prospective National Security Council. But the Constitution 
removed the obligation to consult the president on nominations for ministers of 
defence, internal affairs and foreign affairs and obliged the president to co-operate 
with the Prime Minister and the respective ministers in foreign policy matters. 10 
Thus, the mzýjority of contentious issues were removed from the legal framework. 
The exception was the legislative decision to the right of appointment and dismissal 
of the Chief of General Staff to the president. This prerogative had the greatest 
potential for rising a political conflict anew because that effectively meant that the 
Minister lost influence over the selection of his most important military deputy. 
Additionally, such a solution threatened the return of a special relationship between 
the president and the Chief of General Staff, already observed with president Walqsa 
and gen. Wilecki between 1994 and 1997 with disastrous results for civil-military 
relations. " 
Parallel to the shrinking of the presidential powers the role of the parliament 
increased in defence management and military control. The principle of democratic 
civilian control of the military was enshrined in the Constitution together with a 
tenet of political neutrality of the military and its subordination to democratic 
civilian control, however vaguely those articles were formulated. 12 Moreover, the 
Constitution established the right to set up a parliamentary investigative committee 
ministerial motions and promoted only officers allegedly involved in the voting down of the Minister 
of Defence. 
"' 'Obronnok bez kontrowersýji' (Defence Sector without Controversies), interview with prof. Marek 
Mazurkiewicz, chairman of the parliamentary Constitutional Committee, by Tadeusz Mitek; Polska 
Zbrojnu, No 7, February 1997, p. 10. 
Minister Andrzej Karkoszka drew my attention to this potentially contentious regulation. Interview 
with Dr Andrzej Karkoszka, Under-Secretary of State for Defence, Polish MOD, September 1997. 
12 Boleslaw Balcerowicz, 'Co cywilne, co wojskowe? ' (What is civilian and what military), Polska 
Zhroina, December 1998, p. 9, Mitek, 'Obronnoý6 bez', p. 11. 
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and the right to question members of the cabinet. The permanent Constitution 
created a legal framework generally conducive to the parliament overseeing the 
military, yet the ultimate leverage of the Parliament in the civil-military relationship 
depended on further statutory regulations and, even more than that, on the ultimate 
shape of the political practice in this field, 13 
The Constitution of 1997 corrected and rectified the many weaknesses of the 
Little Constitution and facilitated progress in legislative defence reform. But 
although the passing of the permanent basic law stabilised the political scene and 
improved civil-military relations in Poland, nevertheless some political habits born 
of the interim legal framework and former powerful position of the president in the 
military and defence affairs could not be removed easily. The influence of the Little 
Constitution was detrimental to the consolidation of democratic civil-military 
relations and certain problems related to the role of president in defence policy could 
not be removed prior to Polish accession to NATO. 
The Czechoslovak and later Czech approach to the making of a democratic 
constitution was a testimony to its own tradition of strong democracy. Amendments 
to the old communist constitution were introduced very early on, in December 1989. 
The proper post-communist constitution of the Czech Republic was adopted on 16 
December 1992 in anticipation of the split of Czechoslovak Federation, and 
promptly came into force on I January 19931. The Czech swift and well planned 
adoption of the basic law was an exception among the post-communist countries 
where legislative delays, political deadlocks and interim constitutions were the 
norm. 
Interview with Bronislaw Komorowski, chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for National 
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The Czech Constitution incorporated the Bill on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Liberties as its integral element and made the rights and 
responsibilities of the citizens the central part of the basic law to the point of 
overstating them. 14 In that context it is interesting that the notion of the citizen 
soldier or democratic control of the military did not appear anywhere in this 
otherwise extensive catalogue of democratic standards in the field. 
The constitution introduced a parliamentary system with a very strong 
executive position for the Prime Minister and relatively weak powers for the 
President. The President is elected by the qualified majority of members of both 
chambers and his functions are, by and large, representative. A right of legislative 
initiative belongs to individual MPs, both chambers of parliament, and the 
government; the President is excluded from the process of initiating laws. Similarly, 
decrees issued by the President must be countersigned by the Prime Minister or the 
minister in charge, and the constitution makes it very clear that the government 
bears responsibility for countersigned acts. 
Only a minor part of the Czech constitution is devoted to security and 
defence matters. The management and control of the military is conducted by the 
government, either personally by the Prime Minister or through the Minister of 
Defence. Similarly, the execution of the budget is the responsibility of the 
government. The parliament exercises democratic supervision over military affairs 
through the allocation and control of funds for the military, through legislative 
processes, plenary discussions and the activities of individual MPs and committees. 
Defence, Warsaw, October 1999. 
" See David M. Olson. Philip Norton 'Legislatures in Democratic Transition', in David M. Olson, 
Philip Norton, The Neiv Parliaments q Central and Eastern Europe (London & Portland, Oregon: 
Frank Cass and Co., 1996), pp. 4-6. 
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The parliament also enjoys certain important prerogatives regarding the emergency 
state, yet those regulations were subject to many controversies discussed below. 
The President has an honorary function in the Czech political system and in 
peacetime can act only through government officials. He has a veto power that can 
be overruled by a qualified parliamentary majority. The President is the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Czech Armed Forces (art. 63 p. c), appoints and 
promotes generals (art. 63) and call-up mobilisation on the recommendation of the 
government. He also appoints the Chief of General Staff after consulting the Prime 
Minister and the Minister of Defence, but this prerogative is not included in the 
Constitution. Generally speaking, the constitutional regulations leave the President 
with moral influence on political processes rather than giving him executive 
competencies of importance. The limiting of presidential powers caused some 
constitutional ambiguity regarding emergency situations because the President, 
acting in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, 'ought to obtain 
the prime minister's consent for employing the forces and for commissioning and 
promoting the generals. In this connection the president's emergency powers might 
cause confusion during a crisis. )ý 
The adoption of a democratic constitution prior to the establishment of an 
independent state encouraged the stability and institutional i sation of Czech politics 
and prevented political struggles and major conflicts over the division of 
prerogatives, defence and military affairs included. The clear and permanent 
distribution of powers before the establishment of the independent Czech nation- 
state stabilised civil-military relations in the Republic and provided solid 
foundations for subsequent democratic consolidation on this field. 
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The approach of the post-communist incumbents in Ukraine to the making of 
the constitutional framework greatly resembled the situation in Poland, only 
aggravated by the stateness problem and the complete lack of a tradition of 
democratic legal order. Therefore, it should not be surprising that constitutional laws 
were subject to the most acute political conflict in this country and that Ukraine was 
the last post-Soviet republic and one of the last post-communist countries to adopt a 
new constitution. The Soviet constitution of 1978 remained in force until 1995 with 
some few hundred amendments. In 1995 a temporary compromise was reached 
between the president and the parliament and the Constitutional Agreement was 
passed, followed by the Bill on Government. Those two documents together formed 
an interim constitution. Yet, before long that temporary solution became a subject of 
legal and political dispute. 
The making of the constitution fuelled the struggle between the president and 
parliament over power distribution and delayed the adoption of the permanent 
constitution in Ukraine. 16 When the Constitution was finally adopted on 28 of June 
1996, it was not a product of political compromise but took place in an atmosphere 
of political scandal and presidential blackmail. 17 The parliament proved to be the 
weaker in the power contest with the president and the Constitution finally 
sanctioned the dominant executive position of the president in Ukrainian politics, 
15 Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil- Military Relations and NATO Expansion, McNair Paper, 
No 39, (Washington D. C. Institute for National Strategic Studies: 1996), p. 123. 
16 Kataryna Wolezuk. 'The Politics of Constitution-Making in Ukraine', in Taras Kuzio (ed. ), 
Contemporar- o 
.y 
Ukraine: D. 1 Post-Soviet Transformation (New York and London: 
M. E. Sharpe, 1998). p. H 8. 
17 Tadeusz A. Olszahski, 'Uchwalenie Konst. vtucji Ukrainy' (Passing of the Ukrainian Constitution), 
Biitlef. vn Ukraifiski No 3) (27) (Warszawa: O§rodek Studi6w Wschodn ich, 1996), in Polish, pp. 2-6. 
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particularly in the domain of security and defence policy. 18 The president is the 
Supreme Commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces with powers to nominate and 
dismiss top military commanders of all military branches, chair the Council of 
National Security and Defence of Ukraine and has also has discretionary rights to 
decide on the composition of this body. The Constitution guaranteed the president 
very extensive emergency powers and the right of decision on the use of the 
Ukrainian armed forces. The potential impeachment of the president is an extremely 
complicated procedure. 
The Ukrainian president eqjoys extensive powers also in relation to the 
government. Although the presidential nomination of the prime minister requires the 
consent of parliament, the government is actually accountable to the president in the 
first place and only to a limited degree to the Parliament. The president can dismiss 
individual ministers or the whole cabinet, while the parliament can only vote to 
express no-confidence in the whole cabinet and recall the government through a 
qualified majority. In addition the Ukrainian president secured limited law-making 
powers through the right to issue decrees. 19 
The fact that the constitutional framework of rules and procedures was 
established in Ukraine was in itself an important step towards reform of the state. 
However, the Ukrainian system, despite the appearances of democratic 
presidentialism and inclusion of democratic standard guarantees, was in reality 
closer to a soft authoritarian system than a representative democracy. 20 Such a 
"' Wolczuk, 'The Politics, pp. I IS - 137. 
") Yuriy Lukanov. Trietij, priezidieni. Politichnij- portriei Lieonida Kuehmi (The Third President. 
Political Portrait of Leonid Kuchma - in Ukrainian) (Kiev: Taki Spravi, 1996), pp. 69 - 70. 
2') Ilya Prizel, 'Ukraine Between Proto-Democracy and 'Soft' Authoritarianism', in Karen Dawisha, 
Bruce Parrot. Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and 
Alohlova (Cambridole: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 330 - 369. 
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system was not exceptional among the former Soviet states 21 and featured an over- 
powerful position of the president in politics, law-making powers granted to the 
president and disturbed mechanisms of executive accountability. The method of 
power distribution in Ukraine was insufficiently competitive and took place in the 
narrow circle of political elites resembling 'clans', 22 many of which had been 
formed under the communist regime. 23 Those clans managed to establish 'a 
proprietary claim on the state's power resources' in independent Ukraine 24 and were 
determined to restrict access to state resources for other political actors. Under such 
a system full democratisation became impossible in Ukraine and could lead to 
inhibition of democratic reforms completely. 25 
The prolonged process of making the constitution in Ukraine had a generally 
negative influence on Ukrainian transition. The slow progress in preparing 'ground 
rules' hampered the state-building process, weakening the legitimacy of the new 
2' Gerald M. Easter, 'Preference for Presidentialism: Post-Communist Regime Change in Russia and 
the NIS', World Politics, Vol. 49, No 2, January 1997, pp. 184 - 211. 
22 Tadeusz A. Olszanski, 'Walka k1an6w na Ukrainie' (The Struggle of Clans in Ukraine, in Polish), 
Bildetyn Ukrainski No 4 (28) (Warszawa: O§rodek Studi6w Wschodnich, 1996), pp. 6-7. He 
identified several informal post-nomenklatura clans in Ukraine which are regional ly/industrial ly 
centred: Doneck (coal and metal industry), Dnetropetrovsk (defence industry, the centre of political 
support for president Kuchma, himself coming from defence industry nomenklatura), Kharkiv (heavy 
industry), agricultural (sovhoz and kolhoz nomenklatura) as well as the elusive Security Services 
clan, formed by former KGB functionaries. Viacheslav Pihovshchek, 'Jedno "M Leonida Kuczmy, 
czylj Dnietropietrowsk przeciw bezpieczefistwu pahstwa', (One "D" of Leonid Kuchma, or 
Dnetropetrovsk against the Security (Services) of the State', in Polish), Biulqvn Ukrahiski, No 1 (25) 
(Warszawa: O§rodek Studi6\,,, Wschodnich. 1996), pp. 7- 13. 
Geoffrey Hosking, 'Surviving Communism', in Ruth Petrie (ed, ), The Fall q 'Communism and the 
Rise (? f Nationalism. The Index Reader (London and Washington: Cassel, 1997), p. 2 10. 
24 Easter, 'Preference', pp. 189 &2 11, respectively. 
25 Joel S. Hellman, 'Winner Take It All. The Politics of the Partial Reform in Post-Communist 
Transition', 11"Orld Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2, January 1998, pp. 203 - 235. 
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state, and affecting its international position. 26 The interim basic law had only a 
character of agreement between the parliament and the president and as such was a 
very weak basis for building democratic institutions of the state. Instead, the 
inability to achieve consensus on the shape of the political system in Ukraine 
undermined the legitimacy of the existing institutions, exposed their weakness and 
opened the way to frequent and rapid shifts in the rules of the political game. 27 
But while the constitutional problems were certainly harmful to 
democratisation in Ukraine, they did not result in drawing the military into the 
political contest over power distribution in a manner similar to Poland. On the 
contrary, the Ukrainian military on the issue of power distribution remained 
politically neutral and under the firm control of the president. 28 The restraint of the 
military in Ukraine could be attributed to the dominant positions of the president in 
both domestic and foreign politicy throughout the transition. Such situation might 
have hampered democratisation in Ukraine, 29 but the clarity in division of powers 
kept the Ukrainian military uninvolved in political bargaining in a surprisingly 
effective way. 
In Lithuania, some of the problems related to the preparation of the post- 
communist constitution resulted from the determination to phase out the Soviet 
residue from the institutions of the state and to revive the legacy of the pre-war 
statehood. Moreover, prior to the adoption of the post-communist constitution, the 
26 Wolczuk, 'The Politics', p. 119, 
27 Interview with Tadeusz Olszafiski, expert on Ukrainian affairs, Osrodek Studi6w Wschodnich, 
Warsaw, August 1998. 
2" Tor Bukkvoll, Ukraine and European Security, Chatham House Papers (London: RIIA, 1997), p. 
18. 
2" Easter, 'Preference', pp. 184 -2 11. 
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conflict between the president and the prime minister erupted on the division of 
executive powers. As usual, security and defence policy were among the issues at 
stake. 
As a consequence of the re-establishment of the pre-war Lithuanian state in 
1990 by the parliamentary decision was the restoration of the 1938 authoritarian 
Lithuanian constitution, which was then suspended and replaced by a rudimentary 
interim constitutional law. Under that law, the parliament elected the chairman of 
the Supreme Council to act simultaneously as a president of the state. 30 V. 
Landsbergis, the leader of Sajudis movement was elected the chairman and 
provisional chief of the Lithuanian state and quickly began to push towards vesting 
extensive powers in his office and the creation of a strong presidency. Landsbergis's 
activities towards the simultaneous creation of presidency and his taking over of the 
position provoked political debate on the shape of the future political system in 
Lithuania and and subsequently, the concept was rejected in the popular referendum 
in May 1992 due to a low turnout .31 The 
influence of that controversy was generally 
positive for the creation of legal framework in Ukraine because it sped up the works 
in the parliament on the new constitution and helped work out a viable compromise 
on the political system. Most importantly, it demonstrated that people in Lithuania 
rejected the idea of having an undemocratically elected president. 
The Constitution adopted in October 1992 established a parliamentary 
system with the government fully accountable to the parliament, but with a strong 
position of the president in the areas of foreign and security policy. The president is 
Alfred Erich 
, 'Lithuania's 
First Two Years of Independence', Journul qj Buhic Saidies, Vol. 
XXV, No. 1. Spring 1994, p. 82. 1 
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elected in a direct ballot for five and his prerogative include selection and 
appointment of a prime minister upon parliamentary approval, right of legislative 
initiative, veto power on parliamentary bills and the right to issue acts or decrees 
which need to be countersigned by the Prime Minister or a minister in charge. The 
president can be removed only through the impeachment procedure. 
The president is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and upon 
parliamentary approval appoints or dismisses the Chief Commander of the Army 
and the director of the Security Services as well as confers the highest military 
ranks. The president also has limited emergency powers. Finally, he is the Head the 
State Defence Council of Lithuania. These prerogatives give the president a strong 
position in defence affairs, later confirmed by other defence laws. At the same time, 
the constitution obliges the government to administer the affairs of the country, 
including military and defence issues, to protect the inviolability of its territory and 
to ensure the security of, and public order in, Lithuania. Such a situation holds a 
potential for competition between the president and the government over defence 
competencies, which is always detrimental to the democratisation of civil-military 
relations. 
Lithuania, having created its national army from scratch, included many 
provisions in the Constitution which were to ensure the establishment of democratic 
civil-military relations form the start. In fact, the Lithuanian Constitution put the 
greatest emphasis on this area out of all of the post-communist states. Some of the 
provisions of the Lithuanian constitution were particularly conducive to the 
democratic consolidation of civil-military relations. For example, the constitutional 
Sylwester Przybyla, btvva (Warszawa: MON, Departament Spoleczno -Wychowawczy, 1998), p. 
43. in Polish. Alfred Erich Senn, 'Lithuania's First Two Years of Independence', Journal qf'Baltic 
Studies, Vol. XXV, No. 1, Spring 1994, p. 83. 
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articles provided that the Minister of Defence may not be a person in active service 
and forbid 
soldiers in active military service or alternative service, officers of the 
national defence, the police and the internal service, non-commissioned 
officers, and other paid officers of military and security services (to be) 
members of the Seimas or of local government councils. They may not hold 
elected or appointed posts in State civil service, and may not take part in the 
activities of political parties and political organisations. 32 
The Lithuanian determination to eradicate the Soviet legacy from the 
political system left the country with no option other than the prompt adoption of 
these basic political rules. Without them, the state would have to function on the 
foundations of the communist system. The Lithuanian example illustrates how an 
early adoption of a permanent constitutional law is conducive to the consolidation of 
democracy in the state and helps democratise civil-military relations. 
Military Legislative Regulations 
In established democracies, the legal and procedural arrangements stem from 
constitutional provisions which together form a framework of policy-making rules 
as well as regulate conflict resolution. Such a framework ensures long-term stability 
of the political system, including civil - military relations. 
Post-communist polities emerging from the party-state organisations urgently 
needed a written legal framework, particularly as the informal arrangements took too 
long to settle down and without laws in place, many reforms could not be continued. 
In this process, a particularly important role was given to the parliaments. However, 
32 Artide ) 41 of the Lithuanian Constitution. 
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despite all the significance that the legal regulations carried for the civil-military 
transformation as well as the general reform of the state, in reality the legislative 
refonn, and in particular the military legislative reform, suffered numerous delays. 
hold ups and inconsistencies. The ensuing absence of clear rules for the management 
and supervision of the armed forces encouraged chaos and intra-executive 
competition over control of the military, and constituted yet another factor possibly 
involving the military in politics. Finally, the struggles over the shape of the legal 
framework for the military engaged the parliaments in political conflict and hindered 
their transformation from merely communist 'rubber stamps' for party directives to 
genuine democratic legislatures. 
Despite the fact that Poland was notorious for its civil-military relations 
throughout the first half of 1990s, the history of Polish legislative refom-i illustrates 
the potentially beneficial impact of the legislative regulations on civil-military 
relations. Poland was an example of the processes leading from military 
empowerment and an undermining of the democratic consolidation of the state to the 
saving of the transformations through legislative reform. The prolonged interim 
status of the constitutional law encouraged political competition and inhibited 
institutional isation of the policy - making processes. The adoption of the permanent 
constitution in 1997 improved the legal situation of the military and civil-military 
relations. At the same time, however, certain controversies regarding the division of 
powers continued to hinder democratisation of the military legal framework in 
Poland even after the implementation of the permanent constitutional provisions. 
Poland did not manage to complete its legislative reform before accession to 
NATO and consequently entered the Alliance with a highly incomplete and 
208 
unstructured legal framework for the military. By end of 1998 the military 
legislature was dispersed between 22 various parliamentary laws and supplemented 
by an additional 120 acts of lower order. 33 Some important regulations, for example 
on the wartime administration of the state, were absent from the legal system 
altogether. For example, the constitution provided that in case of war the president 
would nominate the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. However, in the 
light of the existing laws it was not clear whom the president should appoint for this 
position. 34 Another problem was the continued validity of the obsolete laws. The 
Law on Universal Military Service was originally adopted in 1967 and was in force 
until June 1999 when the new Law on Military Service and Other Defence Duties 
replaced it. Another example of scandalous neglect was the law on emergency 
states. Due to stalled legal reform, by 1999 Poland still had regulations on martial 
law based on the draconian decree of 1981 while the change of constitution in 1997 
left a complete legal vacuum regarding other types of state of emergency. 
Another problem of legal reform was the unstructured and chaotic character 
of the legislative process. The already mentioned Law on Military Service and Other 
Defence Duties was supposed to be a foundation for the Polish defence and security 
system, yet instead of being the first one to be prepared, it was adopted as the last 
constitutional act in the package of military reforms undertaken by the parliament 
35 
under the pressure of prospective membership of NATO . Worse still, 
its first 
version failed to comply with provisions of the administrative reform due to take 
Kazimierz Nalaskowski, 'Marzenia prawne' (Legislative Dreams), Polska Zbr(? jna No 43, October 
1998, p. 23. 
34 Zbigniew Derdziuk, 'Porzqdki kompetencyjne' (Putting Competencies in Order), Polska Zbrqina, 
No 24, June 1999, pp. 14 - 15. 
35 Bronislaw Komorowski, 'Plan powa2nej debaty' (Plan of the Serious Debate), Polska Zhrojna No 
49, December 1997. p. 2. 
209 
effect on I st January 199936 and so the Law had to be changed and go through the 
full legislative procedure again. A similar problem arose in 1998 when the public 
ombudsman questioned the possibility of sending anti-chemical defence troops to 
the Gulf in February 1998 37 based on the existing regulations leading the parliament 
to hastily adopt an appropriate bill with a limited period of validity. 38 
However, in Poland the political controversies focused on one law in 
particular, that is the Law on the Minister of National Defence. The story of 
legislative proceedings on this law reflected typical controversies of the legal reform 
of the post-communist military. Poland as the second largest contributor of troops to 
the Warsaw Pact inherited a concept of the absurdly strong post of minister of 
defence. The original 1967 Law on the Universal Military Service granted very 
extensive powers to the minister, yet in the conditions of Soviet tutelage those 
ministerial prerogatives were meaningless. 39 However, when the law became truly 
valid after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the issue of reforming the Ministry of 
Defence became urgent. 
Based upon a Prime Ministerial directive 40 in 1991 the so-called Zabinsky's 
Inter-Ministerial Commission for Reform of an Organisation of the National 
Defence was set up. The Commission worked out a set of proposals for the 
reorganisation of the defence sector, which were only partially implemented by 
subsequent governments but nevertheless changed the basic design of the defence 
Bronislaw Komorowski, *Bez obietnic' (No promises), Polsko Zbrojna No 49, December 1998, pp. 
to- it. 
Jerzy Jachowicz, *Prawo do Nvqjný' (Ri-ht to War), Gaz-eta H"vhorc:: a 19 February 1998. 
Nalaskowski, 'Marzenia. Polska Zbroina No 43, October 1998, p. 23. 
'9 Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Ze s--czyt(jiv do NATO (From Mountain Peaks to NATO) (Warszawa: 
Bellona, 1999), p. 204, in Polish. 
40 Resolution of the Prime Minister of 29 December, Monilor R. 7qdowy No 67/ 1990. 
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management in Poland. The bottom line of the /abinsky's reform proposal was a 
strict separation of the Ministry of Defence from the General Staff .4' 
The 
introduction of this particular recommendation in the long run had a disastrous effect 
on civil - military relations in Poland because it enhanced military autonomy and 
prompted political conflict over the subordination of the Chief of General Staff. The 
full impact of the reform will be discussed later but here it is important to realise that 
the proposal of Zabinsky's Commission was the main source of the civil - military 
struggle inside the MOD and ultimately forced the parliament to work out a 
corrective reform proposal in the form of the Law on the Minister of Defence. 
The adoption of the Law was preceded by a long and bitter political debate 
during which the parliament confronted the president over the shape and 
subordination of the General Staff. President Walqsa proposed the creation of a 
semi-independent military structure with considerable autonomy and split lines of 
subordination. The Chief of General Staff was to be responsible to the Minister of 
Defence over things concerned with military administration, but at the same time he 
would be obliged to carry out presidential decisions in foreign and defence policy 
matters and be accountable to the President in that respect. That solution not only 
threatened the principle of democratic civilian control, but also represented an 
attempt at adjusting the constitution through the back door - then still the Little 
Constitution - to enhance presidential executive powers. The parliamentary counter 
proposal went in the opposite direction of curtailing presidential prerogatives in 
41 'Pr(#eki struktury organLacjJn(, j pionit 0%, ilno - ivojskowego i gl6wne zadania' (Project of 
Organisational Structure of the Civil - Military Sector and Its Main Tasks ), prepared by colonel 
StanislaNk Dronicz. the Secretary of the Team No I of the Commission, MOD, Warsaw, April 1991. 
211 
military and defence matters and subordinating the General Staff unequivocally to 
the ministerial authority. 42 
The Law was finally adopted on 14 December 1995 in the form proposed by 
the parliament. 43 It subordinated the Chief of General Staff to the Minister of 
Defence and incorporated the General Staff as an integral part of the MOD structure. 
The Law also reversed some of the earlier and harmful decisions and moved the 
Military Intelligence Services and Military Attach6s Office back into the ministerial 
structure. 
44 
The adoption of the Law on the Minister of Defence in one sense was an 
anomaly because it gave the MOD the special status of being the only ministry 
regulated by a separate legal act. Therefore the Law generated confusion among 
some extemal observers. For example, Szemerkenyi suggested that the reform 
,.... created a radically new relationship between the Ministry of Defence and the 
General Staff .. unknown in all well established Western democracies, but 
reminiscent of the old Soviet system. ' 45 In reality the Law on the Minister of 
National Defence was the first radical step away from the old Soviet system 46 and 
enable further legal and structural reforms of the military which the General Staff 
could no longer block. The passing of the Law had another important dimension of 
establishing the Parliament as a significant actor in civil-military relations. The 
parliament proved to be an institution capable of breaking the political stalemate and 
42 Interview with Bronislaw Komorowski, October 1999. 
, 
fice ql'the Miniver qfNational Dqfence, Dziennik Listaw No 10/1996, tit e 56. 4' Law on the Qf 
44 Tr6ba deMONta. ýW(An Attempt ofMOD Dismantling), Gu--cta Wvhorcza, 14 December 1995. 
45 R6ka Szemerk6nyi, 'Central European Civil - Military Reforms At Risk, Adelphi Paper No 
306/1996, IISS, p. 14. 
46 Interview, with Dr Andrzej Karkoszka. Under-Secretary of State for Defence, Polish MOD, 
September 1997. 
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the organ able to check any excessive ambitions of the president and reverse anti- 
democratic trends in the management of defence. 
The approach of the Czech authorities to the creation of the military 
legislative framework reflected a very low priority given to the defence reforms. 
Between 1990 and 1992 the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly focused on de- 
politicisations and de-communisation of the military as well as rehabilitation of the 
former officers purged after the 1968 Prague Spring. The Czechoslovak parliament 
adopted only three new legal acts concerning the military and other relevant 
. 
47 - up of regulations were only amended The legislative deadlock prior to the break 
the Federation completely stalled any progress in military legislative reform and 
froze the legal situation of the army for several monthes. 
The situation did not improve after separation from Slovakia. 48 Before 1997 
only one major regulation was adopted on the military. It was the Law No 15/1993 
formally establishing the Czech Army and defining its role in defence of the 
freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Czech Republic. Major 
legislative activity took place in the Czech Republic only under direct pressure from 
NATO officials when the prospect for Czech membership of the Alliance became 
feasible. In 1997 the Czech government and the parliament prepared a 
comprehensive package of legal regulations on military and defence management in 
peacetime and war. However, the remaining time proved too short to pass the 
proposals through the full legal procedure and as a result the Czech Republic entered 
17 Law No 74/1992 on selected aspects of military service, No 124,11992 establishing military police 
and No 480/1992 on material security of the military personnel and students in military schools. 
48 Jan Dubenský, 'K pfipravovaným z6konbm o resortu obrany', Vj, hýrStali, April 1998, p. 1. 
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NATO with a long list of outdated regulations and legislative gaps . 
49 For example 
the Law on Military Discharge was from 1949, the Law on Defence from 1961 and 
the Law on Service Conditions for Soldiers from 1959. '0 
Work on legal and procedural reform gathered speed in 1998. First the 
National Defence Strategy was approved to serve as a 'conceptual base for the 
dcvclopmcnt of a complex defence system' and replace the obsolete White Book of 
1995.51 Based on the Strategy, an important Law on Security of the Czech 
Republic 52 was adopted and the other six legislative proposals were submitted to 
legislative proceedings. These were the following laws: . 53 
e On the Defence of the Czech Republic 54 laying out defence duties of state 
authorities, local self-governments, legal entities and individual persons; 
* On the Army of the Czech Republic 55 delineating defence competencies of the 
government bodies, duties of the ministry of defence and the general staff and 
defining the organisational structure and main tasks of the armed forces. This law 
49 Interview with Dr Petr Veit, Deputy Director, Legislative Department, Czech MOD, Prague, 
September 1999. 
5" Antonin Rakk, 'Rozhodovaci procesy v civilni kontrole armAdy' in Miroslav Purkrabek (ed. ), 
Rozhodoi, 6nifinansowini a komunikace ve v&ejný polifice v OesU republice (Planning, finance and 
communication in the internal policy of the Czech Republic) (Praha: Vesmir, 1997), p. 173 - 174, in 
Czech; ýtcfan Sarvaý, 'The Shift from the Transitional to the Democratic Agenda: the Problems and 
the Future of Democratic Control of Armed Forces in the Czech Republic' (Prague: Institute of 
International Relations, I 997)ý p. 44. 
51 Rojenka 1997, Ministerstvo Obraqv Oeskj Republiky (Annual of the Czech MOD) (Prague: MOD, 
1997), p. 119. 
52 Ostavni Zcikon o beipeiýnosti OesU Republi4,, Law No 110/ 1998, 
53 Jan Dubenský, 'K pfipravovaným zdkon6m o resortu obrany', Vý,, heýr Stati, April 1998, pp. I- 26, in 
Czech and interview with Dr Petr Veit, Deputy Director, Legislative Department, Czech MOD, 
Prague, September 1999. Laws available at web pages of Chamber of Deputies at 
and Senate at http: /\kwýý. senat. U, 12 September 1999. 
54 Zdkon o : qjiýtovani obrany Oeský Republiky. 
S5 Zcikon o arinddi OeW, Replfblik. y. 
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regulated military participation in international/humanitarian missions and in the 
maintenance of internal security and constitutional order of the state. The law 
forbade political activity in the armed forces; 
* On Basic and Alternative Services, on Military Training and on Selected Legal 
Aspects of the Military in Reserve, 56 regulating the conditions of military 
service; 
o On Military Administrative Authorities, 57 laying down an organisational 
structure for military administration; 
* On Foreign Armed Forces on Czech Territory and on Czech Armed Forces 
Deployed Abroad '58 
bringing Czech regulations in line with the NATO SOFA 
agreement of 19 June 1951; 
e On Career Soldiers; 59 
* On Civil Defence. 60 
The overview of the missing regulations of the military and defence matters 
in the Czech Republic makes one wonder how those spheres could function without 
the fundamental regulations. Those legislative delays were not only caused by the 
low political priority of those issues and absence of policy guidelines, but also the 
lack of inter-agency co-operation that resulted in the submittal of rival legislative 
proposals by various bodies and extended parliamentary proceedings. 61 The 
"' Aikon i prUNhu IcKladni (ncihradiii) s1u2by a vojeiiských c, -viüeni ao ný2k(erých prtivnich ponicýrach 
v(? jcikü v --, cilo-ze. 
57 Ztikon o vojenskj,, ch sprävnich üPadech. 
5' Zeikon o cizich o--brojeMIých siläch na iizemi Üeske Republiky ao o--brojenfch silcich Üeske 
Repub/ikv, v --uhraniei. 
59 Ziýkon o vojýcich -- povolýni. 
6" Zdkon o civitni ochraný. 
6' Interview with Dr. Petr Veit. Prague, September 1999; Sebesty6n Gorka. What's in the Pack-Sack? 
- Co"OhiWon to European . 
Yecuri(yfirotn Pola"d, the C: ech Republic and Hungary Defence Studies 
No 26 (Budapest: Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, 1999). p. 39. 
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prolonged lack of permanent legislation had a negative impact most of all on army 
manpower: it frustrated career soldiers and complicated civilian employment in the 
defence sector due to lack of appropriate regulations. 62 On the other hand, the fact 
that the absence of such vital regulations did not cause major disruptions in 
democratic civilian control of the military nor provoke political struggles speaks 
well of the strength of the Czech military tradition of unequivocal subordination to 
the civilian authorities. 
The need to create a legal and procedural framework for the national military 
was perhaps more pressing in Ukraine where it was treated as an important step 
towards asserting the sovereignty and independence of the post-Soviet republic. The 
provisions for creating the separate Ukrainian army were already contained in the 
Declaration of Sovereignty of July 1990, paragraph IX, 63 Immediately after the 
proclamation of independence, those preliminary provisions were worked out into a 
military legislative package. In the course of 1991/1992 the Ukrainian parliament 
adopted over seventy new bills, 64 outlining the procedures for the formation of the 
separate Ukrainian military and building the legal foundations for its existence 
within the independent state. This legislative effort continued throughout 1992, 
during which the following important laws were passed: 65 
1. 'On Ukrainian Defence' of 6 December 199 1; 66 
62 Interview with Jifi DluW, Personnel Division, Legislative Directorate, Czech MOD, Prague 
September 1999. 
63, Bohdan Pyskir, 'The Silent Coup: The Building of Ukranie's Military', European Securiýy, Vol. 2, 
No. 1, Spring 1993, p. 141. 
64 Michta, The Government, p. 204. 
"5 V. Kopieychikov, A. Kolodiy. O. Ukrainchuk. 'Pro konciepciyu nacionalnoy biezpieki Ukraini' (On 
the concept of the national security of Ukraine) Pravo Llkraini, No 5-6.1993, pp. 9- 12 (in 
Ukrainian). 
" Pro oboronu Ukraini, Vidomosti Vierhovnoy Radi Ukraini No. 9, pos. 106,1992. 
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2. 'On Armed Forces of Ukraine'of 6 Dec. 1991; 67 
3. 'On State Borders of Ukraine' of 4 Nov. 1991; 68 
4. 'On the Border Troops of Ukraine' of 4 Nov. 1991; 69 
5. 'On Alternative (Non Military) Service' of 12 Nov. 1991; 70 
6. 'On Military Duties and Military Service'of 25 September 1991; 71 
7. 'On Social and Legal Protection of the Military and Their Families' of October 
1991.11 
Those laws were supplemented by presidential decrees and formed a framework 
for establishing an independent, non-Soviet chain of hierarchy, 73 put foundations of 
the Ukrainian national armed forces and of universal conscription. 
Having accomplished the changes to the rudimentary rules, the Ukrainian 
legislature appeared to have lost interest in the military and the progress of legal 
reform was stalled for the next few years. This was a result of two separate political 
processes. First, the general institutionalisation of the Ukrainian polity slowed down 
in the years 1992 - 1994 because no political actor or force had vested interests in 
the prompt legislative regulation of state institutions and so constitutional progress 
74 became impossible. ' Secondly, the first Ukrainian president, Kravchuk, used the 
military as a catalyst for the nation and state-building processes and as a symbol of 
the sovereign nation-state while neglecting the formal side of the formation of the 
67 Pro Zbroyni Sili Ukraini, No. 9, pos. 108,1992. 
68 Pro dier.: avniy kordon Ukruini, No. 2, pos. 5,1992. 
69 Pro Prikordonni Vilvska Ukraini, No. 2, pos. 7,1992. 
70 Pro alliernativnit (niebiiAovit) slu.: bii, No. 15, pos. 188,1992. 
71 Pro vivskovi. v obo0af ok i vilvskovii slit--bit, NO. 27, pos. 385,1992. 
7' Final version approved on 20 December 199 1, No. ] 5, pos. 190,1992. 
_'I_' On 12 December 1991 president Kravchuk issued a decree, according to which he took over 
command of all the troops stationed on the Ukrainian territory with the sole exception of Strategic 
Forces. 
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national military. 7-S His successor, president Kuchma, adopted a lower profile on the 
nation-building activities, yet he preferred to use the decrees to regulate military 
matters. As a result, apart from the constitution, only one important law was passed 
in Ukraine between 1992 and 1999 delineating responsibilities inside the MOD 
structures. 
With the assertion of independence and sovereignty the Ukrainian 
administration was forced to invalidate the Soviet military laws to underline the 
fresh start, but that created a legislative vacuum. Filling in the vacuum was a 
complicated political process because it was carried out with haste by the legislature 
which was ill prepared to discharge duties of a parliament of independent state and 
was hampered by the uncertainty of the domestic and international situation. 
Moreover, the new statehood required an entirely new legal framework that had to 
be created from scratch. In fact, in nearly a decade, Ukraine managed only to 
prepare the rudimentary legal framework, and a number of important laws still 
awaits legislative processing. The absence of the legal and procedural framework in 
Ukraine contributed to the extremely low institutionalisation of the polity and in fact 
precluded an emergence of democratic mechanisms of military management and 
control by civilian authorities. 
Lithuania was more radical in rejecting the Soviet legacy of military law and 
started creating new democratic rules with more dedication that was the case with 
Ukraine. However, compared to Ukraine, Lithuania was in a more advantageous 
position. The country had a pre-war tradition of a modern nation-state and this 
74 Wolczuk, 'The Politics, p. 135. 
7.5 Andrea Chandler, *Statebuilding and Political Priorities in Post-Soviet Ukraine: the Role of the 
Military. * Armed Forces &, Society, Vol. 22, NO. 4, Summer 1996, pp. 577 - 580. 
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provided the authorities with models to draw upon. The total rejection of the Soviet 
legal heritage put an added pressure on the Lithuanian parliamentarians to quickly 
work out new system and this situation gave the Lithuanians an opportunity to 
produce a comprehensive legal system regulating all aspects of military and defence 
matters in one legislative package. Moreover, thanks to an early adoption of the 
Constitution Lithuania could prepare laws in the proper order, starting with the 
fundamental laws and going down to more detailed issues. It must be admitted that 
the country made use of those advantages offered by the situation of a new 
beginning and regulated the majority of the legal issues pertaining to the military 
and defence in two fundamental laws. By 1999 Lithuania had the most complete 
framework of legal and procedural rules in place among the four case countries. 
The Law on the Basics of National Security, adopted in 1996, became the 
fundamental law for the security and defence system. In May 1998 the Law on the 
Organisation of the National Defence System and Military Service supplemented it. 
These two laws regulate the majority of issues conceming the military, security aDd 
defence policy in Lithuania, 
The Law on the Basics of National Security established and defined the basic 
principles of the national security system in Lithuania, 76 including social, cultural 
and ethnic policy as integral parts of the state security policy. The document 
presented the principal provisions of the defence policy of Lithuania, assessed risks 
and threats to national security and surveyed the major institutions in the defence 
system of the state. According to the Law, the integration with the NATO defence 
svstem was the most important measure to ensure the security of the Lithuanian I 
state. The Law also delineated the prerogatives and responsibilities of the major 
Chapter 3 of the Law on the Basics ol'National Security. 
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institutions in charge of the military, defence and security policy, including the 
government, the parliament, and the Minister of National Defence. The final section 
established the detailed structure and functions of the regular armed forces, 
Voluntary National Defence Services (SKAT) and active reserve force. 
Lithuania attached great significance to the legal regulation of civil - military 
relations. This was motivated by the desire of the authorities to comply with NATO 
standards for membership, but nevertheless gave results in the form of detailed legal 
norms enshrining basic democratic principles. The Law on the Basics of National 
Security devoted the entire chapter to democratic control over the armed forces and 
other national security institutions. Among other things it specified that 'all 
decisions on defence policy and the armed forces shall be made by democratically 
elected civilian government' and that all defence expenditure 'shall be public 
knowledge'. Secondly, the Law provided that only a civilian person could be 
nominated to the post of the minister of defence and emphasised the superiority of 
the Minister over the Commander of the Armed Forces. 77 
The Law on the Organisation of the National Defence System and Military 
Service was a supplement to the Law on the Basics of National Security which laid 
out in detail the scope of power of the MOD and the General Staff. Secondly, the 
document regulated the professional, contract and conscript military services and the 
conditions of entering and terminating such service, including payment and social 
benefits, assessment criteria and discipline. The same Law comprised regulations on 
the employment of civilians in the defence sector and regulated their status. 
The Lithuanian effort to create the legal and procedural framework for the 
military from scratch and simultaneously bring it in line with NATO standards of 
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democratic civil - military relations deserve appreciation. The Constitution and two 
major laws covered the majority of the issues of military and defence policy. And 
while the domestic struggles in the early 1990s delayed legislative reform, the 
common goal of membership in NATO as well as the sense of threat from Russia 
united the politicians in the joint effort to create the credible national armed forces 
and assert control over them without provoking an outbreak of major political 
conflict. 78 Also the legal distribution of powers, usually conflict prone in the post- 
communist polities, was carried out in a comprehensive and orderly manner shortly 
after independence. 
Division of Prerogatives and Responsibilities 
The division of prerogatives and responsibilities in the post-communist 
countries was one of the most important and contentious aspects of the legislative 
reforms. The communist legacy created a vicious circle of political conflicts: the 
post-communist polities lacked basic rules for conflict resolution, the distribution of 
powers between the major political actors was causing conflicts, and because there 
were no established rules to resolve the conflict, the problems escalated. The low 
level of institution alisation of the systems and weak or non-existent mechanisms for 
accountability of the major political actors heated up political struggles, and the 
interim constitutional laws helped in further deteriorating the situation. Conflicts 
over power were occurring in each of the post-communist polities, however in some 
77 Law on the Basics of National Security. Republic of Lithuania. Vilnus, December 19,1996, No 
Vill - 19, chapter 8, pp. 9- 10, official translation into English. 
-8 Interview with Dr Algidras Katkus, MP, Chairman of the Seimas Committee on National Security 
and Defence, Lithuanian Parliament, Vilnus, February 2000. 
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extreme cases they led to military involvement in a political 'tug-of-war' and as in 
the case of Poland, dangerously disrupted the processes of democratic consolidation. 
Precisely the failure to establish a system of clearly divided powers and 
responsibilities in Poland led to a dangerous distortion of civil-military relations and 
threatened democratic consolidation in this country. The seeds of the problems were 
sown during the transitional opening when the Round Table agreement of 1989 
vested extensive powers in the presidency. The Round Table arrangements were 
implemented prior to an establishment of democratic institutions in Poland and that 
later became a source of political contention between the key policy-makers and 
turned the issue of control over the military and defence policy into a main subject 
of controversy. 
Following the victory of Lech Walqsa in the 1990 presidential elections, the 
new president began pressed for the enhancement of his executive powers. In the 
pursuit of his goal, he confronted the parliament that was then still extremely weak 
from its recent systemic transition and, fragmented after the 1991 elections, there 
was also an unstable goverm-nent. In the absence of mechanisms for conflict 
resolution, the three parties became locked in a long and mutually destructive 
conflict. 79 The adoption of the Little Constitution only temporarily settled the 
problem. Rather than clarifying the division of prerogatives, the interim constitution 
provided powerful incentives for the rival politicians to stretch the legal regulations 
and act outside the constitutional boundaries in order to achieve maximum 
empowerment as long as changes to the constitution were possible. Moreover, the 2ý Cý 
systern created by the Little Constitution was destructive for the processes of 
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democratisation. The interim Constitution introduced a hybrid presidential - 
parliamentary system, which combined some of the worst 'perils of presidential ism' 
with some of the most negative features typical of early post-communism. 80 A dual 
executive power with two independent sources of legitimacy was a defining feature 
of that system. 
In that mixed political order the president appeared to have won his own, 
strong legitimacy in the popular elections and felt that that credited him with the 
right to be a dominant executive figure. And indeed, the Little Constitution gave him 
a powerful executive position with only limited accountability and with difficult 
removal procedures. At the same time, the government was formed, dismissed and 
held accountable through the regular parliamentary procedures typical of the 
parliamentary - cabinet system and so it represented the second, equally strong leg 
of the executive power in Poland. The inherent instability of that system was a 
consequence of an executive dualism in which powers and responsibilities were 
blurred and overlapping. Holmes' warning that such a hybrid political system could 
generated a great potential for policy stalemates and that 'the personalities of the 
incumbent of senior offices can dramatically affect the efficacy of a particular 
arrangement' therefore proved particularly true for Poland. 81 The conflict between 
the President and the government over the scope of executive powers became 
inherent to the system. 82 
79 Maurice D. Simon, 'Institutional Development of Poland's Post-Communist Sejm: A Comparative 
Analysis', in Olson, Norton, The New Parliaments, pp. 62 - 66. 
"0 Leslie Holmes offered a 14-point characteristic of post-communism which illustrated many of the 
negative features of the post-communist polity. See Leslie Holmes, PONI-COM1111117iSm: 4n C, 
Introduction (London: Polity Press, 1997), p. 14. 
Holmes, Post-Communism, p. 174ý 
See Thomas A. Baylis, 'Presidents versus Prime Ministers. Shaping Executive Authority In Eastern 
Europe', World Politics, No 48, April 19W p. 3 10. 
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The president pushed his constitutional prerogatives to the limit in order to 
secure a more prominent position. The problem for the civil - military 
transformation began when president Walqsa singled out the military as a source of 
stable political support and an instrument of pressure on other political centres. 
From Walqsa's point of view, the military represented a useful instrument of 
political leverage, both in symbolic and real terms. Therefore the activity of the 
presidential office went in the direction of achieving total control of the military and 
close co-operation with the General Staff. From 1994 on Walqsa managed to 
establish a political practice of leaving the selection of the ministers of defence, 
internal and foreign affairs entirely to him. 83 In the absence of institutional ised 
selection procedures, the president made extremely arbitrary choices and coerced the 
parliament to abide. For example, admiral Adam Kolodziejczyk was offered for the 
second time the post of the Minister of Defence in 1994 during Walqsa's private 
party along with a verbal promise that if he accepted the proposal, Walqsa would 
'take care of the rest'. 84 General Stelmaszuk, the former Chief of General Staff 
remembered how the president and his political assistants were inviting selected 
military commanders, among them the future Chief of General Staff, Gen. Wilecki, 
to the meeting in the presidential office and caused the officers to break the rules of 
disciplinary regulations, as they failed to notify the Chief of General Staff on their 
temporary absence. 85 The explanation typically given by Walqsa was that his 
constitutional prerogatives of Supreme Commander-in-Chief meant that the 
responsibility for key military appointments and the selection of the Minister of 
Prime Minister Waldemar Pawiak was the first Prime Minister who left the nominations to the 
President rather than just seeking his approval for the PM's candidates. as the Constitution stated. 
84 Interview with admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk, former Minister of National Defence, Poland, Gdynia, 
JulY 1997. 
224 
Defence presupposed more direct, executive powers over those policy sectors, and 
therefore justified his actions. 86 
The competency conflict in the executive had fatal consequences for the 
civil-military transformation in Poland. An instrumental treatment of the law and its 
interim character provoked a serious institutional crisis of the state and encouraged 
military involvement in politics. The struggle between the president and the 
government over control of the military and defence matters had yet another harmful 
effect of splitting control over the military between various administrative bodies, 
with ill-defined limits on their powers. 8' Worse still, the highest military echelons 
acquired such a political leverage through close personal relations with the president 
that they ultimately gained control over policy agenda for military reform and were 
able to block execution of the govemmental decisions. 8s 
As the political crisis deteriorated into an open fight between the president 
and the government and as the democratic control of the military became an illusion, 
the parliamentarians undertook an attempt to regulate the defence competencies in 
the Law on the Minister of Defence. However, the works on the law were delayed 
by the uncertainly regarding the future shape of the pennanent constitutional law 
and revealed a continued lack of political consensus on the model of civil-military 
relations in Poland. The issue of control over the military was not treated as a 
necessary element of democratisation of the state, but as a kind of political 'trophy' 
and instrument of leverage. For instance, the left wing parties supported radical 
85 Onyszkiewicz, Ze sZczyf6w,, p. 193. 
86 Miroslaw Cieleniiýcki, 'Kto jest fak-tycznyin nýierzchnikieni polskich sit zbroJnych' (Who is the 
Genuine Supreme Commander- in-Ch ief of the Polish Armed Forces), Wprost, 12 September 1999, 
pp. 26 - 28. 
Gow, Birch, Security and Democracy, p. 28. 
Interview with Dr Andrzej Karkoszka, September 1997. 
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curtailing of the presidential powers only as long as Walqsa was the president. When 
it became clear that their candidate, A. Kwa§niewski, was the likely winner of the 
next elections, they radically changed their position in the parliament and opted for a 
last minute change to the project of the constitution adding the controversial right to 
nominate the Chief of General Staff, military commanders etc. 89 
However, despite the improvement made by the constitutional law of 1997 in 
clarifying the competency division, those last minute additions ruined the clarity of 
the political system of the Polish Constitution and blutred the lines of responsibility 
once again. The controversy was renewed by the milieu of the new president, and in 
particular by Marek Siwiec, the Head of th presidential National Security Bureau 
who pressed for enhancement of his powers in turn. 90 This time, major controversy 
surrounded the president's constitutional function as the Supreme Commander-in- 
Chief and the prerogatives and responsibilities derived from that position. According 
to Siwiec, the president as the C-in-C should have a direct executive influence over 
the most important decisions regarding the security and defence policy; he dismissed 
the constitutional article saying that in peacetime this function should be exercised 
through the Minister of Defence as imprecise and only 'reflecting the spirit of the 
Constitution'. "' Other prominent members of the presidential personnel agreed with 
such an interpretation. 92 President Kwa§niewski himself took a similar position in a 
1998 interview: 
89 Interview with Bronislaw Kornorowski, October 1999. Cielemiqcki, 'Kto jest faktycznym', p. 27. 
9(' Interview with Bronislaw Kornoroýkski, October 1999. 
9' Statement of Marek Siwiec, director of the National Security Bureau (BBN), Wprost, No 37,12 
September 1999, p. 27. 
91 , Democracja szanuje Nvojsko' (Democracy Respects the Military) interview with minister Danuta 
Waniek, Director of the Presidential Administration, Polska Zbrojna No ) 3, April 1997, p. 10. 
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If the Constitution gave the President significant prerogatives and 
responsibilities in important personnel decisions regarding emergency 
states, mobilisation and defence preparations, and atso requires the 
President to safeguard sovereignty and security of the state and 
inviolability of its borders as well as territorial integrity, then it cannot 
be - as some politicians say - 'a symbolic role'... The intention of 
(constitutional) legislator ... was to ensure the complementary role of 
both bodies, that is the President and the government. I see the article 
regarding the presidential exercise of the function of the Commander- 
in-Chief through the Minister of Defence in a similar way. The 
Minister must know what are his duties toward the President, and the 
President cannot depend on the arbitrary decision of the Minister 
regarding the scope of co-operation. 93 
The issue of the presidential role in defence and military matters and his 
exact position in the civil-military relations was not resolved definitely and it is a 
ýconflict in waiting' which may flare up in a crisis situation. And although after the 
change of the office of president, and in the aftermath of the introduction of the 
Constitution and the Law on the Minister of Defence, Polish civil-military relations 
tended to be more placid, occasionally the unresolved competency conflict in the 
executive surfaced in the course of legislative works when as a rule, the president 
and the governing would take contradictory positions. This was the case with 
February 1998's law on the foreign deployment of Polish troops 94 when both sides 
'-' Interview with President Alek-sander Kwa§niewski, by Janusz Grochowski, POlk4a Zbr(? ina, No 33, 
August 1998, p. 11. C, 
9' 'Drqtenie wcjska' (Penetrating the Military), interview with prof. Adam Zielifiski, Ombudsman, 
Polska Zhi-(? jna No 9, February 1998, pp. 10 - 11. 
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strove to gain unilateral right of decision. 95 A similar pattern was repeated with the 
Law on the Protection of Confidential and Secret Information when the presidential 
representatives demanded special rights for the president of access to confidential 
and secret matters and the Prime Minister rejected the proposal. Also with the Bill 
on Martial Law in the introduction of which the 1997 presidential proposal assigned 
a decisive role to the president with the government responding in 1998 with its own 
counter-proposal, where the decision-making powers were fully vested in the 
govemment. 96 
The competency conflict permeated the civil-military relation in Poland from 
the onset of transition and inhibited their satisfactory democratisation. Legal reforms 
and progressive, though slow, institutionalisation of the post-communist political 
system reversed the negative trend, curtailed military autonomy and re-subordinated 
it to the democratically elected representatives of the government. However, the 
instrumental treatment of the military as a tool of political leverage led to the 
preservation of elements of the mixed political system and left a debris of 
constitutional controversy regarding a division of powers between the president and 
the government. The progress in democratisation of civil-military relations may 
form a constitutional practice and clarify the situation; however, the unresolved 
issues of military control carry a potential for the renewal of conflict. In general, the 
developments in Polish civil-military relations demonstrated the weakness of 
democratic tradition in this state and the importance of legal reform in such 
countries. 
9ý Jerzy Jachowicz, Trawo do "lojny'. 
96 Derdziuk, 'Porzqdki', pp. W- 15. 
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The Czech Republic was among the few countries that avoided an acute 
competency conflict over military management and control. The Czech democratic 
tradition and the early adoption of legal foundations certainly helped to avoid 
conflict, yet the low priority attached to the military and defence issues also played a 
role. However, the Czech Republic did not avoid conflict all together. The 
legislative deadlock that occurred in 1992 and led to the break up of the federation, 
the separation of the federal states itself as well as legislative delays in setting the 
legal framework for the military generated a situation contentious enough to 
provoke a mild conflict between the president and the prime minister. President 
Havel twice undertook attempts to gain greater executive powers in domestic 
politics, first in Czechoslovakia on the eve of 'Velvet divorce' and, later, in the 
Czech Republic. Each time the proposals concerned among other issues the military, 
but the parliaments rejected both proposals. 97 This resulted in the post-divorce 
political situation featuring a disparity between formal and existing state of affairs: 
while the formal prerogatives of the president reduced him to representative and 
symbolic functions, in reality president Havel was one of a few politicians showing 
a serious and sustainable interest in the military. 98 Havel's stress on the Czech 
military tradition in defence of democracy, his outspoken support for Czech 
participation in international operations, the moderating influence on the initial 
phases of the screening processes, and the setting up of the Military Office of the 
President to provide contacts between the President and the Czechoslovak army 99 
improved the image of the army and guaranteed a minimal degree of political 
97 Baylis, 'Presidents versus', p. 3 12. 
98 Interview with general Karel Pezi, former Chief of Defence Staff and presidential security advisor, 
Officer of the President, Czech Republic, Pra-gue, September 1999-, Ra§ek, Rozhodovaci', p. 164; 
Szemerk6nyi, 'Central European". p. 9. 
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interest in military reforms. Moreover, Havel showed a considerable determination 
to carry out the process of civilianisation of the Ministry of Defence as soon as 
possible. 100 
The slowly emerging model of civil-military relations where the military had 
close relations with the president rather than the prime minister was against the logic 
of the Czech constitutional order, according to which the body responsible for the 
conduct of military and defence matters was the responsibility of the government, 
And, although prime minister V. Klaus was well known for his lack of interest in 
defense and military issues, nevertheless the political competition between those two 
political centres and personalities gradually forced president Havel to adopt a lower 
profile in the field, sadly to the detriment of the military reforms. ' 01 
However, the major line of competency conflict in defence and military 
matters in the Czech Republic ran between the government and the parliament, not 
inside the executive branch, and focused on emergency powers, and not military 
control, in which the Czech case was unique. The general goal underlying the debate 
over the emergency powers was to curtail the parliamentary and presidential powers 
in defence and military matters and enhance those of the government. According to 
the Czech legal regulations, the president can exercise emergency powers only in a 
situation when decisions cannot be taken by the parliament and need subsequent 
confirmation of the legislature. 102 In all other situation, the emergency powers are 
exercised by the parliament. Similarly, the participation of the Czech armed forces 
in military operations abroad and deployment of foreign troops on Czech soil is 
')') S\VB EE/08 16,14 July 1990, p. 3. 
'00 Security and Military Notes, RFE/RL Reporl, August 14,1995, pý 5. 
"" Interview with general Kerel Pezl, September 1999. 
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decided by the Czech parliament. ' 03 The extensive parliamentary prerogatives 
provoked a conflict in 1995 with government over the proposed Law on Defense. 
The project law granted the powers of introducing a state of emergency to the 
executive; the parliament rejected the proposal and insisted that the legislature 
should have the right to do so. 1 04 The issue was only temporarily resolved in the 
Law on Security (No I 10/1998) which granted that right to the Prime Minister to be 
confirmed by the cabinet, but other legislative proposals went in the direction of 
giving the government the right to do so, but under an obligation to inform the 
Chamber of Deputies immediately. '05 Still, even with the issue of emergency 
prerogatives unresolved, the military in the Czech Republic avoided being drawn 
into elite bargains, probably also due to the weakness of the Czech military as an 
institution. 1 06 Therefore, Sarva§ and Stach had been justified to proudly observe that 
the Czech Republic 
managed to avoid any serious competency conflict between the 
President, minister of defence and chief of general staff (Poland, and 
partially Hungary), did not allow for the remilitarization of the ministry 
of defence (Hungary), there are no serious conflicts between officer 
102 Otto Pick, Stefan Sarvas, Stanislav Stach, Democratic Control Over Security Policy and Armed 
Forces (Praha: Institute of International Relations, October 1995), p. 3 1. 
10' Articles 39 (3) and 43 (1&2) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic. V. Cepl, Malcolm Gillis, 
'Czech Republic', East European Constitutional Review, No. 1,1994, pp. 66 - 68. 
104 Stephane Lefebvre, 'The Army of the Czech Republic: A Status Report', The Journal of Slavic 
Military Studies, Vol. 8, No. 4, December 1995, p. 720. 
10ý Rene Nastoupil, 'Current Czech Defense Policy' Thedournal (? f Slavic Militag Studies, Vol. 12, 
No. 2, June 1999, p. 119. 
106 Some Czech authors were of a different opinion. Purkrabek argued that the processes of army 
transformation were 'hyperpoliticized' and therefore transformation could not be successful. See 
Miroslav Purkrabek, Anton R8ek, X politicke, socialni a vojenske rekonstrukci Cs. armady v 
demokraticke revoluci', ýyberSlali. August 1991, p. 77, in Czech. 
23 1 
corps and certain political parties (Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania), there 
is no information blockade from the ministry of defence (Romania, and 
partially Bulgaria).. ' 07 
The regulation of the fundamental legal issues prior to military legal reform 
permanently defined the principles of the Czech political system and prevented 
major controversies regarding the management of the military and defence. The 
contentious issues that emerged in civil-military relations were marginal and did not 
have an impact on democratic consolidation in the Czech Republic. 
Contrary to the Czech Republic, the political circumstances in Ukraine were 
certainly conducive to conflict over competency divisions. Prior to the passing of the 
1996 permanent constitution, Ukrainian domestic relations between the executive 
and the legislature resembled a constant tug-of-war with frequent shifts in power 
relations. In fact, the conditions of the Ukrainian political scene precluded complete 
democratic consolidation. The passing of the 1996 constitution improved the legal 
situation in Ukraine. However, the system adopted in the Constitution had 
authoritarian features and, while it stabilised the Ukrainian policy, it also guaranteed 
a dominant position if the president in the executive branch, particularly in military 
and defence matters. 
Such an uneven distribution of competencies was welcomed by the 
Ukrainian elites that needed the president to exercise strong executive control over 
the political system in order to maintain their hold on power and access to resources. 
107 ýtefan Sarv8, Stanislav Stach, 'Demokratickd kontrola bezpeýnosti politiky a ozbrqjených sil', 
(Democratic Control of the Security Policy and Armed Forces) in ýtefan Sarv8 a kolektiv 
výzkumnýho týmu. Beýpeýnost a arniýda v moderni spoleinosti (Praha: University Karlovy, Fakulta 
socidinich vOd), No 6,1997, in Czech, p. 127. 
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Issuing of decrees and close oversight of the armed forces and special services 108 
belong to the favourite strategies of the president striving to enhance the position of 
himself and his ý clan'. ' 09 The system established by the Ukrainian Constitution went 
precisely in the direction of eliminating the rival political centres from policy- 
making and vesting all powers in the office of the president. It prevented further 
political struggles, settled the issue of control over military services and clarified the 
responsibilities, however, in the conditions of deficient democratic institutions and 
mechanisms, an emergence of democratic civil-military relations of any kind was 
impossible. 
Rather than ensuring at least a modicum of a democratic civilian control of the 
armed forces, the Ukrainian constitution sanctioned the presidential civilian control 
of the armed forces. Other political institutions are either excluded from the political 
process, or are too weak to take control of the military, or to control the presidential 
control of the military. As it was, the Ukrainian case underlined the fact that civilian 
control of the military cannot be democratic if the overall political system of the 
state in not democratic. As one Ukrainian journalist dryly summed up the situation: 
Democratic control of power structures by the legislative and judiciary 
branches in Ukraine has hardly been initiated. Instead the executive branch 
has in fact already constructed an authoritarian, no-alternative system of 
daily civilian control of the power structures which goes only one - way: 
president (and his apparatus) - power ministries. 
' to 
" On the special services in Ukraine see Olela Strekal, 'The New Secret Service', Transition, 23 
June 1995, pp. 24 - 27. 
Philip G. Roeder, 'Varieties of Post-Soviet Authoritarian Regimes', Post-Soviet Affilirs, vol. 10, 
No. ] 1994, p. 65. 
'" W. Grechaninov, 'Kak kontrolirowat' armiyu', (How to Control the Army) Dzien, No 107,16 
October 1997, in Russian. 
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Lithuania appeared well posed to avoid the competency conflicts and civil- 
military rifts thanks to the early adoption of the constitutional law, progress in 
establishing a comprehensive military and defence framework of rules and 
regulations as well as the high priority attached to the establishment of civil-military 
relations based on the Western model. '' Yet, despite those advantages, Lithuania 
experienced a serious political rift over the competencies in defence policy matters 
in the course of its civil-military transformation. The controversy concerned the 
placement of the major civilian body controlling the military: if it should be situated 
in a democratically elected and accountable, but frequently changing government, or 
with the president, who is elected for a fixed term, but liable to impeachment 
procedures only. 
The conflict originated in the political struggle in the early 1990s between 
the two major parties: the right-wing Sajudis, and the post-communist Lithuanian 
Democratic Labour Party. After the post-communist electoral successes in 1992 - 
1993 , the post of the Minister of 
Defence and the control of the military became the 
contentious subject. The post of the Minister of Defence until September 1993 was 
held by the nationalist-oriented Sajudis politician A. Butkevicious who remained in 
the government formed otherwise by politicians from the former communist party. 
In an effort to oust Butkevicious, the post-communist parliamentarians reacted with 
passing of the Law establishing the post of the Commander of the Armed Forces 
(equivalent to the Chief of General Staff) and practically eliminating the minister 
from the chain of command. The same law increased the autonomy of the General 
Algirdas V. Kanauka, -Virtues and Pitfalls of Civilian Control of the Military', in Conference on 
Civil -Militarj? Relutions in the Context qf'an Evolving NATO (Budapest: Ministry of Defence / 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 1997), p. 57. 
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Staff and strengthened presidential control over the army at the expense of the 
government. 
112 
Such a move provoked further conflict over the executive control of the 
military, and had the effect of politicising military issues and in fact undermining the 
foundations of democratic civilian control of the military. The legal changing of the 
system of military control in the pursuit of a short term political victory in 
eliminating influence of the opposition from the armed forces management was a 
dangerous precedence and underlined the weakness of democracy in Lithuania. The 
changes were eventually reversed by the reform of the command and control 
system, introduced by the Law on the National Defence Organisation of 1998. The 
strategic command authority was given to the Commander of the Armed Forces who 
is also the head of the Integrated Defence Staff and advisor to the President and the 
Minister of Defence. However, under the Law on Organisation, the Commander is 
subordinated to the Minister of Defence, and only through him to the President. The 
President and the Minister of National Defence jointly exercise the National 
Command Authority which runs from the President to the Minister of Defence and 
through the Commander of the Armed Forces to the lower level command, that is 
the Operational Forces Commander. I 133 
Generally speaking, the system of civilian control established in Lithuania by 
the legal framework gave the President the core function in the military command 
and control structures, probably stronger than could be expected from the articles of 
the constitutions. Within this system, the Minister of Defence has a supreme position 
112 Albert M. Zaccor, 'Problems in the Baltic Armed Forces', The Journal qf Slavic Military Studies, 
Vol. 8, No. ], March ) 995, p. 66; Albert M. Zaccor, 'Lithuania's New Army', The. Journal (? f Slavic 
iWilitag Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, June 1994, p. 216. 
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in the military chain of command and the Commander of the Armed Forces was 
clearly subordinated to him, yet the solution adopted in Lithuania affected the unity 
of the government by subordinating in part the minister to the president. Despite 
authoritative statements by Lithuanian defence officials, 114 this solution raises 
doubts on the potential for conflict over executive prerogatives in the future. 
Summary 
The study of the legal reform in the case countries showed the ostensible 
obstacles that the post-communist conditions put to the legislative processes. The 
extreme incompatibility of the post-communist power relations with democratic 
principles and instability of the internal political scene stemming from the absence 
of fundamental regulations made the adoption of post-communist constitutions a 
priority. However, due to the necessity of distributing powers and responsibilities 
among the political actors in the course of making the constitutions, the 
constitutional processes proved higbly contentious in most countries, particularly if 
the interim constitutions were adopted. As a rule, the problems related to the general 
distribution of powers within the political system were transferred to the lower level 
of civilian management and control of the military and, on numerous occasions, 
engaged the military in intra-executive competency conflicts against the principles 
of the democratic civilian control that the politicians professed to be introducing. 
The overview of the developments in each of the case countries showed that the 
devisina of the institutional design of the presidency and clarification of the powers 
attached to it, particularly in military and defence policy, were defining moments for 
, "' (Aet-view ql'Lithuanian National De 
, 
fence Sivem '99 (Ministry of National Defence, 1999), pp. 6 
- 7, Law on 1hc Organisalion qj'the Nalional DefýnceSystem and Military Service, article 14. 
114 Interview with Dr Algidras Katkus, February 2000. 
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the ultimate model of civil-military relations and had a potential to destabilise the 
entire process of democratic consolidation, as was the case in Poland. 
At the same time, the legal reforms underlined the seemingly obvious fact 
that lack of democratic institutions and procedures at the state level will effectively 
preclude an emergence of democratic civilian control of the military and distort the 
civil-military transformation. In the process of legal refon-n it became particularly 
clear that the transition paths in Central Eastern Europe were diverging and that the 
outcomes of the civil-military reforms are likely to be different. The constitutional 
and legal developments also showed a considerable correlation between the 
traditions and quality of statehood and the progress of legal reforms: the Czech 
Republic, the only post-communist state having democratic credentials, hardly 
experienced any conflicts or major setbacks in the course of the reforms, while other 
countries strove to overcome political instability and low levels of 
institutionalisation, with a varying effect. 
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Chapter 6 
EFFECTIVE DEMOCRATIC MANAGEMENT 
The restructuring of the military and the creation of a legal and procedural 
framework represented those stages of democratic transformation where the basic 
institutions of representative democracy were being set up and becoming 
operational. However, implementation of those reforms did not automatically 
provide for an effective functioning of democratic civilian control over the military. 
Democratic management of the defence policy and military affairs requires the 
strong democratic institutions and the rule of law, but also more sophisticated 
mechanisms, such as provision of accountability of the politicians, clear division of 
responsibilities inside the defence management structures, transparency of defence 
planning and military management, availability of information, parliamentary 
oversight of the military, and finally, public scrutiny over defence and military 
affairs. The process of developing these subtle mechanisms of democratic 
management are bound to be lengthy and therefore, the study results indicating the 
lack or the underdevelopment of the instruments of effective democratic 
management in the post-communist countries were predictable. 
Operation of MOD and General Staff 
Balancing the powers of the Ministries of Defence against the General Staffs 
was one of the most dauntina tasks of the post-communist civil-military 9: 1 
transforniations and spelled problems in the course of reforms. It needed the 
rebuilding of the entire structure of the ministries to adjust the prerogatives of the 
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civilian ministers and military chiefs of staff in order to make the military 
administration functional in the new system and in accordance with the new 
principles of democratic order. Logically, the structural arrangements should stem 
from legal regulations and experience, yet in the post-communist countries, none 
was readily available, and so the MODs were restructured without clear policy 
guidelines at first. The contentious situations ensued from the legacy of the Warsaw 
Pact, within whose framework the ministers theoretically were empowered with 
extensive rights, and in practice were doubly subordinated: to the Chiefs of staffs 
and the Soviet superiors. Moreover, the nomination of civilian ministers where 
previously there had been only military men was a change that the post-communist 
military found by and large difficult to accept and that provoked conflicts as well. 
Nonetheless, settlement of the conflicts inside the MODs was the first necessary step 
towards establishing effective democratic management of the armed forces. 
In Poland, the process of delineating powers between the Ministry of 
National Defence and the General Staff was particularly long and charged with 
political conflict. There is no doubt that the great empowerment of the General Staff 
in the first half of the 1990s was possible only thanks to president Walqsa and his 
policy of winning the greatest possible executive power. However, the original 
source of problems with internal design of the MOD was the implementation of the 
first institutional reform of the MOD structures in 1991 - 1993, based on the 
recommendations made by the so called Zabinsky Commission. This reform 
introduced a faulty institutional model of relations between the ministry and the 
General Staff. The Commission proposed a rigid division of the Ministry into two 
separate structures: a mixed civilian - military ministerial part in charge of the 
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administration of MOD and a strictly military body of General Staff to deal with 
'purely' military issues. ' It was expected that such reform would bring 40% 
personnel reductions and increased efficiency of the military administration. What 
the members of the Commission overlooked, however, was the fact that such a 
solution inevitably dwarfed the ministry and empowered the General Staff .2 
The problem was aptly described by one of the original authors of the reform 
(and later a great critic of the MOD design), under-secretary of State for Defence, 
Jerzy Milewski. Commenting on the problem of military overpowerment in the 
Polish defence management system, he said: 
It is not a problem of personalities, this is a systemic problem. In my 
opinion, we have approved a faulty model. The civil-military part of 
the MOD was supposed to manage the armed forces, provide for them, 
oversee them, take care of the defence policy, social affairs, education 
etc. The General Staff is the military part of the Ministry to which the 
whole of the army has been subordinated. Those two structures were 
supposed to co-operate. But this model, in spite of the good will of the 
subsequent ministers of defence could not function property and with 
time it has led to the increasing alienation of the civilian part of the 
ministry. Ministerial departments which do not have an independent 
access to the army must work through the respective directorates 
' 'Prqjekt struktury organizacyinej pionit cywilno - wcjskowego i gl6wne zadania' (Project of 
Organisalional Structure of the Civil - Military Sector and Its Alain Tusks), prepared by colonel 
Stanislaw Dronicz, the Secretary of the Team No I of Zabinski Commission, MOD, Warsaw, April 
1991. 
2 The reform of the MOD was criticised by some politicians at the time of its introduction, who 
rightly warned against probable negative consequences of the division, but to no avail. See Rornuald 
Szeremietiew. 'Terra Incognita', Tygodnika Solidarno. ý6, I January 1993. 
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(which are parallel to ministerial departments) in the General Staff. Of 
course, consequently the General Staff has grown, the respective 
directorates have overlapped with the ministerial structures and 
become independent. So they no longer need the assistance from the 
partner civilian departments. 3 
Under such circumstances, the military in the General Staff were in a good 
position to block the decisions of the civilian politicians. For example, in 1993 
Minister Onyszkiewicz decided to create a MOD department for defence planning. 
Such a department potentially could undermine military predominance in the field 
and also its political leverage, therefore the General Staff froze the implementation 
of the decision by refusing to fulfil their part of the process of forming the new 
structure (giving mobilisation assignments etc. ). 4 The steady support from the 
president ensured that the insubordinate military went unpunished. Moreover, under 
pressure from president Walqsa ministers made a series of concessions to the 
General Staff. For example, in 1993 the General Staff managed to overturn the 
internal regulations of the MOD introduced by minister Onyszkiewicz, which 
subordinated the Chief of the General Staff to the Minister. A year later minister 
Kolodziejczyk placed the Military Intelligence Service under the direct supervision 
of the Chief of General Staff and left the military entirely in charge of strategic 
planning, thus building up the military's autonomy even further! The corollary of 
the situation was succinctly summed up by James Gow: 
3 Interview with Jerzy Milewski, Polilyka Nr 25,24.06.1995, by Janina Paradowska. 
4 Interview with Andrzej Karkoszka, Under-Secretary of State for Defence, Polish MOD, September 
1997. 
5 Interview with minister Andrzej Karkoszka; Andrew A. Michta, The Soldier-Citi, 7etv the Politics qf 
the Polish, 4rnw, 4fier Communism (Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Macmi)lan Press, 1997), pp. 87 - 90. 
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'if based on the issue of personalities, the army can exert influence via 
the President, that is not control of the military, that is military control 
of the political process and in that case it puts the whole political 
process and the transformation into jeopardy'. 6 
The Law on the Office of the Minister of National Defence stopped the 
erosion of the civilian control of the military and initiated the process of dismantling 
excessive autonomy of the General Staff. But the reform of the MOD institutional 
structure and real division of powers inside the Ministry became possible only 
thanks to the settlements of the so called Karkoszka's Commission. The 
Commission was set up in the ministry and chaired by minister Karkoszka. The 
working group was a mix of representatives from the MOD and the General Staff 
and in the years 1996 - 1997 managed to work out and begin implementing the new 
institutional structure for the ministry. 7 Its main goal was to subordinate the Chief of 
General Staff to the Minister of Defence and turning the General Staff into a military 
planning organisation. The essence of the reform was to take away command and 
control functions from the General Staff and turn it from a military command and 
control organ into a military planning, prognosis and administration body. The 
reform liquidated overlapping structures in the General Staff, mainly financial, 
personnel policy and strategic planning directorates, streamlined the structures both 
in the MOD and GS and provided for significant manpower reductions, mainly in 
the military. The overall number of General Staff directorates was reduced from 52 
to 32. The brunt of personnel reductions (over 100 positions in the entire MOD) was 
6 Civil - Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe, workshop held in Luxembourg on 21 - 22 
April 1995, Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies, Transcript of Proceedings 
(unpublished), p. 58. 
' Interview with minister Andrzej Karkoszka, September 1997. 
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also bom by the General Staff, and the redundancies included several general's 
positions. The Ministry was also reorganised into 5 branches: for social and 
parliamentary affairs (later restricted to social affairs), finance, defence policy, 
logistics and command. 8 
However, the earlier empowerment of the General Staff originated not only 
from presidential policy and faulty institutional design, but also had its roots in the 
legacy of the Soviet/ Warsaw Pact command structure. The Polish General Staff 
combined functions: it was the main body for strategic planning and, at the same 
time, it represented the headquarters of the Polish army and the command of the 
Ground Troops, that is two thirds of the Polish Armed Forces. Therefore, only a 
creation of the Ground Troops Command structures separate form the General Staff 
could lastingly curtail the excessive power of the military. This third leg of structural 
reform was particularly resisted by the Chief of General Staff general T. Wilecki and 
his close associates and was deliberately delayed. Nevertheless, the Ground Troops 
Command structure became operational in 1999.9 Finally, on 31 July 1997 the Law 
on the Professional Military Service was amended and introduced a limited term of 
office for selected military posts. ' 0 Officers up to the rank of colonel may hold their 
positions for a period of between 2 and 5 years, while generals (or corresponding 
naval ranks) are nominated for 3 years only. With that, the basic redesign of the 
MOD was complete'' and, despite the General Staff foot-dragging in transferring the 
'Interview with minister A. Karkoszka and Michta, Soldier - Citi.: en, pp. 99 - 101. 
9 Janusz Grochowski, 'Bilans zamkniýcia, bilans otwarcia' (The Closing Balance. The Opening 
Balance Sheets), Polska Zbrojna No 4 1, October 1997, ppý 20 -21. 
"'Dziennik Ustaw No 107 of 15 Sept. 1997, title 688. 
'Armia przyszloýci'(Thc Army of the Future), interview with general Henryk Szumski, Chief of the 
General Staff. Polska Zbrqina, No 17, May 1997, p. 10. 
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prerogatives to the Ministry, 12 the conflicts over the division of powers were 
terminated with the practical implementation of reform. 13 
No such tussles and controversies surrounded the division of competencies 
between the MOD and the General Staff in the Czech Republic despite certain 
similarities in the initial institutional design between the two countries. The long 
standing tradition of military subordination to the political leadership in this country 
assured a smooth implementation of the structural reform in the MOD. 
The process of delineation of powers began already in 1989 in 
Czechoslovakia, but the haste with which the reform was carried out had to do with 
an underlying fear of the post-communist military, resulting from the discovery of 
the preparations for military intervention during the Velvet Revolution. 14 Between 
1990 and 1991 the Ministry of Defence underwent a reorganisation process and took 
over political and administrative powers from the military. At the same time, the 
MOD was strictly separated from command functions. 15 In an effort to remove 
overlapping functions of the MOD and GS, three new posts of deputy ministers were 
created in the MOD in charge of strategic planning, economic management and 
social and humanitarian affairs. The Chief of the General Staff was nominated as the 
fourth deputy of the Minister of Defence and this post was reserved for the 
military. 16 
12 Michta, Soldier- Citizen, pp. 107 - 109. 
1 _-' Janusz Onyszkiewicz, 'Na Zach6d patrz' (Look to the West), Wprost, 17 October 1999. 
14 Interview with Martin Vdvra, secretary to the Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech 
Republic, Prague, September 1999. 
Anton R8ek, 'The Transfromation of the Army in the Czech Republic', Perspectives, No 3,1994, 
pp. 41 - 50. 
16 Thomas S. Szayna, James B. Steinberg, Civil - Militag Relations and National Security Thinking in 
Czechoslovakia. A Conference Report. RAND, R-4195-OSD/A/AF, pp. 19 -21. 
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After the break-up of the Czechoslovak Federation, the general direction of 
defence management reform was upheld. The Czech Republic retained all federal 
structures of military management and control and therefore the creation of the 
national MOD and General Staff was done on the basis of Czechoslovak institutions 
and completed quickly. In the course of setting national command and control 
structures in the aftennath of the 'Velvet divorce', the role of the Ministry of 
Defence was defined as 'the central administrative body responsible for ensuring 
state defence, control of the armed forces, civil protection, and administration of the 
military cantonment area ... 
The part of the Ministry of Defence that commands the 
army is the General Staff. 17 The task of the General Staff is to manage, foster the 
professional development and command the army of the Czech Republic as well as 
project and organise defence preparations of the state. 
Despite similar logic of strict institutional separation underpinning Polish 
and Czech reforms of the MOD, the low prestige of the military in the Czech 
Republic prevented the empowerment of the General Staff as its natural inclination 
to enhance autonomy and political leverage was not fuelled by political conflict. The 
reform was successful in removing the military from policy-making processes and 
curtailing the powers of the General Staff, however, its negative feature was the 
breaking of the communication link between the civilian-military part of the 
ministry and military General Staff. In the Czech model, rigid separation of the 
civilian administration from military management was at the core of the defence 
management reform. This solution had the potential to widen a gap between the 
civilian and the military over issues of professional career or social problems in the 
17 Rene Nastoupil, 'Current Czech Defense Policy' The Journal (? f Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 12, 
No. 2 (June 1999), p. 120. 
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army due to the lack of channels for exchanging infonnation and the growing 
insulation of the Ministry. ' 8 
The institutional separation also promoted competitive behaviour and so both 
sides engaged in competition because of which on several occasions they developed 
and promoted rival concepts of defence reform, with which the General Staff 
frequently acted in opposition to the Ministry of Defence in defence of military 
corporate interests. It was particularly visible in case of the decision on the 
prospective level of army professionalisation when the General Staff managed to 
force through its proposal for a larger and less professional army 19 against the ideas 
of the Minister; similarly, the MOD and General Staff presented opposing proposals 
when drafting of the new Czech strategic concept of defence policy. 
Generally, the Czech reform of defence management led to an over- 
separation and lack of inter-agency co-operation between the MOD and the General 
Staff which in turn had a negative impact on civil-military relations in the Czech 
Republic. Regular bypassing of the military representatives in decision-making 
process pushed the GS to entrenched positions of protecting the corporate interests 
of professional soldiers and in the conditions of frequent changes of ministers and 
political leadership, the generally low political leverage of the politicians in the 
defence sector enabled the military to filter political decisions and check the agenda 
of reform at the MOD. Therefore, in 1995 another reform of the MOD was 
introduced with an aim to curtail the General Staff. The new Section of Defence 
Policy and Strategy was created in the MOD and took over some responsibilities 
Interview with general Karel Pezl, former Chief of Defence Staff and presidential security advisor, 
Officer of the President, Czech Republic, Prague, September 1999. 
19 R6ka Szemerkenyi, 'Central European Civil - Military Reforms at Risk', Adelphi Paper No 306, 
(London: IISS, 1996), p. 15. 
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from the military headquarters. 20 It seems, however, that the second restructuring 
also failed to resolve the vital problem of civil-military relations within the MOD 
and instead of promoting co-operation, it further alienated the two bodies. 
In Ukraine, the General Staff were empowered relative to the minsiterial 
structures simply because the military command organisation was there, while the 
ministry itself needed to be set up. When on 3 September 1991 the Soviet General of 
Aviation, Konstantin Morozov was appointed the first Defence Minister of Ukraine, 
the Ministry of Defence was not yet even legally established by the parliament. 
Organising the national chain of command, Minister Morozov had to build up the 
ministerial institutions from scratch, while the Ukrainian General Staff was quickly 
organised on the basis of the Soviet military administration of Kiev district. 
Therefore, the Ukrainian MOD became 'the youngest stepchild' among the 
Ukrainian power ministries and from the beginning its position was inferior to 
21 
theM. 
The military legislative package of 1992 created legal rules for the 
organisation and functioning of both bodies, modelled after the Soviet command 
structures, it did not however specify their functions or divide spheres of authority. 
As a result, overlapping structures emerged in the MOD and General Staff and 
further reforms were blocked by inter-agency competition. But, as long as the men 
in charge of both institution were in uniforms, there were few conflicts between the 
20 Otto Pick, Stefan Sarvas, Stanislav Stach, Democratic Control (Wer Security Policy and Armed 
Forces, (Praha: Institute of International Relations, October 1995), p. 34. 
2' Anatoliy S. Grytsenko, Defence RqfOrm in Ukraine: Chronology of the First Five Years. Berichte 
des Bundesinstituts fOr ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien 29,1998; see also Andrew 
A. Michta, The Government andPolitics of Post-Communist Europe. (Westport, Connecticut& 
London: Praeger, 1994), p. 12. 
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MOD and the General Staff. Once the civilian politician arrived in the Ministry in 
1994, a heated political struggle ensued between the Minister and the Chief of 
General Staff in Ukraine. 22 
The conflict was provoked by the reform plans prepared in the MOD, but the 
military distrust in civilian politicians created the background for the military 
resistance to reform. The Chief of General Staff, general Anatoliy opata, many times 
expressed the view that the civilian minister was incompetent and his reform plans 
were prepared in secret and could only ruin the Ukrainian army. 23 But the lack of 
trust was mutual - minister Shmarov in his turn refused to transfer operational 
command of the military to the General Staff where it should have been. However, 
rather than civil-military, the struggle had mostly an inter-agency character: at the 
time of minister Shmarov's term, there were only two civilians at the higher posts in 
the MOD; all the remaining key officials were military. 24 
The rejection of reform was also provoked by the plans to streamline and 
rationalise the defence finances and management procedures. The successful 
implementation of the financial and procedural regime in defence management 
would impinge on the vested interests of the military in the General Staff and put z: 1 
them under more effective control of the politicians. This was definitely not in the 
interest of the military and therefore Shmarov's reform was successfully blocked. 
22 OMRI Daily Digest, 16.02.1996. 
23 Interview with A*; hearing of gen. A. Lopata, 'Sud i Osud. Ministr Oboroni proti Vichimovo 
Kiyeva, Vichirniy Kiyev proti Szmarowshchiny'. Vichirn4, Kývev, special issue, 1996, pp. 68 - 77 (in 
Ukrainian); Tor Bukkvoll, Ukraine and European Security, Chatham House Papers (London: RIIA, 
1997), p. 20. 
24 Grytsenko, Defence Rqtbrm, p. 31; interview with Captain (navy) Czeslaw Karczewski, Military, 
Naval and Air Attache, Embassy of the Republic of Poland, Ukraine, Kiev, October 1997. 
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But the relations between the MOD and the General Staff were also 
complicated by the lack of clear delineation of authority. The ministers intervened in 
professional matters, and the officers pursued their own political agenda. With the 
nomination of the civilian minister, the brewing MOD - General Staff conflict 
exploded into an open struggle. However, contrary to the Polish case, the Ukrainian 
Chief of General Staff, gen. Lopata opted for a quick introduction of regulations 
dividing the responsibilities, while minister Shrnarov delayed their introduction. 
This was because he understood how weak was his position was versus the military 
command at that time and how limited his control was over the General Staff . 
25 
Postponement of the delineation of authorities could have changed the balance of 
power in favour of the minister, therefore the division was held up and Shmarov 
rejected several drafts of the respective law. 26 
In the end, both men were fired by president Kuchma in 1996, gen. Lopata 
in February and minister Shmarov in July. The ministerial post went to a military 
man, general Kuz'muk, which was a step back from the point of view of democratic 
civilian control, but was necessary to bring back co-operation inside the military 
management structures. Moreover, the conflict inside the leadership at the top 
dramatically undermined the prestige of both institutions in the officer corps. The 
survey carried out in April 1996 among the officers demonstrated the extent of the 
problems. Asked about their attitude to the three highest military authorities the 
professional military gave the following answers: 27 
25 Bukkvoll, Ukraine and- p. 20ý Grytsenko, Deýence Re fbrm, p. 29. 
26 Interview with Tadeusz Olszafiski, expert on Ukrainian affairs, O§rodek Studi6w Wschodnich, 
Warsaw, August 1998. 
27 Survey *Socialni probliemy ta rieforma Zbroynih Sil Ukraini' (Social Problems and Reform of the 
Ukrainian Armed Forces - in Ukrainian) (Kiev: Center for Social Monitoring & Ukrainian Center of 
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Extremely negative attitude Extremely positive attitude 
Ukrainian President 19.4% 4.6% 
Minister of Defence 23.0% 3.7% 
Chief of General Staff 13.8% 4.2% 
The nomination of someone from the military to the ministerial post helped 
to rectify the problem of erosion of authority. Nevertheless the Shmarov-Lopata 
conflict drew attention to the need for regulating the MOD - General Staff relations 
and delineating authority. Consequently, president Kuchma on 21 August 1997 
signed two decrees. One decree subordinated the General Staff to the Minister of 
Defence, but also made the Chief of General Staff responsible to the president and 
the State Defence and Security Council. The other decree granted the General Staff 
powers to co-ordinate the activities of other, non-army military formations, that is 
the National Guard, Internal Troops and others. 28 This decision met with avid 
opposition from the commanders of those forces as their competition with the 
regular army was not a secret, yet they eventually succumbed to the president's 
Will. 29 Presidential decrees clarified the situation and smoothed the functioning of 
military command and control structures. However, it was not a proper reform in the 
sense of a democratic civil-military transformation. The structure and function of the 
MOD and General Staff in Ukraine to a great degree petrified the old Soviet model 
in which the military are the only professionals capable of taking charge of strategic 
Political and Economic Studies, April 1996), unpublished, courtesy of T. Olszafiski, Center for 
Eastern Studies, Warsaw. 
28 G. Niesmianovich, 'Ob'iedinienic pod vidom rozdielienia: rieforma v VS Ukraini poluchila novyi 
stimul', Krasnay'a ZTvie--da, No 210,9 September 1997; G. Niesmianovich, 'Noviy status Giensztaba 
Ukraini', Krasnaya Zwie-7da, No 170,24 January 1997. 
S. Zguriec, 'Hochiesz mira - gotov'sia', D: ien', 30 July 1997. 
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planning and military affairs and the civilian 'layer' of defence officials remained 
very thin and powerless. 
In Lithuania, the conflict over the role and place of the defence minister and 
army commander had a similar background to Poland and originated in the power 
struggle between two parties over the scope of responsibilities of the president and 
the government in defence and military policy. The law passed in 1993, thanks to 
the support of post-communist parliamentarians, established the post of the 
Commander of the Armed Forces (equivalent to the Chief of General Staff) and 
provided it with considerable autonomy, simultaneously strengthening the powers of 
the president in the management of defence. The goal of the legislators was to 
undermine the position of the minister of defence and the law largely eliminated him 
from the chain of command. 30 Such a move was driven by current political 
calculations because the post of the minister was held by an opposition politician 
after the 1992 electoral victory of the post-communist party. However, in the long 
run the awkward solution appeared harmful to the development of mechanisms for 
democratic control and the system was rectified by the Law on the National Defence 
Organisation of 1998. This act introduced a new structure of military command and 
control of Lithuanian army and changed the relations inside the MOD, particularly 
through strengthening the position of the minister again. 
Under the Law, the Commander of the Armed Forces is strictly subordinated to 
the Minister of Defence, and through the Minister to the President of the Republic. 
The Commander has a strategic command authority and is the head of the 
"0 Albert M. Zaccor, 'Lithuania's New Army', The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, 
June 1994, p. 216; Albert M. Zaccor, 'Problems in the Baltic Armed Forces', The Journal of Slavic 
Military Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 1995, p. 66 
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Integrated Defence Staff (General Staff). He is responsible for drafting the force 
planning and personnel levels requirements, force structures and procurement needs. 
His plans are then submitted through the Minister for financial evaluation. Finally, 
the Commander is the chief advisor to the president and the minister on security 
issues. 31 
Under the Lithuanian system, the Minister of Defence is closely connected to the 
President and together they constitute the State Defence Civil Authority. Within this 
body, they jointly exercise the National Command Authority which runs from the 
President to the Minister of Defence, then through the Commander of the Armed 
Forces to the lower level command, that is the Operational Forces Commander. 32 
The 1998 Law on the Organisation of National Defence clarified the operational 
chain of command and preserved civilian control. However, that character of 
command system seems in need of streamlining the structures. The complicated 
subordination of the military commander, partly to the minister and the government, 
partly and (indirectly) to the president, blurs the division of powers and lines of 
responsibility in defence management. The organisation of the management system 
also appears to breach the cohesion of the government, because the minister's 
subordination is split between two executive bodies. The same institutional design 
provoked a heated political struggled in Poland in the early 1990s and similarly in 
Lithuanian case, it has a potential for internal conflict in the MOD. 
31 'The Roles of the Executive and the Parliament: A Lithuanian Perspective', by Vidmantas Purlys, 
Director, Defence Planning Division, Lithuanian Ministry of Defence, at the seminar Security in Z= 
Democratic Societies -A Parliamentary Seminar, 20 - 24 July 1998, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 
Germany, unpublished, p. 6. 
32 Overview. Lithuanian National Defence System '99 (Republic of Lithuania: Ministry of National 
Defence, 1999), pp. 6-7; Law on the Organisation (? f'the National Dqfence ývstem and Military 
Service, article 14, Purlys, *The Roles', p. 6. 
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Advisory Bodies. 
The existence of various advisory bodies within the government 
administration in itself does not constitute any breach of democratic principles of 
civil-military relations. On the contrary, such institutions can perform important 
roles in defence and military management and control, identify problems and 
propose solutions to the policy makers. Yet, the functioning of those bodies in 
mature democracies is regulated by law and long standing practice, therefore the 
depth of their 'reach' in military and security management and political leverage is 
predictable and under control. 
Similar bodies proper in defence and security policy were set up in many 
post-communist countries within the structures of presidential or government 
administration. In most cases, however, those bodies constituted a direct 
continuation of the communist structures for defence management and control, and 
their existence and functioning in post-communist states was either based on very 
vague legal foundations or was far beyond constitutional stipulations. Often the 
close relationship of those advisory bodies with the government administration made 
them parties to the power contest over defence and military prerogatives. 
Consequently, the political leverage of the advisory institutions often far surpassed 
the position originally envisaged for it in the defence system. As it was, the degree 
of accommodation of the advisory bodies into the entire legal and procedural system 
of defence and military management turned out to be a good indicator of the strength 
of the system itself. 
In Poland, the competency conflict 'spilled over' to other political bodies and 
turned them into instruments of contest between the president and the government. 
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Distorting the functioning of advisory bodies was not very difficult in view of the 
legislative gaps, overlaps and obsolete regulations still valid in Poland, and so the 
two main bodies proper for defence and military affairs, the governmental 
KSOR N433 and presidential KOK, 34 because of their affiliations, became natural 
opponents. 
With the progress of democratisation of civil-military relations in Poland, the 
governmental body KSORM turned into a professional advisory institution and by 
and large withdrew from political competition. The story of the Home Defence 
Committee (KOK) was more complicated. KOK was originally a communist supra- 
governmental body proper in defence and military management and as such played a 
significant role in the introduction and administration of the martial law in Poland in 
1981. The Round Table agreement also provided it with substantial executive 
prerogatives in defence policy and made the president its chairman. Therefore, there 
were wide expectations that KOK would soon be disbanded after the election of the 
first non-communist president. Instead, president Walqsa, even before constitutional 
regulations subordinated KOK to himself, used this institution in his pursuit of 
power. 
The Home Defence Committee provided Walqsa with control over the 
military and police. 35 The prerogatives of KOK were confirmed by the amended Bill 
on Universal Military Service of 21 November 1967 36 and Walesa insisted on their 
maintenance despite its unconstitutional character after the adoption of the Little 
3S Committee for Defence Affairs of the Council of Ministers. 
34 Home Defence Committee. 
35 Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil - Militaty Relations and NA TO Expansion, McNair Paper, 
No 39 (Washington D. C. Institute for National Strategic Studies: 1996), pp. 118 - 119. 
36 Dziennik Ustaw 1992, No 4. title 16. 
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Constitution. 37 The responsibilities of the KOK comprised drafting military doctrine 
and reform plans, but also proposing the introduction of emergency state, martial law 
and calling mobilization if necessary. The 1992 military doctrine was essentially 
prepared by the Home Defense Conunittee, chaired by the President, and rival 
proposals were rejected. By then, the inter-agency competition between the advisory 
bodies was already high and the role of KOK was mostly disruptive to the military 
reform. 38 Without waiting for proper constitutional regulations, on 13 December 1991 
Walqsa issued a presidential decree which sanctioned the existence of KOK and 
created the National Security Bureau (BBN). This second body was to serve as an 
administrative support to KOK. 
The Little Constitution did not confirm the further existence of KOK nor its 
competencies, instead it provided for the creation of the National Security Council 
(RBN). The same advisory body was included in the articles of the Constitution of 
1998 which described RBN as a presidential advisory body in matters of internal 
and external security of the state. Still, president Walqsa ignored the article of the 
Little Constitution and maintained KOK in existence until his departure from office 
in 1995. His successor made several attempts to create RBN as a cross-party 
advisory body, but failed. In the end, the Home Defence Committee was tacitly 
dissolved, the National Security Council was not formed and the vacuum was filled 
by the National Security Bureau (BBN), which was originally created only as an 
auxiliary body to KOK. Despite the unconstitutional character of this body and 
general lack of proper legal regulations defining its activity and responsibilities for 
,7 Interview with Kazimierz Nalaskowski, Director, Lelgal Department, Polish MOD, Warsaw, April 
1997. 
'8 Stanislaw Koziej. National Defý, nce Management qfthe Republic qf Poland (Warsaw: MOD, 
1996), pp. 38 - 40. 
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state defence and security, BBN grew to become one of the most influential political 
bodies in post-communist Poland, and its chief constantly strives to acquire even 
greater political leverage in defence. In pursuit of power enhancement, he among 
other things revived the competency controversy regarding the presidential 
responsibilities as a Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces which threaten the 
return of bitter executive conflict on the management of civil-military relations. 
The Czech Republic also experienced certain problems related to advisory 
bodies in defence policy, however the scale of the problems were small and 
proportional to the low intensity of political conflict in the country. Until 1993, the 
presidential Defence Council was the most influential body in defence and security 
affairs. It consisted of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, of Interior, of 
Foreign Affairs, of the Economy and selected military experts and was chaired by 
the President. In Czechoslovakia, the Council had executive powers; after the break 
- up of the Federation it was, however, transformed into a mere consultative and 
advisory body. 39 
In keeping with the general political trend, the prerogatives of the presidential 
Council were transferred to the governmental State Security Council, which was 
chaired by the Prime Minister and involved the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Defence, Interior and Finance. Its task is to co-ordinate national defence planning 
and preparations, supervise the implementation of particular activities in this realm 
and evaluate concepts, documents and reports related to the national defence. The 
works of the State Security Council were supplemented by the activities of two 
'9 Antonin Sv&dk, 'Democratic Control of Armed Forces in the Czech Republic', in Conference on 
Civil - Alilitatýv Relations in the Context of an Evolving NATO (Budapest: Ministry of 
Defence/Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 - 17 September 1997, p. 212. 
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standing committees within the Council that is Defence Planning and Civil 
Emergency Planning. 40 Parallel to the process of reinforcing government expert 
bodies, the role of the presidential council was systematically curtailed, then 
replaced 
Given the dominant position of the Czech government in the conduct of defence 
and military affairs, the creation of a governmental agency responsible for the 
national defence would have been a logical and desirable step to speed up the 
military and defence restructuring. This, however, was not the main cause of the 
reshuffle. The setting up of both committees was more an element of political rivalry 
between the prime minister and the president, in which prime minister Klaus 
gradually limited the influence of the president on military and defence 
management. 41 However, the lack of interest of Vaclav Klaus in defence policy was 
widely known, therefore the two bodies did not perform a significant role beyond 
the function of instruments in the political contest. Once this role was accomplished, 
the government lost interest in the bodies and in defence affairs. The governmental 
councils revived after 1997 in the course of preparations for a military legislative 
package, however even on this occasion the work on the legal system was marked 
by political rivarly. 42 The inter-agency rivalry setting of the bodies contributed to 
politicisation of defence policy in the Czech Republic, yet the influence was short 
term and passed with the settlement of the political situation. 
40 Nastoupil, 'Current Czech', pp. 120 - 12 1. 
41 Interview with general Karel PezI, September 1999. 
42 Interview with Stanislav Stach, Institute for Strategic Studies, Czech Republic, August 1997 and Jifi 
Sedivy, Director, Institute of International Relations, Prague, interview in Birmingham, October 
2000. 
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Defence policy of Ukraine was politicised to a much greater degree than in 
the Czech Republic or other case countries, and the presidential Council of National 
Security and Defence of Ukraine played a crucial role in the military and defence 
affairs of the state throughout its independent existence. The body was formally 
established in June 1992 by president Kravchuk's decree with a task of co- 
ordinating various aspects of national security policy. Later the Constitution 
included the Council in its regulations, giving it a solid legal base. However, soon 
the real importance and political leverage of the CNSD surpassed its original 
advisory function and continued steadily increasing. The statutory function of the 
NSDC comprised the elaboration of a general strategy for national security, internal 
security included, proposals for reform of the defence sector, prevention and 
monitoring of emergencies and the co-ordination of executive bodies in charge of 
security in emergency or in war. 43 The influential National Institute for Strategic 
Studies also constitutes part of the Council and was mainly responsible for 
conceptual work on the strategy and policy of Ukrainian defence. 44 The NSDC was 
chaired by the President who appointed the members of the Council. However, the 
Prime Minister, his deputy for security affairs and the remaining power ministers 
were statutory members of that body. From October 1994 the NSDC secretaries 
acquired the status of official presidential advisors on national security, which in 
reality gave them the position of the second most important state officials in 
Ukrainian defence with a decisive voice on most defence policy issues. Thus, the 
Council practically monopolised the creation of defence and security policy in 
43 Alexander Goncharenko, Ukrainian - Russian Relations: an Unequal Partnership (London: RUSI, 
1995), pp. 30 - 34. 
44 Interview with Alexander Manachinsky, National Institute for Strategic Studies, Kiev, Ukraine, 
October 1997. 
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Ukraine and partly replaced the parliament in its supervisory function and in the role 
45 
of elaborating legislative regulations in the field . 
The NSDC functioned within the framework of laws and procedures 
sufficiently defining its composition and responsibilities. However, its position and 
leverage did not stem from legal regulations, but from the position of the Council 
within the executive structure and from close links with the president. This was the 
corollary of the institutional weakness of the defence management system in 
Ukraine: the president was the real source of power and prestige for the Council, and 
he dictated the scope and limits of the political leverage of the Council. Together, 
the president and the NSDC dominated the entire field of defence and military 
related issues, and further overbalanced the already undemocratic distribution of 
powers designed in the Ukrainian Constitution. The members of the Council and the 
supporting academic bodies, like NISS, are made up of a great majority of military 
personnel, either delegated from active service or retired, and maintain close 
relations with the General Staff and the highest military commanders in the 
Ukrainian army. Therefore, the proposals of defence strategy, policy or reforms 
worked out by the Council, by and large represent the views of the military in 
Ukraine, without taking into account alternative solutions. Moreover, the members 
of the Council spent their professional careers in the Soviet military and this legacy 
is visible particularly in the profile of strategic thinking and the deep rooted distrust 
of Western models and assistance. 46 
'5 Commentary by Tadeusz Olszafiski, Pr: edruki -- prasy ukraifiskiej 
(Reprints from Ukrainian Press) 
(Warszawa: O§rodek Studi6w Wschodnich, December 1997). p. 1. 
46 Interview with Manachinsky, NISS, Kiev, October 1997. Interview with Rafal Seniuch, Director 
and Chief Ukrainian Specialist , 
Department of International Security, Polish MOD, Warsaw, 
December 2000. 
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The National Security and Defence Council represents an important expert 
body with a considerable pool of the best defence specialists available in the 
Ukraine with good access to both up-to-date information and key decision-makers. 
This alone gives this body a great potential for policy-making, and this potential 
could certainly be used for the sake of military reform. However, in the 
undemocratic constitutional design of civil-military relations in the Ukraine the 
power and influence in defence and military policy is concentrated in the hands of 
the president with the NSDC playing the role of a presidential body for preparing 
and executing defence and military policy. The coupling of the president and the 
NCSD restricted the development of the strategic planning capabilities outside the 
team, and the Council helped the president to monopolise the control of the military 
in Ukraine. 
Lithuania, for reasons stated many times already, did not inherit advisory 
bodies from the Soviet system. Instead, it created the legal framework for the 
creation of several institutions with specific competencies in the realm of national 
defence. 47 In an effort to comply with NATO standards for civil-military relations, 
the Lithuanian authorities even established a special Civil-Military Relations Office 
in the Ministry of Defence to monitor the developments in the course of 
transformation and propose appropriate solutions. 48 However, only one advisory 
body acquired a more prominent status and this was the State Defence Council. 
47 See Law on the Basics qf'National Security, Republic of Lithuania, Vilnus, December 19,1996, No 
Vill - 19. 
" Algirdas V. Kanauka, 'Virtues and Pitfalls of Civilian Control of the Military', in 'Conference on 
Civil - Military Relations in the Context qý'an Evolving AIATO' (Budapest: Ministry of Defence 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 1997), p. 57. 
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In keeping with the model dominant in post-communist countries, the 
Council was situated in the structure of presidential administration and chaired by 
the president. The body consists of the Prime Minister, the Chairpersons of the 
parliament, the Minister of National Defence and the Commander of the Armed 
Forces (equivalent to the Chief of General Staff). Formally, the task of the Council 
is to 'consider and co-ordinate the key matters of state defence', 49 that is planning, 
supervision and development of the national defence strategy. 50 The Council is the 
chief advisory board to the president, however, thanks to a more democratic and 
advanced legislative framework of regulations in defence policy, the Council did not 
attempt to perform executive functions. The main advantage of this body is its 
access to first hand information from the president and the minister of defence 
through the so called National Command Authority. Difficult access to information 
is the common problem in the post-communist countries, therfore in Lithuania the 
presidential advisory body was better situated to supervise the military than the 
parliamentary committee itself 
Parliamentary Committees 
Effective parliamentary overseeing of the military remains one of the basic 
principles of democratic civilian control and a hallmark of democratic management. 
The legislative supervision 'implies authority to investigate the general policy 
process, to determine the allocation of public funds, and to ensure that the defence 
policy stays within the guidelines set by the legislature'. 51 But, while the legislating 
49 Law on the Basics. Chapter 16, p. 20. 
50 aerview, p. 6, Fig. 1. 
5' Ben Lombardi, 'An Overview of Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe, The 
Journal QfSlavic Alilitary Studies, Vol. ] 2. No. ], March 1999, p. 23. 
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role and to a lesser extent the 'power of the purse' are performed in its most 
important stages by the parliament on plenary sessions, the day-to-day military 
oversight tasks can only be realised by relevant parliamentary committees. Their 
prerogatives stem from the powers of the parliament enshrined in the Constitution, 
constitutional laws and parliamentary statutes. However, the real scope and limits 
for committees supervisory activity are set by the amount of information and 
expertise available to the parliamentarians, by the degree of co-operation from the 
supervised institutions and by the ability of the committee to execute its demands 
and implement recommendations. Therefore, the letter of law is insufficient to 
ensure a proper parliamentary scrutiny. In addition to legal empowerment, 
parliaments must enjoy sufficient levels of prestige and organisational capabilities to 
perform its supervisory functions. Therefore, the effectiveness of parliamentary 
control over the military is a good indicator of the maturity of democratic civil- 
military relations in the post-communist countries. 
In Poland, the recognition of the parliamentary role in the supervision of the 
military came rather late, due to the dominant position of the executive in defence 
management and to the considerable autonomy gained by the military during 
Walqsa's presidency. Paradoxically, however, it was the most scandalous affairs in 
the history of post-communist civil-military relations in Poland, the so-called 
Drawsko affairs, that brought a decisive breakthrough in the development of 
parliamentary control. 
Initially, the weak and fragmented post-communist parliament was unable to 
perform the controlling function. Instability in Polish domestic politics, intra- 
executive conflict, the legislature's own institutional weakness and lack of expert 
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support precluded the emergence of the parliamentary committee as an agent of 
civilian oversight. In addition, the MPs themselves did not fully understand or 
appreciate the importance of parliamentary control of the military for post- 
communist civil-military relations. For example, in 1991 the members of the 
Committee of National Defence opposed the idea of nominating a civilian minister 
of defence arguing that a non-military minister could cause a decline in the security 
of the state. 
52 
The heated competency conflict between the president and the prime minister 
and the growing political involvement of the military led to the scandalous Drawsko 
affair in 1994, which was the lowest point in the Polish democratic transition. At an 
official dinner at the Drawsko training grounds, inspired by the president Walqsa, 
the high ranking officers gathered at the table took an informal vote of no- 
confidence against the then minister of defence admiral Piotr Koldziejczyk. The 
scandalous vote took place in the presence of president Walqsa, the Chief of General 
Staff gen. Tadeusz Wilecki and Secretary of State in the Chancellery of the 
President, Mieczyslaw Wachowski, and none of them intervened. Instead, the results 
of the vote prompted president Walqsa to call for the minister's resignation. 53 Even 
more scandalous was the reaction of the government. The Prime Minister, ignoring 
the parliamentary investigation launched into the affair, dismissed Minister 
Kolodziejczyk and did not oppose military awards and promotions from the 
president to the officers involved in the infamous meeting. 54 
52 Bulletin of the Session of the National Defence Committee of the First Parliament, II December 
1991. 
533 interview with admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk, former Minister of National Defence in Poland, 
Gdynia, July 1997. 
54 Michta, Soldier-Citi--en, p. 92. 
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The Drawsko affair and its aftermath represented a short term victory for 
president Walqsa who gained the upper hand in the competency conflict with the 
government by consolidating the autonomy of the General Staff under his 
patrimonial protection. Drawsko was also an open violation of the principles of 
democratic civilian control and immediately after the scandal it further undermined 
the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight of the military. 55 The results of this 
empowerment of the General Staff came before long. The military frequently and 
56 
publicly criticised politicians and reforms, and in August 1995, during the official 
celebrations of the anniversary of the 1920 Battle of Warsaw, the Chief of General 
Staff general Wilecki again shocked public opinion. He delivered an unauthorised 
speech, bitterly criticising reform of the armed forces and viciously attacking the 
political elite regardless of the presence of the president and the prime minister at 
the celebrations. 57 
But, despite its immediate dire consequences for democratic consolidation in 
Poland, in the long run the Drawsko affair had a healing effect on democratic 
transformation. The deep crisis provoked by the military involvement in the 
domestic political situation and foreign criticism of Polish civil-military relations 
encouraged the parliament to assert a more active role and make use of the available 
legal instruments of military supervision. The parliamentary Internal Regulations 
55 James Gow, Carol Birch, Security and Democracy. - Civil - Military Relations in Central And 
Eastern Europe, London Defence Studies No 40 (London: published by Brasseys for Centre for 
Defence Studies, September 1997), pp. 31 - 32; Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Ze s--c--yt6w do NATO (From 
Mountain Peaks to NATO - in Polish) (Warszawa: Bellona, 1999), pp. 211 - 214. 
56 For example colonel Wieslaw Rozbicki, 'Po;., egnanie z broniq', (Farewell to Arrns) Ga--eta 
Wyborcýa, 12 July 1996; interview with Colonel Krzysztof Pornmes, Deputy Director of Public 
Relations Office., Polish MOD, June 1997. 
57 M ichta, Soldier - Citizen, p. 93. 
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Act58 admitted three types of committees: standing committees, ad hoc committees 
and investigative committees, which can be formed by the parliament for the 
investigation of a particular issue and which operate under the regime of criminal 
law. Until 1995, such investigations did not take place in the military. After 
Drawsko, the Committee for National Defence appointed a Special Sub-Committee 
under the chairmanship of the head of the Committee, to carry out an investigation 
of the events at the famous dinner. The investigation was closed with the concluding 
report which included condemnation of the action of the military officers and 
indirectly of the president for engaging the military in politics, and advocated the 
punishment of the officers involved. The report also recommended several more 
general remedial measures to improve democratic civilian control of the military in 
Poland, among them rapid legislative action and clear division of the areas of 
executive competency. 59 
At the time of the investigation, the parliamentary action and its results were 
politically ignored by the government, the president and the General Staff. However, 
the lesson was not lost on the military. 60 The hearings conducted by the 
parliamentarians came as a shock to most officers summoned by the Sub-Committee 
and made them realise the full extent of the political consequences of the scandal. 
Moreover, the more distant consequences of the involvement in the Drawsko plot 
constituted a warning to the officer corps that political involvement would not pay 
58 Regulamin Sejmu RP, (Parliamentary regulations) Monitor Riqdowy 1992, No 26, item 185 (with 
amendments). 
ýq Longin Pastusiak (Associate Rapporteur), Civilian Control qfthe Armed Forces oj'the Republic oj' Zý 
Poland DrqfiSpecial Report, Working Group on Transatlantic and European Organisation, pp. 3 - 5. 
60 Interview with Bronislaw Komorowski, chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for National 
Defence, Warsaw, October 1999, former member of special Sub-Committee investigating Drawsko 
affair. 
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off in the long run. In spite of the promotions and awards received by the officers 
involved in the infamous dinner, all of them were released from military service in 
the next few years. The second lesson learnt by the military was that the ministers of 
defence and their deputies by and large come from among the members of the 
Committee for National Defence and so the opinion of the parliamentarians was not 
entirely irrelevant to their career prospects. 61 
The Drawsko affair and the launching of the parliamentary investigation 
were the real breakthroughs in the civil-military relations of post-communist Poland. 
For the very first time the legislature in general and the parliamentary Committee for 
National Defence in particular executed its prerogatives in control of the military 
and preceded with the investigation despite a generally unfavourable political 
environment for such activities. The subsequent passing of the Law on the Office of 
Minister of Defence further reinforced the supervisory role of the parliament 
through the empowerment of the government/ minister of defence at the expense of 
the president. Moreover, the legislature proved capable of breaking a political 
deadlock regarding executive management of the military and defence affairs and 
reversing trends dangerous for the consolidation of democracy. 
The relative success of the parliament in asserting its important role in the 
management of civil-military relations was later confinned by several other events. 
The parliament was the institution that gained most prestige in the eyes of the 
professional military between 1993 and 1995 (see the table below). Secondly, the 
second big investigation launched after the November 1998 crash of military plane 
Iskra during an air show while celebrating Independence Day led to the subsequent 
dismissal (however honorary) of the much criticised Air Force Commander, gen. 
61 Interviews with Bronislaw Komorowski and General Wfadyslaw Stelmaszuk, former Polish Chief 
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62 Dziok. This was so despite the fact that the conclusions of the parliamentary 
investigation differed from the findings of the military investigation team. While 
the military blamed equipment failure, the parliament stressed mistakes in 
performance of command and control tasks on that day. Finally, recognition of the 
significance of good co-operation with the parliament by the Polish MOD and the 
issuing of an internal document, explaining the controlling function of the 
parliament and recommending good relations and contacts on routine basis, were 
also a measure of the success of the parliament in establishing itself as a supervisory 
body of post-communist military management. 63 
Opinions of the Professional Military on the Activities of the Main Institutions 
and Organisations between 1993 and 1995.64 Numbers indicate the result of 
subtracting negative opinions from positive ones. 
INSTITUTION 1993 1994 1995 
GOVERNMENT 4 37 31 
PRESIDENT -20 -38 -45 
SEJM (LOWER CHAMBER OF 
PARLIAMENT) 
-63 38 31 
of General Staff 1989 - 1992, Warsaw, September 1997. 
62 Marek Henzler, 'Doczolgaý siq do NATO' (To crawl down to NATO), Polityka, No 48,28 
November 1998. 
63 Wsp6lpraca Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej Z Sejmem i Senatem Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (Co- 
operation of the MOD with the lower and upper chambers of the Parliament), in Polish, internal 
document of the Polish MOD, courtesy of minister Robert Lipka, Under-Secretary of State for Social 
and Parliamentary Affairs, Polish MOD, whom I interviewed in October 1998. 
64 Source: Czeslaw Ochenduszka, ýwiadomoýý oby-watelska i orientu(je spoleczno - polityczne 
. ýrodowisk wqjskowy, ch. Dynamika przemian i cechy s--czeg6lne (Citizen Consciousness and social 
and political orientation of the military. Dynamics of change and its characteristic features. ), in 
Polish, (Warszawa: WIBS, January 1997), p. 32. 
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No such scandals marked the process of establishing the parliamentary 
overseeing of the military in the Czech Republic. The combination of the political 
tradition of sustainable democracy in Czech lands and the early adoption of the post- 
communist constitution ensured the relative stability of the post-communist political 
system in the Republic and effective institutionalisation of the Czech polity. In the 
course of legislative reform, the Czech parliament acquired standard democratic 
law-making and supervisory powers, and its formal structure and regulations 
enabled the creation and proper functioning of parliamentary committees. 6-5 
The parliamentary Defence and Security Committee is the principal 
parliamentary body for dealing with proposals pertaining to defense and military 
issues, mediating exchange of information between the MOD and the parliament, 
giving opinions on security issues and having the right of intervention in matters of 
public interest. The Czech parliament also has investigative prerogatives and may 
establish special investigative commissions. In addition to the Security and Defence 
Committee, the Budget and Foreign Affairs Committees execute control over the 
military in selected fields. 66 
In reality, however, parliamentary control of the military in the Czech 
Republic is not very strong or effective. The legislative control is generally 
characterised by formal strength, reinforced by the attachment of the Czech 
population to the principle of military subordination to democratically elected 
politicians, and a functional weakness. The formal controlling prerogatives of the 
parliamentary committee are extensive, however, the parliamentarians meet a 
'5 On the organisation, character and composition of the parliamentary committees in the Czech 
le0lislature see Jana Reschovd, Jindri§ka Syllovd, 'The Legislature of the Czech Republic', in David 
M. Olson, Philip Norton. The New Parlionients of Central and Eastern Europe (London and Portland, 
Oregon: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 101 - 104. 
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number of obstacles in executing their supervisory rights. As the record of the 
Defence and Security Committee demonstrated, the Committee rarely challenged the 
government on legislative grounds or rejected the executive proposals of regulations 
in the field of security and defence. As a rule, the cabinet's initiatives were approved 
without major interference. Moreover, despite serious delays in the preparation of 
the military legislative framework, the Czech parliamentary organs did little to speed 
up the process. 67 Lack of institutional support, organisational capabilities and 
financial resources were often indicated as a source of insufficient activity of the 
parliamentary committee. 68 However, equally the sheer lack of interest in military 
security was frequently a reason for neglect of defence problernatique. The low 
levels of attendance at the Committee sessions were noted with distress by Czech 
analysts; for example Otto Pick complained that 'less than half of the members 
participated at the committee meeting that was held to decide whether the Czech 
Republic should acquire MIG-29s in exchange for Russian debt' - 
69 The distribution 
of responsibilities among the committees left the Security and Defence Committee 
in charge of internal security and police issues as well as military and national 
defence. Therefore, on numerous occasions the activities of the Committee were 
66 Sv6rdk, 'Democratic control', p. 212. 
67 Interview with Petr Neýas, chairman of the Security and Defense Committee, Prague, Czech 
Republic, September 1999. 
68 Interview with Petr Neýas and Captain ýtefan Sarv8, Senior Research Associate. Research 
Department, Czech MOD, Prague, September 1999. 
'9 Otto Pick. 'Contribution', in BeIiind Declarations. Civil - Military, Relations in Central Europe 
(papers presented at the workshop in Budapest, March 22- 23,1996). Defence Studies, special edition 
(Budapest: Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, 1996), p. 20. 
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focused rather on police matters, thinking it far more important to Czech citizens 
than military affairs. 70 
The Czech model of parliamentary control of the military features a very 
strong emphasis on control of finances and material resources. Right of budget 
approval and monitoring of its execution are the most effective controlling 
instruments in the hands of Czech MPs. The Czechs achieved greatest progress in 
the implementation of the budget planning systems based on NATO models, and in 
the introduction of budget transparency. However, the power of the purse does not 
rest primarily with the Defence and Security Committee, rather it is concentrated in 
the Budget Committee, from where it goes to the plenary sessions. Therefore, the 
stress on control through the budget somewhat degraded the Defence and Security 
Committee in its controlling role. 71 
The political tradition of democracy in the Czech lands ensured military 
respect for parliament and facilitated the establishment of channels of democratic 
control. However, apart from the lack of interest in defence matters, the Czech 
parliament shares the common problem of all post-communist parliamentary 
committees, that is the weakness of professional expert support and absence of 
permanent background facilities. 72 The situation is likely to continue in the Czech 
case, due to a low political priority for military affairs, absence of investment in 
educating tearns of experts and a general lack of civilian experts. 73 
"' Interview with ýtefan Sarvaý and Dr Petr Veit, Deputy Director, LegislativeDepartment, Czech 
MOD, Prague, September 1999. 
71 Interview with Petr N&as. Prague, September 1999. 
72 Reschovd, Syllový, 'The Legislature', p. 103. 
71 Interview with Petr Netas, Prague, September 1999. 
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In Ukraine, the functional weakness of parliamentary control was far more 
conspicuous than in the case of Czech Republic and can be attributed both to the 
institutional weakness of the legislature and external political factors conditioning its 
performance and effectiveness. The Ukrainian legislature underwent a rapid 
transition from a largely powerless and provincial body under the communist system 
to the parliament of an independent state, but the speed and conditions of this 
transformation did not allow for the proper institutional isation of this body, 
development of internal structure and assertion of important political roles. Instead, 
the Ukrainian parliament remained to a great degree a Soviet institution in transition, 
additionally hampered by the lack of pre-communist experience of parliamentary 
rule in Ukraine. 
74 
The parliament in the post-Soviet Ukraine featured amorphous internal 
structures and generally low levels of party loyalty, discipline or even identification 
with its own background structures, although the situation somewhat improved after 
the 1994 elections. The parliamentary electoral procedure was the source of political 
weakness of the legislature because its regulations practically excluded the 
possibility of electing all 450 deputies in one round. In the 1994 parliamentary 
elections, for example, there were six consecutive rounds of voting and even then 
75 
only 405 deputies out of the total of 450 were elected . Such an unstructured and 
politically vulnerable body was no match for the Ukrainian president neither in 
74 Stanley Bach, 'From Soviet to parliament in Ukraine: the Verhovna Rada During 1992 - 94', in 
David M. Olson, Philip Norton, The New Parliaments QfCentral and Eastern Europe (London: Frank 
Cass Ltd., 1996), pp. 214 - 223. 
7' Roman Solchanyk, 'Ukraine: The Politics of Reform', Problems qf Post-Communism, Vol. 42, No. 
6, Nov. /Dec. 1995, p. 48. 
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76 
scope of constitutional rights, political leverage, nor in social prestige. The 
conflict over the constitution of 1996 further weakened the parliament in its relation 
to the president and his administration. 
The articles of the Ukrainian constitution and laws provided the basic legal 
instruments for parliament to oversee defence policy and the military. The 
combination of the budgetary powers, law-making rights, and investigative 
prerogatives to set up a temporary investigative commission, formed a sufficient 
legal framework for at least rudimentary supervision. However, in reality the 
Ukrainian parliamentary Committee for Defence and Security of the State failed to 
build up appropriate mechanisms of control and the supervisory role is extremely 
limited, chiefly by the president. 
There are three fundamental problems hampering the effectiveness of the 
Committee works. The first obstacle in developing mechanisms of democratic 
control is the uncooperative attitude of the post-Soviet military, their tendency to 
preserve maximum secrecy in defence planning and distrust of civilians intruding 
into military affairs. The 'expert problem, the second great obstacle encountered by 
the parliamentary committees, is Partly the result of this secrecy. The MPs 
themselves lacked necessary knowledge in defence matters, and do not have a 
supporting team of experts due to financial constraints and sheer lack of non- 
military specialists. The expertise deficiency in Ukraine was in fact so acute that 
during work on the military reform, the parliamentarians became merely an addition 
to the MOD board of experts. Grytsenko observed in 1998 that 
" In the survey of trust in public institutions and political leaders carried out in May 1995, the 
Supreme Council scored only 2.09 in the scale from 5 (full trust) to I (no trust) and found itself in a 
very distinct place, behind, for example, the Security Services and police. Original source: Post- 
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the role of the current Parliamentary Committee has been limited to 
participation of its leaders in the MOD Board meetings and the NSDC 
meeting to discuss military issues ... [The Committee members] 
did not urge 
the Parliament to intervene in the defence planning process. They did not 
seem to be ready to provide the necessary political and financial guidance 
needed to ensure military reform in general and the reform of the Armed 
Forces in particular. 77 
Finally, the inability of the members of the parliament to work out a viable 
and sustainable compromise regarding the security and defence policy was 
responsible for the dramatic weakness of parliamentary supervision. The works in 
the Committee featured the same political divisions as the entire political scene in 
Ukraine and so the Committee members often presented sharp differences of 
opinions to the military and the remaining political actors. 78 It further undermined 
the prestige of the parliamentary Committee for the Defence and Security of the 
State and left civil-military control entirely in the hands of the president. 
Lithuania overcame an institutional legacy of the Soviet system much more 
effectively than Ukraine and managed to organise and establish the parliamentary 
Committee on National Security and Defence as a competent supervisory organ in a 
relatively short time. The difference between the two post-Soviet countries was not 
just in the tradition - or its lack - of modem government and its institutions, but in 
the post-communist legislative framework and its application. Lithuania adopted an 
Postup, No 23/ )995, quoted in Binletyn UkraMmki, No 7/8 (Warszawa: Oýrodek Studi6w 
Wschodnich, July-August 1995). p. 19. 
7' Grytsenko, Defence Reform, p. 26. 
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approach of regulating everything possible by constitution and law, down to the 
smallest detail. And so the principles of democratic control of the military were 
enshrined in numerous documents, beginning with the Constitution, through the Law 
on Basic National Security, down to the detailed procedures of defence 
management. 7) The great importance attached by the Lithuanian authorities to the 
establishment of democratic civil-military relations in connection with NATO 
enlargement helped establish effective mechanisms of civilian control over the 
military, also in the parliament. 
The formal prerogatives of the parliamentary committees were established in 
the Statutes of parliament and they comprised reviewing draft laws, including the 
budget law, co-ordination of the work of institutions preparing military legislature, 
consideration of the defence policy of the state, hearings of the candidates to foreign 
military missions, and finally, exercise of civilian parliamentary control over the 
armed forces and other militarised formations of the state. The Committee for 
National DefeDce and Security is authorised to conduct hearings and investigations, 
however, normally the parliament sets up a standing committee if the need to 
investigate a special issue arises. 8() Thus, the legal regulations provide a full range of 
instruments necessary for parliament to effectively oversee the military. In 
Lithuania, however, just as in other case countries, the law only created the basis for 
the effective parliamentary supervision and its real effectiveness depended on a 
number of other factors which set limits on this power. 
78 See the statements of Stephan Khmara and Yaroslava Illyasievivha, members of the Committee for 
Defence and Security of the State, in in 'Sud i Osud. Ministr Oboroni, pp. 87 - 91 & 98 - 103. 
79 Interview with Dr At-idras Katkus, MP, Chairman of the Seimas Committee on National Security 
and Defence, Lithuanian Parliament, Vilnus, February 2000-, White Paper '99, Ministry of National 
Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, Vilnus 1999, p. 25. 
Statutes of the Scimas, available at htto:, '/wýN'w. )rs. It 
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Although the National Security Committee managed to consolidate its 
structures and, by 1999, became the second largest committee in the parliament, 
nevertheless it encountered similar problems in performing its functions as in other 
post-communist countries. One problem was expert support which in Lithuania was 
particularly acute because of the rejection of former Soviet officers and defence 
specialists and lack of civilians educated in military matters. The Committee was 
forced to rely predominantly on the advice of the retired military and even those 
were sometimes in short supply. 81 Limited resources and insufficient support 
facilities certainly did not ease the performance of parliamentary supervision. 
It appears however that in Lithuania the reluctance of the institutions 
involved with defence and security, not least the military, was the greatest obstacles 
for effective control. The Committee members commonly had difficulties in 
acquiring timely and accurate information, both from the military and MOD 
officials. 82 Insufficient information and lack of alternative sources limited the 
parliamentary reach into military and defence matters in Lithuania and was by and 
large responsible for the deficiencies in the parliamentary control of the military. 83 
Civilian versus Military Expertise. Security Community. 
Civilian expertise and security community represent the two most 
sophisticated instruments of democratic management of the military and defence 
policy, and they are the hallmarks of mature, democratic civil-military relations, 
"ý Interview with Algoidras Katkus, Vilnus. February 2000. 
82 Interview with Alslidras Katkus, Vilnus, February 2000 and Bartas Trakymas, assistant to the 
Chairman of the Seirnas Committee on National Security and Defence, Lithuanian Parliament, 
Vilnus, February 2000. 
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ensuring the sustainable interest of the public in the military. Without civilian 
experts in defence and a vibrant security community no mode of the military 
management can be really effective and democratic at that. Likewise, those two 
democratic instruments are by definition the least developed tools of democratic 
management of the military in the countries undergoing transition to democracy, 
particularly as they require an underpinning of civic values, civilianised ministries of 
defence, transparency in defence matters and information available outside the 
government system. 
As I have argued many times already, the conditions of post-communism and 
the legacy of the Warsaw Pact were hardly conducive to the emergence of civilian 
expertise and the development of a robust security community anywhere in the 
Central Eastern Europe. In addition to that, the onus put on the re-education of the 
post-communist military by the Western assistance programmes, PfP in particular, 
offered only a few opportunities for the civilians to enhance their knowledge and 
experience within the framework of NATO-sponsored initiatives. As R6ka 
Szemerk6nyi observed, 'Western initiatives ... have all tended to involve a large 
majority of military personnel ... From 
its inception, [PfP] had an excessive military- 
to-military f6cus. ' 84 As a result, the civilianisation of the MODs and other policy- 
making bodies remained relatively shallow, and public debates played only a 
marginal role in the post-communist transformation of civil-military relations. 
Civilianisation of the Ministry of National Defence was Dever a high priority 
in Poland, and although during the decade of post-communist reforms the numbers 
of civilians employed in the ministry went up considerably, the great majority of the 
Purlys, 'The Roles'. 
276 
important advisory positions and many posts of directors in the ministerial 
departments remained staffed by military personnel. 85 The employment rules, 
ensuing from the 1999 enactment of the new regulations for the civil service, 
introduced stringent requirements for the civilians candidates and to some extent 
aggravated the situation of the civilian employees compared to their military 
counterparts, although at the same time it regulated the civilian employment and 
stabilised their legal situation. 96 There is also a great gap in the remuneration and 
social benefits offered to the civilian and military employees, to the disadvantage of 
the former. Most importantly, however, there is a continued reliance on the military 
advice and expertise that is noticeable throughout the government agencies and the 
lingering conviction that the advice offered by the professional soldiers is more 
valuable than that coming from the civilians. Under such circumstances, the 
emergence of the body of professional civilian experts in the defence field will be a 
lengthy processes, if only due to the lack of opportunities for them to gain 
experience. 
The notorious Polish civil-military relations throughout most of the 1990s were 
not on the whole conducive to the emergence of the security community, and the 
introduction of the legal regulations on the protection of confidential and secret 
information compatible with NATO standards in fact worsened the situation by 
narrowing the number of people with access to relevant information and diminishing 
whatever degree of transparency had been previously achieved. 87 Nevertheless, a 
84 Szemerk6nyi., 'Central European', p. 68. 
85 . Stan osobowy ; ýolniery zawodoNAých i praco\,. nik6,, N, Nvojska'. materials of the Department of the 
Social Affairs, I June 1999, courtesy of minister Robert Lipka. 
96 These remarks stem largely from the personal experience and observations of the author who was a 
civil servant in the Polish MOD from 1999. 
97 Interview with Bronislaw Komorowski, Warsaw, October 1999. 
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modicum of a security community was formed in Poland, though in a form of small, 
elite institutions, circulating information and people within a closed circle. The 
Polish Institute for International Affairs (PISM) based in Warsaw has an established 
reputation in the field and publishes the International Af I , 
t, ýirs (Sprawy 
Miqdzynarodowe) quarterly, both in Polish and English. Two other expert Polish 
institutes with high reputations are the Warsaw-based Centre for Eastern Studies 
(O§rodek Bada6 Wschodnich) that specialises in the research of post-communist 
countries and issues a number of regular publications as well as weekly reviews of 
the events in the CIS and former communist countries, and the Institute for Strategic 
Studies in Cracow, which is focused on the studies of security and defence matters, 
especially in the context of NATO enlargement processes and PfP programmes. 
Additionally, the faculty of the International Relations Department of the Warsaw 
University is associated with the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy 
of Sciences and runs the one year programme in Studies of National Security, with 
an offer directed mostly at civilians and the military working, or intending to work-, 
for government bodies. 
While these are promising signs of a budding security community, those non- 
government institutions share one characteristic that deprives them of real 
autonomy. All of them must be somehow well-connected to the executive system of 
defence and security policy, in order to gain money, contacts and information 
necessary for their functioning. Thus, the PISM was for years a part of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and many of its employees were at the same time working for the 
MFA; the founder and the director of the Cracow Institute for Strategic Studies, Mr 
A. Klich, was closely linked with the government coalition and was nominated in 
1999 to the post of deputy-minister of defence after his predecessor, minister 
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Mroziewicz, had to resign on the charges of co-operation with communist special 
services. The Centre for Eastern Studies was set up as a RAND-type institution, and 
it is partly a government agency with limited access to their resources and a 
classified character to some of their projects. Thus, the predominantly elite character 
of the non-governmental institutions dealing with defence issues reduces their 
capacity to generate public debate and does not contribute to increased transparency 
in them. Still, on a few occasions when the public debate on security issues did take 
place in Poland, the greatest of them was related to the Drawsko scandal of 1994 and 
the infamous celebrations of the Battle of Warsaw in 1995. The major role in 
generating the debate was then played not by experts or academics, but by 
journalists, particularly from Gazeta Wyborcza daily newspaper and Polityka 
weekly. The discussion on military matters takes place mostly on the pages of the 
military weekly Polska Zbrojna, but the freedom of opinions of its journalists is 
largely dependent on the actual approach of the minister of defence in office. 88 
The civilianisation of the defence ministry seemed to have a higher priority 
in the Czech Republic than in Poland. The large-scale civilianisation of the MOD 
was initiated in Czechoslovakia by the group of rehabilitated officers and NCOs 
who in December 1989 formed a military union called Obrada. The representatives 
of this organisation soon took the leading positions in the Ministry and carried out 
profound changes in personnel policy towards increased employment of civilian 
staff. 89 By 1997, one third of the MOD personnel was civilian and in the General 
" Conversation with Maria W4growska, Editor-in-Chief, Polska Zbrojna, Warsaw 1999. 
81) Szemerk6nyi, 'Central European', p. 13; interview with Colonel Adam Zaj4c, Polish Military 
Attach6, Embassy of Poland, Prague, September 1999. 
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Staff, the level of civilianisation approached one fifth. 90 This, however, did not 
translate easily into a body of civilian experts. For the most part, the 'civilians' were 
the former military who either retired or were forced out of military positions. 
Moreover, the lack of systematic training, scarce educational opportunities and 
unclear career path put off many employees from long term affiliation with the 
MOD. The low prestige of the military in the Czech Republic was an additional 
factor delaying the progress in civilianisation of the military and hindering the 
development of civilian expertise in defence matters. Moreover, as my interlocutors 
often pointed out, the MOD did not attempt to create an educational system for 
civilian specialists in the defence sector, and the special university courses in 
international relations seldom tackled the defence problematique either. 9) 
The Czech Defence sector achieved a relatively high level of transparency, 
particularly in financial matters in which the Czech public was mostly interested. 
Thanks to the input of the media, 92 the financial aspects of military functions 
provoked a measure of public debate on the utility of the armed forces and its price; 
it also contributed to transparency in the processes of preparing the military 
budget. 93 Yet, in most cases the sensational approach prevailed and the media settled 
for the 'control through scandal' routine and constant criticism, which resulted in the 
"' ýtefan Sarva§, 'Dernocratic Control in the Czech Republic', conference paper, unpublished, 
Groningen, pp. 4-6 March 1999. 
91 Interview with Martin Vavra, Secretary to the Minister, MFA, Czech Republic, Prague, 1999, 
92 Petr Bakowski, 'The Military and the Media in the Czech Republic'. in Behind Declaralions, pp. 
63-66. 
QII Marie Vlachova, ýtefan Sarva§, 'From the Totalitarian to the Post-Totalitarian Military', in Anton 
Bebler (ed. ), Civil - Military Relations in Post-Communist States. Central & Eastern Europe in 
Transition (Westport, Connecticut and London: PRAEGER, 1997), p. 97, 
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military reaction of attempting to limit the amount of information available to the 
public. 94 
The extremely low interest of the public in defence issues practically 
precluded the development of the robust security policy. In fact, the situation 
worsened and not improved during the decade of post-communist reforms. Two 
expert institutions, the Institute for Strategic Studies and the Military Institute for 
Social Research, were dissolved due to a lack of funds. The side effect of this 
decision was the increased dependency of the civilian MOD on the military experts 
from the General Staff, as the closing down of the two prominent institutes rid the 
politicians particularly concerned with the MOD of important analytical tools. 95 The 
only remaining civilian institution of top level personnel and resources was the 
Institute of International Relations, based in Prague, where some of the experts from 
the closed institutes went. The issues related to the military and the civil-military 
relations were also widely studied by the Institute of Sociological Studies, 
particularly within the framework of the public policy projects. The works of many 
of the sociologists associated with the Institute showed a deep understanding of 
policy matters and civil-military relations in the democratic systems, something that 
never showed in the Polish policy papers. 96 However, the Czech institutes were 
likewise the small entities, often isolated from each other and their chances of 
developing into a broad security community remained rather negligible. 
94 Lombardi, 'An Overview', p. 26; Vlachova, Sarvas, 'From Totalitarian', p. 97. 
95 Miroslav Purkrdbek, 'Legitimita a podpora brann6 politiky jako realizAtora vefejn6ho zdjmu', in 
ýtefan Sarv8 a kolektiv výzkumnOho týmu, BezpeCnost a arincida v moderni spoleCnosti (Security 
and the Military in the Modem Societies) (Praha: University Karlovy, Fakulta socidInich v6d), No 6, 
1997, in Czech, p. 95. 
96 See for example ýtefan Sarv8 a kolektiv výzkurnn6ho týrnu, Bezpe(5nost a armýda v moderni 
spolecýnosli (Praha: University Karlovy, Fakulta sociAinich v6d), 6/1997, in Czech. 
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In Ukraine, the situation in defence management can be characterised very 
briefly: deficiency of democratic institutions, lack of civilian experts in defence 
policy and an absence of a democratic security community. 
The mechanisms of effective democratic management remained most 
underdeveloped in Ukraine. There was a situation of deficient democracy, a near 
complete lack of civilian experts and a complete lack of a security community. For 
one thing, the shape of the entire political system inhibited the emergence of a 
strong network of non-governmental organisations, which constitute the backbone of 
the security communities and civil society as such. Information was turned into 
important power instruments and so the ruling elite deliberately restricted access to 
it as a means of guarding its own spheres of power and influence. Lack of 
alternative sources of information, combined with the closed and corrupt character 
of the political elites, eliminated the public scrutiny as a factor in decision-making 
process in Ukraine and rid the public of instruments of control over the authorities. 
Although the reforming of the military from communist to national force 
functioning within a democratic system of civil-military relations did not progress 
far enough, particularly in terms of military culture, nevertheless the Ukrainian 
authorities did undertake a meaningful attempt to bring the structures of military 
management closer to the democratic standard. In 1995 the civilian politician, 
Valeriy Shmarov arrived at the MOD in Ukraine and undertook an attempt to reform 
the ministry structures and introduce more civilians. Yet, the corporate resistance of 
the military was so forceful that the reform failed altogether, and the Shmarov's 
successor was again a military man, gen. Kuzmuk. But even when Sharov was still 
in office, there were merely three civilians that held important posts within the 
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97 MOD . Since than, the military 
has only strengthened their monopoly on defence 
expertise. 98 At the same time, the problems of deficient civilian cadres had a wider 
context than merely the Soviet military culture and mistrust of ignorant civilians: it 
reflects the degree of stateness problem in Ukraine visible in the lack of qualified 
cadres to run an independent state. 99 
If the security community in Poland and Ukraine were small and had an elite 
character, the same community in Ukraine was tiny and closed to outsiders and often 
was intricately tied to the president or the government. The most influential such 
institute, the National Institute for Strategic Studies, was based in Kiev and in fact 
represented a part of the presidential Council of National Security and Defence of 
Ukraine. 100 The institute published a series of surveys and an analytical brief, 
however their circulation was also restricted and due to the predominantly military 
character of the staff in the Institute, the publications had a rather conservative 
character and Soviet approach to defence policy. ' 01 Other institutes, such as the Kiev 
based Ukrainian Centre for International Security Studies, were less well connected 
to the ruling elite and so constantly suffered from under-funding. Thus, their ability 
9' Interview with Alexander A. Parfionov, Department of Foreign Relations, Ukrainian centre for 
International Security Studies, Kiev, August 1995. 
98 Interview with Rafal Seniuch, Warsaw, December 2000. 
99 Marc Nordberg, 'State and Institution Building in Ukraine', in Taras Kuzio (ed. ), Contemporary 
Ukraine. - Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation (New York and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 
43. 
100 Interview with, Alexander Manachinsky, National Institute for Strategic Studies, Kiev, Ukraine, 
October 1997. 
For example V. P. Kovalskiy, TiehnichieskaYa osnashchietinost'vooritýýiennjh. ýiI Ukraini. - ocienka 
i progno: ý (Technical Equipment qf the Armed Forces (? f Ukraine: Assessment and Forecast - in 
Russian), Series of Informational - Analytical Surveys, No. 7 (Kiev: National Institute of Strategic 
Studies, 1995). 
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to generate public discussion and alternative policy perspectives through 
publications and other academic activities was restricted by lack of funds. )02 
The debate on the military in Ukraine in fact acquired a public dimension 
only in one aspect, related to the military and its traditions. The discussion on the 
traditions and heritage of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was in fact part of the wider 
stateness debate in Ukraine. A relatively prominent role in this debate on tradition 
and policy-making was played by the historical institutes, and in particular by the 
History Department of the University of Lviv. The city was a capital of the 
nationally conscious Western Ukraine and the activities of the academics based at 
the University contributed significantly to the generation of the debate on Ukrainian 
identity as well as a reassessment of some of the commonly held views on it. 
In Lithuania, the identity debate was far less heated than in Ukraine and 
therefore the progress towards democratic management could be achieved more 
easily. On the level of official policy formulations, the documents underlined an 
attachment to democratic principles of civil-military relations: as the 'co-operation 
and mutual understanding between the Armed Forces and the rest of society has two 
1 103 main benefits: improved democracy and effective defence'. Yet, the reform of the 
defence system in Lithuania put the arrangements in place that clearly favoured the 
military over civilian experts. It was the Commander of the Armed Forces that 
became the chief advisor to the president and the minister of defence, and there is a 
very close systemic connection between the military staff and the presidential 
102 Nevertheless there were scattered attempts to generate public debate through publications. For 
example, S. Makeyev, O. Manachynský, E. Lysytsyn, H. Perepelytsya, O. Bodruk, V. Krotykov, 
V. Haleyev, S. Vlasov, V. Halynovsky, 'Does Ukraine Have a Military Elite? ', Political Thought - 
Llkrainian Political Science Journal No 1 (5), 1995. 
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administration that inhibits the development of serious civilian expertise on military 
and defence matters. Lithuania, similarly to Ukraine, had problems related to the 
lack of cadres to administer the state, and its determination to drive out the 
representatives of the former Soviet nomenclature from their positions only 
aggravated the problem. However, the Lithuanian authorities employed and quickly 
promoted very young people, both military and non-military, to managing positions 
in the MOD in order to avoid the employment of large numbers of Soviet experts. 
This policy resulted in a substantial degree of civilianisation of the Lithuanian 
MOD, yet at the same time the MOD featured a relatively low professional level of 
the cadres and frequent changes in management positions. ' 04 
But, the major problem of civil-military relations in Lithuania is the lack of 
public interest and support for the military. As Zaccor noted, the lack of public 
support may 'entrap an army in the vicious circle' where the army enjoys little 
popularity and so its budgets are slashed and best conscript exempt from service. 105 
In the second half of 1990s the popularity of the military somewhat increased, 
nevertheless it remained low. 106 For society at large the matters of national security 
simply remained insignificant. Even the unlawful nomination of a retired American 
colonel of Lithuanian origin and double citizenship to the post of the Commander of 
the Armed Forces did not a provoke public debate or outcry. 107 
Transparency is another problems. In the opinion of one of the Lithuanian 
civilian experts, the public debate could only be feasible if the government brought 
1' White Paper'99, p. 52. 
104 Interview with Tadeusz Olszafiski, Warsaw, August 1998. 
"" Zaccor, 'Problems in", p. 63. 
106 Interview with Bartas Trakymas, Vilnus, February 2000. 
"" Biuletyn O§rodka Studi6w Wschodnich, I July 1999, No 26, pp. 5-6. 
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it closer to the citizens and provided it with greater clarity and transparency. 'O' 
Public relations are officially managed by the Civilian Operations division in the 
Defence Staff and by the Information Centre in the MOD, the duties of which are to 
provide the public with information on defence and security policy, promote 
patriotic education and pursue activities bringing the military closer to the public. 
Paramilitary activities rather than academic institutions appear to be a 
defining characteristic of the Lithuanian society - military relations and a reservoir 
for the security community. This is yet a pre-war tradition, additionally strengthened 
by the strategic doctrine of total and unconditional defence, In 1999 the MOD 
established the State Resistance Training Centre, the purpose of which is to educate 
the civilians in civilian defence programmes and train for individual and organised 
resistance, Additionally, there are two active paramilitary youth associations, ýauliai 
and SKAK (Voluntary State Defence Service). Their statutory aims are the 
promotion of patriotic education and military training for civil defence. 
Among non-governmental institutions, the most active is the Joint Baltic 
American National Committee. It is based in the USA and pursues a number of 
activities aimed at the promotion of Lithuanian accession to NATO and education of 
the society in democratic civil - military relations, history and tradition. Finally, the 
debate on military issues is generated by the military journal KARYS, published 
regularly by the Lithuanian MOD. 
Summary. 
The establishment of the effective democratic management of the military 
and defence policy in post-communist states required that all the democratic 
"'8 Ronaldas Kacinskas. 'Lithuanian Public View on National Security in a Changing Environment', 
conference paper. unpublished, 1998, p. 7. 
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institutions and procedures created in the course of reforms fell into the right place. 
It also needed time for the internalisation of democratic norms and the fostering of 
the security community. Development of mechanisms for democratic management 
was the final stage of the democratic transformation of the post-communist relations 
and it was predictable that it would not be complete in any of the case countries. The 
countries, however, made a degree of transitions towards establishing proper 
mechanisms of management. But, while Poland and the Czech Republic 
achieved a measured progress toward creating mechanisms of democratic 
management, and so did Lithuanian though perhaps with less success, 
Ukraine failed to institutionalise any system of military and defence 
management, let alone a democratic one. 
The review of the situation in defence management in each of the 
couDtries exposed the weaknesses of other segments of the polity. The 
problems with delineating the responsibilities between the MODs and the 
General Staffs was a reflection of the more general problems of difficulties or 
inability to reach agreement on the distribution of power in the post- 
communist countries. The overpowerment of some of the advisory bodies 
stemmed from the incomplete legal system of regulations and the feeble rule 
of law. Finally the deficiency of parliamentary overseeing of the military was 
a function of internal weakness of the parliaments as an institution in the 
polities under transition and the generally insufficient transparency of defence 
and military policy. 
The need for the civilianisation of defence policy and education of civilian 
experts was verbally recognised everywhere in Central Eastern Europe, but the 
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policy was introduced reluctantly and did not advance enough to create a pool of 
civilian experts in defence anywhere in the case countries. Numbers of civilians in 
the MODs increases steadily, however beyond employment they are generally 
offered little in terms of educational opportunities compared to their civilian 
counterparts. The persistent distrust between the civilian and military employees 
combined with inferior conditions for employment of the civilian specialists 
contributed to the weak co-operation within the MOD institutions. As a result, none 
of the post-communist ministries became prepared for working within the structure 
of mixed, civilian-military teams. 
Finally, the weakness of autonomous civil society and relative detachment of 
defence reforms from other fields of transformation were behind the low public 
interest in civil-military transition and prevented the emergence of security 
communities. However, the greatest obstacle for the development of the democratic 
security community was lack of access to necessary information. Despite some 
progress in introducing transparency to policy planning, access to information 
remains the prerogative of the official authorities and therefore the budding security 
community in the post-communist countries remains dependent on the power- 




By adding stateness to the security and democracy framework, I have argued 
in this study that the stateness matrix can be used to explain differing civil-military 
outcomes in post-communist transitions to democracy. In sustaining this argument, 
this study of civil-military relations has achieved two major goals. First, by 
comparing the individual experience of the four post-communist countries studied 
on the basis of different types of civil-military relationship, it has identified the main 
differences in the processes of democratic transformation of civil-military relations. 
Secondly, it has isolated the key factor to explain, rather than merely compare, the 
diverging course of reforms and to account for the different models of civil-military 
relations that emerged there as a result of post-communist transformations. I have 
argued that this essential explanatory variable is 'stateness', which can be broadly 
understood as the quality of statehood and which determines the degree of 
democratisation and stability that can be achieved in the civil-military relationship in 
any individual case. The thesis stated that the outcome of civil-military 
transformations depends on the interaction of four imperatives in post-communist 
polities: statehood, military restructuring, the application of democratic rules and the 
establishment of mechanisms for effective democratic management, with the first 
being the most important. 
The argument advanced in the course of the study of post-communist civil- 
military relations was based on three assumptions outlined in the Chapter 1. First, it 
reiterated the necessity to define the state before one can make a successful move to 
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a consolidated democracy. Secondly, it underlined the inherent relationship between 
the transformation of civil-military relations in the post-communist countries and the 
democratisation of the overall political systems of those states. Thirdly, it was 
professed that on launching the transitions from communism to democracy, the four 
case countries appeared to be starting from similar positions, and operated under the 
same imperatives for successful reforms. This similarity stemmed from the specific 
character of the communist legacy, featuring a number of common traits shared by 
the countries of Central Eastern Europe, and from the identical goal of making the 
transition to democracy, declared by the post-communist incumbents. 
In addition, the years of totalitarian regime totally eradicated any pre- 
communist heritage that there might have been. Therefore, in the institutional sense 
there was no legacy of 'survivors' from the earlier historical periods that could 
differentiate the context of transitional opening in the case countries and help ease 
through the democratic transition. Drawing on those assumptions, and particularly 
keeping in mind the similarity of the legacy and goals of the post-communist 
reforms, it could have been justifiably expected that the civil-military 
transformations in Central Eastern Europe would take convergent trajectories. 
The results of the research disproved this assertion. The comparative study of 
the reforms undertaken in Poland, the Czech Republic, Ukraine and Lithuania 
demonstrated that the civil-military transformations carried out between 1989 and 
1999 brought widely varying results. The transformations did not differ merely in 
pace, but in the direction of fundamental reforms as well as in the degree of 
completeness of the transitions. Over the decade of democratic reforms, the four 
post-communist countries came to establish political systems the nature of which 
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ranged from an advanced consolidation of democracy to authoritarianism, and 
models of civil-military relations that were correspondingly assorted. 
This study has applied the comparative and explanatory framework offered 
by the stateness matrix to produce an integrated cross-country comparison of civil- 
military transitions. The initial assumption that post-communist reforms in each of 
the case countries were governed by the interaction of the concurrent imperatives 
identified has been corroborated. The study has demonstrated that while in each of 
the case countries the same reforms in military restructuring, rules and management 
were at least attempted in the course of civil-military transformations, their mode of 
implementation and final results were highly divergent. These differences are clearly 
visible in the process of military restructuring. The Czech Republic managed to 
carry out harsh de-communisation and radical de-politicisation of the military and to 
alter the structure of its national armed forces, bringing it closer to NATO standards 
without provoking major political upheavals, although undeniably with some 
negative effects to the cohesiveness and combat readiness of the forces. Lithuania 
and especially Poland experienced a number of serious setbacks in the course of 
building and rebuilding their national military. In the end, however, the political 
systems of the two countries became sufficiently consolidated to overcome the 
corporate resistance of the army and to continue with democratic restructuring. 
Ukraine provides an example of failed restructuring due to the resistance of the 
professional military which could not be overcome by the civilian politicians. 
Consequently, the Ukrainian General Staff gained sufficient position and enough 
political leverage to dictate the reform agenda and to bring restructuring to a halt. 
Each of the four case countries were under pressure to create a new 
framework of rules and procedures, from the making of constitutions, through the 
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appropriate laws down to the detailed regulations, procedures, statutes etc. for the 
working of military management institutions. The establishment of new rules was 
necessary to avoid praetorianisation of post-communist politics and to govern 
military and defence affairs in the changed political and security environment. 
However, within the decade of reforms, the four countries established four different 
political systems, from the parliamentary-cabinet system in the Czech Republic, 
through the hybrid presidential - parliamentary systems in Poland and Lithuania, to 
the extremely strong presidential system in Ukraine. The process of the 
redistribution of powers in the post-communist polities had a definitive impact on 
the outcome of the legal reforms in the military and defence sphere, and it 
determined the ultimate shape of the post-communist civil-military relations in the 
countries concerned. The problem of the division of executive prerogatives in the 
overseeing of the military was the major subject of contention in the course of legal 
reforms. In the Czech Republic, a consensus regarding the fundamental traits of the 
political system was achieved relatively easily, although not without some political 
rifts along the way. Lithuania experienced a serious political conflict regarding the 
positions of the president in the management and overseeing of the military, which 
delayed the establishment of a legal framework for the military and defence. In 
Poland and Ukraine, the agreement on the distribution of powers proved to be so 
difficult to achieve that both countries were forced to adopt interim constitutions 
before their political elites were able to work out a viable compromise. The 
prolonged uncertainty regarding the fundamental law had a detrimental effect on the 
democratic reforms of civil-military relations in the two countries and delayed or 
even precluded the institutionalisation of the policy-making process that was a 
necessary precondition for achieving democratic consolidation. 
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The insufficient institutionalisation of post-communist polities, weak 
mechanisms of democratic accountability and low levels of transparency in defence 
and military policy hindered the effectiveness of military management and inhibited 
completion of civil-military transformations even in the most advanced cases of 
Poland and the Czech Republic. The mechanisms of effective management represent 
the most sophisticated elements of democratic civil-military relations and as such, 
by definition, were the least developed ones in the post-communist countries. But, 
precisely because the effectiveness of democratic management was dependent on the 
degree of achieved democratisation of civil-military relations, after a decade of 
reforms the post-communist countries featured great differences in their instruments 
of democratic management. While Poland and the Czech Republic achieved a 
sufficient degree of efficiency in their management of military and defence policy to 
become NATO members, Lithuania still had to develop and improve its democratic 
instruments of defence planning and military control, whereas Ukraine largely 
preserved the Soviet model of management, with such defining features as the 
strong prevalence of military expertise in strategic planning and defence matters and 
the tendency on the part of civilian authorities to let the professional soldiers run the 
affairs of the army autonomously. 
Stateness emerges as the most significant factor. While stateness is not an 
independent causal factor in the course of democratic civil-military transformation, 
it plays a crucial role in determining the ultimate outcome of reforms. Depending on 
the individual country's circumstances, the condition of stateness may be either 
conducive to the process of democratic consolidation. or detrimental to it. In this 
respect, Poland and Ukraine represented two borderline examples, one the 
established nation-state and the other with only certain of the prerequisites to be a 
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nation-state. However, the research on post-communist polities and civil-military 
transformations proved that the relevance of the stateness concept was not limited to 
the cases of the newly established or re-established states. The imperatives of the 
processes of democratic transition and consolidation forced every single post- 
communist state to redefine the concepts of the nation, the state, citizenship, 
institutions etc. even if the actual letter of the law regulating them had not changed. 
Thus, even though Poland was in a fortunate situation of being an established 
nation-state with a near complete congruity of the polity and the demos, nevertheless 
it experienced tremendous difficulties in establishing democratic institutions of the 
state. Moreover, the political and military traditions of pre-war statehood, as well as 
traditionally high levels of contention in Polish politics played more than a small 
part in it. In the case of the Czech Republic, the separation from Slovakia meant that 
it was necessary to redefine the identity of the state and to determine foreign policy 
and security interests anew, even though the break up did not provoke political 
upheavals. Despite the long-standing democratic traditions of the Czech Republic, 
the process of improving Czech stateness turned out to be long and difficult. Striving 
to consolidate the nation-state and establish it on the international arena, the Czech 
authorities went as far as to tolerate administrative discrimination of the undesirable 
minority of Roma people. They carried out the de-communisation processes in a 
manner highly disruptive to the cohesiveness and combat readiness of the armed 
forces, and committed a number of mistakes in the foreign and defence policy of the 
Czech Republic. These two examples, of Poland and the Czech Republic, 
demonstrate that the relevance of the stateness matrix is not limited to the post- 
Soviet states. 
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Stateness problems are, however, infinitely more acute in the case of post- 
Soviet states. The major difference lies in the tradition of statehood and the 
experience of modern government of the state that made up the 'usable past' for the 
non-Soviet post-communist countries, whereas such tradition was scarce or non- 
existent in the case of the countries that were formed in the aftermath of the break- 
up of the Soviet Union. The newly established states were confronted with the 
problems of a legal and institutional vacuum, territorial and minority problems, 
deficient legitimacy, amorphous national identity, and an uncertain position on the 
international arena. The overcoming of the stateness crisis became a task of the 
highest priority. The authorities in the post-Soviet entities had to define the formula 
for their states before they were able to move on to democratic refonus. 
Consequently, stateness was responsible for changing the agenda for transitional 
reforms: whereas initially it was believed that democratic reforms could be carried 
out simultaneously with the strengthening of the post-Soviet states, it soon became 
clear that the logic of the nation-building, state-building and democratic 
consolidation processes were not always convergent. The corollary of the stateness 
crisis in the post-Soviet states was the necessary inclusion of the nation-building and 
state-building tasks on the agenda for reforms, often to the detriment of democratic 
changes in the political systems, and consequently to the detriment of civil-military 
transformations. In this process, the states drew on the available traditions, symbols 
and institutions from the past and the degree of their availability was the factor 
conditioning the nation- and state-building processes in the respective countries. The 
armed forces, being a standard characteristic of sovereignty, were one of the 
institutions most commonly used in the course of state-building in the post-Soviet 
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countries. That, too, inhibited the swift creation of a national military and 
democratic civilian control over it. 
In the case of Lithuania, the presence of a strong national identity and a 
relatively long tradition of statehood alleviated stateness problems. All the same, on 
emerging from the Soviet amalgam, the authorities of the newly independent 
Lithuania faced the need to establish the country as a viable nation-state both in term 
of constructing an internal legal and political system and securing the state's position 
in the international arena. In doing so, the post-communist incumbents chose to 
define the identity of the new state through a thorough eradication of Soviet heritage 
and by drawing on the legacy of pre-war Lithuanian statehood. The pre-war 
statehood gave the post-Soviet Lithuania the identity, the legitimacy, and the sense 
of direction in the process of state-building. At the same time, however, it 
introduced certain features to the Lithuania polity that were taken from pre-war 
authoritarian politics and were not compatible with democratic consolidation. 
Among them there was a tendency towards a narrow idea of nationalism, leading to 
an exclusion of minorities from political life, a hostile attitude to neighbouring 
countries, particularly Poland and Russia, a refusal to revise the historical past and 
the wartime relation of the Lithuanians to the Jewish minority, and finally, support 
for the political and paramilitary movements that questioned the principles of 
democracy, but whose traditions extended to the pre-war period. These features, 
however, characterised the early phase of the post-communist state-building in 
Lithuania. Despite the few problems that had not been resolved, such as territorial 
issues or position of the Russian community, Lithuania successfully consolidated the 
state and therefore could embark on and make substantial progress on the way to 
consolidated democracy. The Lithuania national armed forces that had been created 
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from scratch also moved from fulfilling mainly a symbolic role in the process of 
state-building to being treated as a small but real instrument of state defence. In 
addition, although in the process of the creation of Lithuanian armed forces the 
formal side - declarations, laws, regulations, white papers - often prevailed over 
substance, nevertheless by 1999 Lithuania was well on the way to building 
democratic civil-military relations, 
In contrast to Lithuania, Ukraine failed to consolidate the state despite some 
progress made towards this end, and so in the conditions of a persistent stateness 
problem the establishment of a democratic political system proved impossible. 
Although the nation and citizenship formulae adopted in the post-communist 
constitution and laws were sufficiently inclusive and did not breach the principles of 
democracy, the identity discourse remained essentially unsettled in Ukraine, making 
the nation-building and state-building tasks continually relevant to the political 
reforms. The choosing of the army as a vehicle for the nation- and state-building in 
Ukraine did little to improve the overall political situation, but had a negative impact 
on the restructuring processes in the armed forces. The national military tradition 
was in itself uncertain in Ukraine and applying it mechanically to the Soviet force, 
which the so-called 'national' army had been through the first years of the 1990s, 
was doomed to fail. As a result, the efforts to make the army a symbol of the 
sovereign state contributed to the politicisation of ethnic issues inside the anned 
forces and to a degree of engagement by the military in politics, while at the same 
time it led to a stalling of the restructuring processes and preservation of Soviet traits 
in the Ukrainian army. Undcr such circumstances, the emergence of anything 
resembling democratic civil-military relations is not possible in the foreseeable 
future. 
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This study has demonstrated the utility of the stateness matrix for 
comparison and explanation of post-communist civil-military relations. While the 
cases selected have enabled this theoretical model to be tested, the model itself has 
allowed comparison of democratic reforms of civil-military relations in selected 
post-communist countries of Central Eastern Europe. Of the four elements within 
the stateness matrix, it is stateness itself that is the decisive one. Stateness can 
explain the differing outcomes of the post-communist reforms in the individual 
states, and depending on circumstances, it can have either a beneficial or a harmful 
impact on the overall democratisation process. The overcoming of stateness 
problems is not in itself a guarantee of the successful democratisation of civil- 
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